Essays on Private Equity by Vinten, Frederik Christian
ISSN 0906-6934
ISBN 978-87-593-8346-9
Essays o
n
 Private Eq
u
ity
Essays on Private Equity
Frederik Christian 
Vinten
PhD Series 1.2008
PhD School in Economics and Business 
Administration
CBS / Copenhagen Business School
CBS PhD omslag A4 nr. 1 Frederik Vinten - Engelsk udgave.indd   1 23/01/08   14:38:58
Essays on Private Equity

Frederik Christian Vinten
Essays on Private Equity 
CBS / Copenhagen Business School
PhD School in Economics and Business Administration
PhD Series 01.2008
Frederik Christian Vinten
Essays on Private Equity 
1. edition 2008
PhD Series 1.2008
© The Author 
ISBN: 978-87-593-8346-9
ISSN: 0906-6934
Distributed by: 
Samfundslitteratur Publishers 
Rosenørns Allé 9 
DK-1970 Frederiksberg C 
Tlf.: +45 38 15 38 80 
Fax: +45 35 35 78 22 
forlagetsl@sl.cbs.dk 
www.samfundslitteratur.dk 
All rights reserved.
No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, 
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information 
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
1 
CONTENTS 
 
PREFACE 3 
INTRODUCTION 5 
Perspectives 8 
SUMMARY 10 
English summary 10 
Essay 1: The Performance of Private Equity Buyout Fund Owned Firms 10 
Essay 2: Delistings in Europe and the Costs of Governance 11 
Essay 3: Equity Market Timing and the Decision to Delist 13 
Dansk Resumé 14 
Essay 1: Performance i kapitalfond-ejede virksomheder 14 
Essay 2: Børsafnoteringer i Europa og omkostningen ved Corporate Governance 16 
Essay 3: Aktiemarkeds-timing og beslutningen om børsafnotering 17 
REFERENCES 20 
THE PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY BUYOUT FUND OWNED FIRMS 24 
1. Introduction 25 
2. Data 31 
2.1. Sample selection 31 
2.2. Descriptive statistics 35 
2.2.1. Pre-buyout Firm Characteristics 35 
2.2.2. Post-buyout Firm Characteristics 38 
3. Empirical Strategy 41 
3.1. Empirical specifications 41 
3.2. Hypotheses 43 
3.2.1 The Ownership hypothesis 44 
3.2.2. The Debt hypothesis 47 
3.2.3. Stakeholder Expropriation hypothesis 49 
4. Results 51 
4.1. The performance impact of PE fund ownership 51 
4.2. Goodwill-adjusted performance effects 55 
4.3. Robustness checks 57 
4.3.1. Control groups 57 
4.3.2. Firm size 58 
4.4. Hypotheses testing 59 
4.4.1. The Ownership hypothesis 59 
4.4.2. The Debt hypothesis 63 
4.4.3. Stakeholder Expropriation hypothesis 66 
4.5. Alternative explanations 68 
4.5.1. Selection bias 68 
4.5.2. Valuation bias 69 
 2
4.5.3. Measurement errors 71 
5. Discussion 74 
Appendix 78 
References 80 
DELISTINGS IN EUROPE AND THE COSTS OF GOVERNANCE 85 
1. Introduction 86 
2. Theory 89 
2.1. Political determinants of delisting 92 
2.2. Determinants of going private transactions 95 
2.3. Determinants of M&A 97 
2.4. Determinants of Bankruptcy and liquidation 98 
3.  The data 98 
3.1. Data sources 98 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 104 
4. Results 113 
4.1. Overall delistings 113 
4.2. Analysis of going private transactions 116 
4.3. Endogenous politics 120 
5. Discussion 127 
References 130 
EQUITY MARKET TIMING AND THE DECISION TO DELIST 137 
1. Introduction 138 
2. Related literature 140 
2.1. Mergers and Acquisitions 140 
2.2. Going private transactions 143 
3.  The data 145 
3.1. Data sources 145 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 148 
4. Results 153 
4.1. Market timing, market valuation and its impact on delistings 153 
4.2. Interactions with industry and size 158 
4.3. The timing ability of M&A vs. going private investors 162 
5. Discussion 163 
References 166 
 3
Preface 
 
This thesis ‘Essays on Private Equity’ marks the final end of my Ph.D. studies in 
Economics at Copenhagen Business School (CBS). The thesis consists of three 
empirical studies on the private equity market and the studies are self-contained such 
that each of the three essays in the thesis can be read independently.  
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank family, friends and colleagues for support 
and encouragement throughout the project. The three essays have benefited greatly 
from comments and suggestions from a number of persons and they are mentioned in 
each essay, but a few deserve more than a general word of thanks. 
 
First of all, I am indebted to my supervisor Morten Bennedsen for his invaluable 
guidance and help throughout my years as a Ph.D. student. Furthermore, I thank my 
colleagues at Department of Economics and Centre for Economic and Business 
Research (CEBR) at CBS for contributing to an inspiring and stimulating research 
environment. In particular, I thank Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Christian Scheuer, Esben 
Anton Schultz and Steen Thomsen for many helpful comments, discussions and 
suggestions and laughs. I also wish to thank the Polaris Private Equity team for 
providing me with a good insight on the private equity industry, together with many 
good discussions and useful suggestions.  
 
During my studies I had the opportunity to spend a great half year at Department of 
Finance, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University. I am especially 
grateful to Daniel Wolfenzon for making the stay possible. I also thank Oticon Fonden, 
Rudolph Als Fondet, Nordea Fonden and Morten Bennedsen for sponsoring part of my 
stay in New York. 
 
Throughout my Ph.D. studies I have found presenting my work at workshops and 
conferences together with participating in Ph.D. courses to be extremely rewarding. I 
would like to thank the Department of Economics, CBS, for making this financially 
possible. I have also enjoyed my teaching activities at CBS and thank Lisbeth la Cour, 
 4
Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Jan Rose Skaksen for providing me with good 
premises in preparation for the classes. 
 
Last but not least, I am indebted to my parents, Gurli and Jørgen, for their continued 
support and help.  
 
 
Frederik Christian Vinten 
Copenhagen, November, 2007 
 5
Introduction 
 
There has been a wave of private equity (PE) investments the recent years. Both USA 
and Europe has experienced increases in number and volume of going private 
transactions and in the related PE fund buyouts1 – as a joint term these are called PE 
transactions in this section. To illustrate this, my own calculation suggests that around 
30% of all listed European firms have been delisted during 1995-2005 and about 40% 
of these have been going private transactions. Note that several PE industry statistics 
are published, however, the numbers varies substantially and it is difficult to assess 
which is the better. Statistics from the European Private Equity & Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA) reports that the capital committed to private equity investments in 
Europe surged to €145 billions in 2006 compared to €46 billions in 1997.2 Other 
numbers illustrate that the value of PE deals have so far in 2007 accounted for almost 
30% of all takeover deals worldwide.3 EVCA also document that European buyout 
investments accounted for 0.1% of GDP in 2001 while increased to 0.5% in 2006.  
 
Since the PE market accounts for a larger fraction of the total economy the 
understanding of this market is without doubt important. Naturally, it raises the 
question - what can explain the recent wave of PE transactions? Among several 
suggestions this thesis focuses on examining three explanations related to the weakness 
of public-equity markets. Firstly, the main argument is that PE transactions improve 
firm efficiency since value destroyed (especially in public firms) by agency problems 
are captured by this new owner. This argument relates to several theoretical studies 
have investigated the benefits of a concentrated ownership (e.g. Coase, 1937; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986a, 
1986b, 1989a; Aghion and Bolton, 1992). The ownership model implemented by e.g. 
buyout funds has hence been claimed to be superior (also known as the “Jensen 
hypothesis”). It would imply that more PE transactions eventually lead to better 
governed companies due to fewer firm-level principal-agent problems. The first essay 
investigates whether firm efficiency improves in these firms. 
                                                 
1 Source: Thomson Financial. 
2 Source: www.evca.com.  
3 Source: Thomson Financial. 
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Secondly, it has been claimed that the PE buyout activity has been a response to 
corporate governance regulation. Even though corporate governance regulation should 
improve markets there has actually been a global wave of delistings simultaneously 
with several regulatory initiatives, for example the Sarbanes-Oxley act (USA, 2002), 
the Higgs report (United Kingdom, 2003) and the Nørby committee (Denmark, 2001). 
These initiatives were likely prompted by a number of large corporate scandals such as 
Enron (2001), WorldCom (2002) and Parmalat (2003). Obviously, the aim of this 
regulation has been to improve market conditions and transparency. Thus, corporate 
governance regulation potentially erodes several market governance problems it may 
however also introduce different disadvantages (e.g. Pagano and Volpin, 2001, 2005a, 
2005b; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Perotti and von Thadden, 2006; Roe, 2006). 
Particularly publicly-traded firms would be affected by this. If the costs of investor 
protection, which is the main legal approach to corporate governance (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), outweigh the benefits it may influence listed companies to go private. 
Thus, increased regulation could have triggered the recent going private wave. This is 
investigated in the second essay. 
 
It could also be that going private transactions are spurred by stock market valuations. 
In line with this the behavioural view from the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
literature argue that inefficient markets lead to misvaluations, i.e. deviations between 
market and fundamental values of firms, and these misvaluations may drive delistings. 
In the existing literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Ang and Chen, 2007) it is commonly 
held that overvaluation drives M&A. However, it is not clear whether market 
misvaluations justify the latter wave of going private transactions (e.g. PE fund 
buyouts). This is analyzed in essay three. Remark, that our studies (essay 2 and 3) are 
the first comprehensive studies of delistings in Europe. 
 
The present thesis contains three essays and examines whether these three explanations 
constitute evidence for the current wave of PE transactions by testing the superior 
governance model of PE buyout fund owned firms, and also investigates whether 
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corporate governance regulation or market valuation errors explains the latter wave of 
going private transactions. In the first essay ‘The Performance of Private Equity Buyout 
Fund Owned Firms’ it is tested whether the superior governance could contribute to 
changes in firm performance. Specifically, using Danish data 1991-2004 it is tested 
whether PE buyout fund ownership through their governance model in so-called 
portfolio firms increases firm efficiency. The somewhat surprising finding is that PE 
buyout fund ownership is associated with lower firm performance relatively to 
comparable firms, and thereby the superiority of the PE buyout fund governance model 
is not present in this data. Hence, no measurable gains on firm performance from 
elimination of principal-agent problems are found. However, other studies from the 
USA and U.K. has previously found support for this governance model (e.g. Kaplan, 
1989a; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990; 
Wright et al., 1992; Wright et al., 1997; Harris et al., 2005; Cao and Lerner, 2006; 
Cressy et al., 2007).  
 
Essay two ‘Delistings in Europe and the Costs of Governance’ (co-authored with Steen 
Thomsen) examines whether going private transactions are caused by corporate 
governance regulation. Using European data from 1996-2004 it is documented that 
stronger investor protection regulation (the investor protection index constructed by La 
Porta et al. (1998) and updated by Pagano and Volpin (2005b)) leads to a higher 
delisting frequency both by M&A (corporate acquirers) and going private transactions 
(e.g. PE fund buyouts, incumbent management buyouts etc.). This result continues to 
hold when we take into consideration that investor protection policy may be 
endogenous. Conversely, we found that better general legal infrastructure (index 
constructed by the World Bank, Kaufman et al. (2005, 2006)) is associated with lower 
going private rates. This study somewhat supports related findings from the USA since 
they find that the Sarbanes-Oxley act has lead more firms to deregister (Block, 2004; 
Engel et al., 2005; Marosi and Massoud, 2005; Kamar et al., 2006). Hence, this study 
indicates that stronger investor protection could explain the latter delisting wave. 
Indicating that investor protection is not only beneficial, it may come with a cost as 
well.    
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In the third essay ‘Equity Market Timing and the Decision to Delist’ (co-authored with 
Steen Thomsen) we examine whether the delisting decision is influenced by firm value 
fluctuations using European data from 1996-2004. Previous research has shown that 
M&A occur more often when market valuations (and industry market valuations) are 
high. This is paradoxical since it implies that companies are more likely to engage in 
M&A when it is most expensive. When market valuations are high it may be a sign of 
market misvaluations. In accordance with prior research (e.g. Maksimovic and Phillips, 
2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf 
et al., 2005; Ang and Chen, 2007) we find that delistings by M&A are more likely 
when industry market-to-book values are high. On the other hand, we find no effect of 
industry market-to-book values on going private transactions. It seems like private non-
corporate buyers are less sensitive to valuation errors as are corporate buyers. This is 
the first study to demonstrate that going private transactions appear to be driven by 
causal mechanisms different from those determining M&A. There are several possible 
explanations for these differences. One is that acquiring listed companies find it easier 
to finance acquisitions when market values are high while private non-corporate buyers 
are less sensitive to fluctuations in market valuations because they are not listed. Or that 
going private investors are better at evaluating real firm value. The data also suggest 
that M&A are more likely to take place in bull years (where stock prices are high) 
while going private transactions are relatively more likely in bear years (where stock 
prices are low). 
Perspectives 
 
The present thesis investigates some potential weaknesses of the public equity market. 
In the late 1980s Jensen (1989b) claimed that the public company had outlived its 
usefulness and the emergence of PE buyout fund ownership was and is a response to 
this. Different theoretical arguments and empirical findings support that PE buyout 
fund ownership is an efficient ownership form. However, using Danish data my results 
contradict the majority of related studies since no evidence of superiority of PE buyout 
fund ownership is found. This indicates that the private firm (or more specific PE 
buyout fund ownership) is not necessarily organizationally superior to the public firm. 
Different arguments could explain the mixed empirical results from the literature. For 
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instance the PE buyout markets may vary at the country level due to countries being at 
different saturation. The PE buyout market took off in the 1980s in U.S., then it moved 
to Europe and lately the Asian PE buyout market has emerged. Thus the PE buyout 
market in the U.S. is presumably more mature compared to for instance the Danish 
market. Furthermore, countries have different structural settings. Some countries have 
traditionally many family owned businesses (concentrated ownership structure) such as 
Denmark and other continental European countries (e.g. Faccio and Lang, 2002), 
whereas the U.S. has relatively few family firms (dispersed ownership structure). These 
differences could have implications for how successful the PE buyout fund ownership 
model is. 
Gains from operational improvements at the portfolio firm level are not the only way 
PE buyout funds could generate large returns for their own investors. If they are good 
merchants it should be possible to obtain large returns from the timing of entry and exit 
in portfolio firms. According to our study at least private investors (including PE 
buyout funds) are less sensitive to market valuation errors and these investors seems to 
time their investments better. However, these returns could be squeezed by the 
immense activity at the market for corporate deals since it put an upward pressure on 
firm prices. This might well apply in the current situation. Finally, the buyout activity 
has been highly correlated with the current credit bubble. However, interest rates have 
lately been increasing which could dampen the future buyout market.  
 
Another caveat with the public equity market is that regulation is needed to protect 
minority investors. The lessons learned from earlier corporate scandals lead to a wave 
of new governance rules and standards. It has been argued that regulation comes with 
costs as well as benefits and our study indicates that regulation has gone too far. We are 
not able to calculate the exact costs of corporate governance but a related study from 
the U.S. shows that the average listing costs of a large company has increased by 
approximately 50% due to the Sarbanes-Oxley act (Zhang, 2005). Again there are 
country differences in the institutional settings meaning that ‘one size does not fit all’. 
The design of a country’s corporate governance rules and standards should be carefully 
determined and not directly copied from otherwise similar countries.  
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Even though disadvantages of public equity markets have attracted much attention they 
also confer several advantages. The advantages of being listed are numerous - external 
financing, reputation motives etc. A stock exchange also maintains a relatively 
transparent market place which is attractive for most companies. Initial public offerings 
(IPOs) may also be the optimal way for PE buyout funds to exit the portfolio firms 
especially when the current credit market situation is taking into consideration. Thereby 
PE buyout funds feed the public equity market with IPOs. Curiously several buyout 
funds are also currently going public – so PE buyout funds which allegedly originated 
from the weakness of public equity markets are now themselves becoming part of the 
public equity market, also suggesting that the benefits of being listed might outweigh 
the costs for firms with special needs.  
 
Summary 
English summary 
Essay 1: The Performance of Private Equity Buyout Fund Owned Firms 
 
Over the last thirty years PE buyout funds have become responsible for a larger and 
increasing quantity of investments in the global economy. Although it has been claimed 
that this new type of owner generates economic efficiency through superior governance 
(e.g. Jensen, 1986a, 1989a, 2007; Jensen et al., 2006) few studies test this claim. The 
purpose of this paper is on assessing the superiority of the PE buyout fund governance 
model. 
 
Hence, this paper addresses the issues of how PE buyout fund ownership affects post-
buyout firm performance (portfolio firms) and whether the claimed superior 
governance model is able to explain the empirical findings. The governance model is 
tested by assessing associations between changes in ownership structure and/or changes 
in debt structure affect firm performance. It is also tested whether stakeholder 
expropriation is present in data by assessing the dividend policy and layoffs. These 
three approaches are denoted the ownership, debt and the stakeholder expropriation 
hypotheses’ respectively (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986a, 1986b, 1989a; 
Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Renneboog and Simons, 2005).  
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The analysis is performed on a dataset of 73 buyouts which took place in Denmark 
during 1991-2004 which are matched on the basis of ownership change, industry and 
size with a control group of 545 firms. The data cover firm level financial information 
from Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau (KOB). Surprisingly the main finding is 
that post-buyout performance of portfolio firms falls. In addition, it is found: 1) that 
performance was improved through better monitoring of management possibly 
resulting from less separation of ownership and control (the ownership effect). 
However, the data show a post-buyout fall in ownership concentration which could 
explain the lower performance; 2) On the contrary, little evidence is found of that debt 
monitoring improves firm performance (the debt effect). However, it does seem like 
debt with shorter maturity have a positive monitoring effect; 3) the dividend policy 
within portfolio firms is much more favourable and sensitive compared to the 
benchmark firms, i.e. pay out higher dividends. This result suggests that owners behave 
in an opportunistic manner which arguably could be costly for other stakeholders and 
the portfolio firm in the long term (the expropriation effect). However there is not 
found evidence of layoffs. Overall, the predicted effects of the superior governance 
model of PE buyout fund ownership do not seem to appear in the data.  
 
One explanation of this finding could be that the vast majority of these deals have been 
private-to-private transactions where the benefits of PE fund ownership are supposedly 
less. Therefore Denmark illustrates a common feature of continental European 
countries, i.e. the presence of many closely-held private companies where benefits of 
the PE fund ownership model are less clear.  
 
Essay 2: Delistings in Europe and the Costs of Governance  
(Co-authored with Steen Thomsen) 
 
In this paper we examine whether the increase in recent years delistings is attributed to 
increasing governance costs for listed companies. For example, if new corporate 
governance regulation – e.g. investor protection or codes – increase bureaucracy and 
transaction costs without adding sufficient value to minority investors – it may be 
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profitable to take companies private or to merge them to spread the fixed costs of 
governance over a greater volume (e.g. Pagano and Volpin, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003; Perotti and von Thadden, 2006; Roe, 2006). This we would call the 
overregulation hypothesis. In contrast if the costs of corporate governance regulation 
are exceeded by increasing efficiency of listed companies, less expropriation of 
minority investors and greater transparency, companies and their owners will find it 
more attractive to remain listed. This we think of as the efficiency hypothesis. 
 
Using data from Thomson Financial/Worldscope on all listed firms in Europe within 
1995-2005 we find that better protection of minority investors (index constructed by La 
Porta et al. (1998) and updated by Pagano and Volpin (2005b)) appears to lead to more 
going private transactions. We call this measure investor protection regulation. The 
adoption of corporate governance codes also appears to lead to more going private 
transactions. This is consistent with the overregulation hypothesis. We did find some 
indication that better general legal infrastructure (as measured by the World Bank 
governance index, Kaufman et al. (2005, 2006)) was associated with fewer going 
private transactions, which tends to support the efficient regulation hypothesis.  
 
It has been emphasized that corporate governance policy may be endogenously 
determined (e.g. Pagano and Volpin, 2001, 2005b; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Perotti 
and von Thadden, 2006; Roe, 2006). This implies that statistical estimates of the effects 
of these policies need to take into consideration how the policies are determined. One 
way to solve this is to apply economic instruments which influence investor protection 
without possibly also influencing the going private decision. However, it is difficult to 
identify proper economic instruments.  Nevertheless our best estimates using the legal 
system, voting system and unionization as instruments indicate that investor protection 
regulation tends to increase the frequency of going private transactions.   
 
Obviously, we cannot deduce from this that protecting minority investors is harmful. It 
may be that gains in investor confidence are well worth the costs of some delisted 
companies. But our findings do indicate that there are costs as well as benefits to 
corporate governance regulation, and one of the costs is that lower private benefits of 
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control and more formalized corporate governance practices will lead some companies 
to delist. While some regulation is necessary and beneficial to stock market 
development, there may also be limits to regulation, for example how much minority 
investors should be protected in a zero sum game with other interest groups such as 
large shareholders, employees or creditors.  
 
Essay 3: Equity Market Timing and the Decision to Delist  
(Co-authored with Steen Thomsen) 
 
Both in the USA and in Europe there has been an increase in delistings in recent years. 
From 1995 to 2005 we found that 30% of the population of listed European firms were 
delisted for one reason or another. In this paper we have examined the impact of stock 
market valuations on M&A (corporate takeovers) and going private transactions (e.g. 
PE fund buyouts, incumbent management buyouts etc.) on European stock exchanges 
over the period 1996-2004. We use firm and market level data from Thomson 
Financial/Worldscope on all listed firms in Europe within the mentioned period (same 
data as in essay 2). In accordance with previous research we have found that M&A tend 
to be pro-cyclical in the sense that they occur more often when industry market 
valuations (q values) are high (e.g. Nelson, 1959; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 
2005; Ang and Chen, 2007). We also show that this is not the case for going private 
transactions. Note, that high (or low) stock market valuations are also in the existing 
literature interpreted as market misvaluations (valuation deviates from fundamental 
values). Additionally, we find that M&A are more likely to take place in bull years, 
while going private transactions are relatively more likely in bear years. Furthermore, 
as expected, we found no significant industry q effect in the relatively transparent 
financial industries and or in large firms, where misvaluations should be minor, while 
the industry q effect was significant in the more transparent industries with low R&D 
intensities. Apparently, going private transactions and M&A are driven by different 
causal mechanisms. Hence M&A seems to be partly driven by misvaluations whereas 
going private transactions are not. 
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There are several possible explanations for these differences. One is that acquiring 
listed companies find it easier to finance acquisitions when market values are high 
while private non-corporate buyers are less sensitive to fluctuations in market 
valuations because they are not listed (can not use own stocks as payment). It could 
also be that going private investors (e.g. buyout funds, incumbent management etc.) are 
better at evaluating the real value of firms (Jensen, 2007). Finally, high stock prices 
may make both investors and acquiring companies more optimistic concerning the 
future business outlook which could make it more attractive to invest.  
 
It is not self evident that buying cheap is equivalent to investing smart. Even if private 
buyers were smarter investors than companies during the boom and bust years around 
the millennium, some of this may be attributable to luck since private equity funds 
“happened” to emerge in time to profit from the bear market in 2001-2003. 
Alternatively, private buyers may be more focused on value creation since they 
represents more concentrated ownership and other governance characteristics. 
Moreover, private buyers may be less concerned about pre-empting competitors in 
bidding for acquisition targets. They can afford to participate only if they believe that 
the individual transaction will create value without taking into consideration 
repercussions on incumbent businesses.  
 
Dansk Resumé 
Essay 1: Performance i kapitalfond-ejede virksomheder  
 
Kapitalfonde er i de senere år kommet til at udgøre en stadig større og stigende andel af 
investeringer i den globale økonomi. På trods af at det hævdes at denne ’nye’ ejer 
skaber økonomisk efficiens igennem såkaldt ’overlegen’ eller ’uovertruffen’ 
governance (f.eks. Jensen, 1986a, 1989a, 2007; Jensen et al., 2006) har få studier 
undersøgt denne påstand. Formålet med dette studium er derfor at teste hvorvidt 
kapitalfondes governance model rent faktisk er ’overlegen’ eller ’uovertruffen’ og 
derved gunstig for de overtagne virksomheder. 
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Denne essay fokuserer således på hvorledes kapitalfond-ejerskab påvirker overtagne 
virksomheders performance efter opkøbet, og endvidere om hvorvidt den hævdede 
’overlegne’ governance model er i stand til at forklare de fundne empiriske resultater. 
Governance modellen testes via hvorvidt ændringer i ejer- og/eller kapitalstrukturen 
påvirker virksomhedens performance. Desuden undersøges det om 
dividendeudbetalingerne eller antallet af afskedigelser påvirkes af dette ejerskab. Dette 
er interessant pga. der er mulighed for at kapitalfonde eksproprierer virksomheders 
interessenter (stakeholders). Således repræsenterer disse tre tilgange hhv. ejerskabs, 
gælds og eksproprierings hypoteserne (f.eks. Grossman og Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986a, 
1986b, 1989a; Shleifer og Summers, 1988; Aghion og Bolton, 1992; Renneboog og 
Simons, 2005). 
 
I analysen anvendes et datasæt bestående af 73 danske opkøb (betegnes portefølje 
virksomheder) i perioden 1991-2004, samt 545 kontrolvirksomheder som er matchet 
mht. ejerskabsændring, branche og størrelse. Datasættet fra Købmandsstandens 
Oplysningsbureau (KOB) indeholder virksomheders regnskabsdata. Det findes (måske) 
overraskende at kapitalfond-ejede virksomheder har en lavere performance efter 
opkøbet relativt til kontrol virksomhederne. Desuden findes: 1) at mindre adskillelse 
imellem ejerskabet og kontrol og således en forventet bedre monitorering af ledelsen 
forbedrer performance (ejerskabs effekten). Dertil findes at ejerskabskoncentrationen 
falder efter opkøbet, hvilket derved kan være med til at forklare den lavere 
performance; 2) Tilgengæld finder jeg begrænset belæg for at gælds-monitorering 
forbedrer virksomheders performance (gælds effekten). Undersøgelsen indikerer dog at 
gæld med kortere varighed har en positiv monitorerings effekt; 3) portefølje 
virksomhedernes dividendeudbetalinger er langt mere favorable og sensitive 
sammenlignet med kontrolvirksomhederne, dvs. dividende udbetalingerne stiger. Dette 
resultat antyder at ejerne har en opportunistisk adfærd som kan være omkostningsfuld 
for andre interessenter/interessegrupper i virksomheden, samt for portefølje 
virksomhederne på længere sigt (eksproprierings effekten). Dog findes der ikke bevis 
for at der efterfølgende gennemsnitligt finder afskedigelser sted.  Overordnet ser det 
ikke ud til at effekter fra denne ’overlegne’ governance model findes i det anvendte 
data. 
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En forklaring kunne være at størstedelen af disse handler har været transaktioner af 
allerede privatejede virksomheder, hvor gevinsterne af kapitalfondejerskab formentligt 
er mindre. Derfor illustrerer Danmark et almindeligt karakteristika ved kontinental 
Europæiske lande, dvs. mange virksomheder med koncentreret ejerskab hvor 
gevinsterne af kapitalfondejerskab er mindre tydelige.  
 
Essay 2: Børsafnoteringer i Europa og omkostningen ved Corporate Governance 
 (i samarbejde med Steen Thomsen) 
 
I dette studie undersøges hvorvidt stigningen i antallet af afnoteringer fra børser de 
seneste år kan tilskrives de øgede governance omkostninger for børsnoterede 
virksomheder. Hvis nye corporate governance initiativer (investor beskyttelse) f.eks. 
øger bureaukrati og transaktionsomkostninger uden samtidigt at tilføje tilstrækkelig 
værdi for minoritetsaktionærerne – kan det være gunstigt at afnotere eller fusionere 
virksomheder, for at sprede den faste omkostning af governance (f.eks. Pagano og 
Volpin, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; Rajan og Zingales, 2003; Perotti og von Thadden, 2006; 
Roe, 2006). Dette kalder vi overregulerings-hypotesen. Omvendt hvis omkostningerne 
ved corporate governance regulering overstiges af øget efficiens af noterede 
virksomheder, mindre ekspropriering af minoritetsaktionærer og større transparens, vil 
virksomheden og deres respektive ejere finde det mere attraktivt at være noterede. Dette 
kalder vi efficiens-hypotesen. 
 
Vi anvender data fra Thomson Financial/Worldscope, som omfatter alle børsnoterede 
virksomheder i Europa i perioden 1995-2005. Vi finder at bedre minoritetsaktionær 
beskyttelse (indeks konstrueret af La Porta et al. (1998) og opdateret af Pagano og 
Volpin (2005b)) tilsyneladende fører til flere going private transaktioner. Vi kalder 
dette mål for investorbeskyttelses regulering. Introduktion af corporate governance 
anbefalinger/regler fører tilsyneladende også til flere going private transaktioner. Disse 
resultater er konsistente med overregulerings-hypotesen. Vi fandt dog visse 
indikationer af at bedre såkaldt generelt lovmæssig infrastruktur (målt vha. 
 17
Verdensbankens governance indeks, Kaufman et al. (2005, 2006)) fører til færre going 
private transaktioner, hvilket derved tenderer til at støtte efficiens-hypotesen.  
 
Det hævdes at corporate governance regulering kan være endogent bestemt (f.eks. 
Pagano og Volpin, 2001, 2005b; Rajan og Zingales, 2003; Perotti og von Thadden, 
2006; Roe, 2006). Dette implicerer at statistiske estimater af reguleringens effekt bør 
tage højde for hvorledes reguleringen er determineret. En mulig løsning er at anvende 
økonomiske instrumenter som påvirker investorbeskyttelse uden at påvirke afnoterings-
beslutningen. Det er dog besværligt at finde egnede økonomiske instrumenter som kan 
anvendes. Når information omkring landes juridiske system, landes valgsystem og 
organiseringsgrad anvendes som instrumenter, indikerer vores bedste estimater at 
investorbeskyttelses regulering tenderer til at øge going private afnoterings-frekvensen. 
 
Vi kan ikke alene ud fra dette udlede at minoritetsaktionær beskyttelse er skadelig. Det 
kan være at øget investor-tillid er mere værd end omkostningen ved afnoterede 
virksomheder. Men vores analyse antyder at corporate governance regulering medfører 
omkostninger såvel som gevinster, og at en af omkostningerne er at lavere private 
gevinster ved kontrol og mere formaliseret corporate governance praksis vil få nogle 
virksomheder til at afnotere. Alt imens en vis regulering er nødvendig og gavnlig for 
aktiemarkedets udvikling så er der også grænser for reguleringen. F.eks. hvor meget 
skal minoritetsaktionærer beskyttes i et nul-sums spil med andre interessegrupper 
såsom store aktionærer, medarbejdere og kreditorer.  
 
Essay 3: Aktiemarkeds-timing og beslutningen om børsafnotering 
 (i samarbejde med Steen Thomsen) 
 
Antallet af børsafnoteringer har været stigende de senere år i både USA og Europa. Vi 
finder at 30 procent af alle børsnoterede europæiske virksomheder blev afnoteret i 
perioden 1995-2005 af forskellige grunde. I dette studie undersøger vi forskellige mål 
for markedsværdis effekt på fusioner og virksomhedsovertagelser (M&A) og going 
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private transaktioner på de europæiske børser i perioden 1996-2004.4 Vi anvender data 
fra Thomson Financial/Worldscope på virksomheds- og markedsniveau for alle 
børsnoterede virksomheder i Europa i nævnte periode (samme data som i essay 2). I 
overensstemmelse med tidligere resultater finder vi at M&A tenderer til at være pro-
cyklisk således at de forekommer hyppigere når branchens aktiemarkeds værdi (q-
værdier) er høj (f.eks. Nelson, 1959; Maksimovic og Phillips, 2001; Shleifer og Vishny, 
2003; Rhodes-Kropf og Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Ang og Chen, 
2007). Vi viser derimod også at dette ikke er tilfældet for going private transaktioner. 
Bemærk at høj (eller lav) aktiemarkeds værdi kan fortolkes, som i den relaterede 
litteratur, som markeds misvalueringer (valueringer som afviger fra fundamentale 
værdier). Endvidere finder vi at M&A er mere sandsynlige i perioder hvor aktiekurserne 
topper (bull market), imens going private transaktioner er relativt mere sandsynlige i 
perioder hvor aktiekurserne er i bund (bear market). Desuden, som forventet, fandt vi 
ingen signifikant industri q-effekt i den relativt transparente finansielle branche, samt 
for store virksomheder, hvor misvalueringer burde være mindre. Men industri q-
effekten var dog signifikant i de mere transparente brancher med lave forsknings- og 
udviklingsudgifter. Derfor virker det til at going private transaktioner og M&A er 
drevet af forskellige kausale mekanismer. Således indikerer dette at M&A til dels er 
drevet af misvalueringer imens going private transaktioner ikke ser ud til at være det. 
 
Der er flere mulige forklaringer på disse forskelle. En forklaring er at det er nemmere 
for børsnoterede virksomheder, der opkøber andre virksomheder (som evt. også er 
noterede), at finansiere disse opkøb når aktiekurserne er høje. Imens er private ikke-
industrielle købere mindre sensitive overfor fluktuationer i aktiemarkedets værdi pga. 
de (normalt) ikke er børsnoterede, hvorfor de ikke kan bruge egne aktier som del af 
finansieringen. Det kan også være at going private investorer (f.eks. kapitalfonde, 
ledelse mv.) er bedre til at vurdere den faktiske værdi af en virksomhed (Jensen, 2007). 
Endvidere kan høje aktiekurser gøre opkøbere mere optimistiske angående fremtidige 
forretningsmæssige udsigter, hvilket derved gør det mere attraktivt at investere.  
 
                                                 
4 M&A forekommer når en virksomhed afnoteres som led i en fusion eller virksomhedsovertagelse, hvor opkøber er en 
virksomhed. En såkaldt going private transaktion forekommer hvis en ikke-virksomhed overtager og afnoterer 
virksomhed. F.eks. dette er tilfældet hvis den siddende ledelse eller en kapitalfond opkøber en virksomhed. 
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Der er ikke nødvendigvis en sammenhæng mellem at ’købe billigt’ og at være en dygtig 
investor. Selv hvis private opkøbere omkring årtusindeskiftet var dygtigere investorer 
end f.eks. virksomheder, så kan timingen af disse opkøb til dels tilskrives held pga. 
kapitalfondenes aktivitet indtraf således at de profiterede af bear market perioden 2001-
2003. Alternativt er private virksomhedsopkøbere måske også mere fokuseret på 
værdiskabelse gennem et mere koncentreret og fokuseret ejerskab samt andre 
governance karakteristika. Desuden er det mindre væsentligt for private 
virksomhedsopkøbere at forhindre target virksomhedens konkurrenter i at opkøbe 
virksomheden. Disse private opkøbere forsøger formentligt kun at overtage en 
virksomhed hvis de mener, at den individuelle transaktion vil skabe værdi uden at tage 
hensyn til tilbageslag i værende forretning. 
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Abstract: 
 
 
This paper studies the impact of private equity (PE) buyout fund ownership on the 
performance of their portfolio firms. Using Danish data during 1991-2004 portfolio 
firms are compared to otherwise comparable firms not subjected to such an ownership 
change. The main finding is that PE buyout fund ownership has a significant negative 
effect on firm performance relatively to similar firms. This result indicates that the so-
called superior corporate governance model is not consistent with the data partly 
because post-buyout ownership concentration falls and that debt does not lead to 
efficiency improvements. Moreover, a proxy for expropriation seems to be present in 
the data since post-buyout dividend payments increases. Alternative explanations are 
examined - such as selection bias, valuation bias and measurement errors – but the main 
finding remains unaffected.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last thirty years private equity (PE) buyout funds have become responsible for 
a larger and increasing quantity of investments in the global economy.7 It is therefore 
desirable to understand the possible impact of PE buyout fund ownership better. 
Although it has been claimed that this type of owner generates economic efficiency 
through superior governance (e.g. Jensen, 1986a, 1986b, 1989) few studies test this 
claim. It is also known as the “Jensen hypothesis”. The buyout market has experienced 
two big waves. The first wave in 1980s was particularly driven by the presence of 
corporate inefficiencies which created the opportunity for ‘corporate raiders’ and 
industrial restructurings, leading to the so-called rebirth of active investors. Even 
though the second and current wave are different in many respects the main motivation 
of the PE fund buyouts is the absence of monitoring within the firms (e.g. Prowse, 
1998; Brealey and Myers, 2003; Renneboog and Simons, 2005; Jensen et al., 2006).  
 
In practice PE buyout funds are believed to create value through two channels (Jensen 
et al., 2006): 1) financial and governance engineering, 2) operational engineering. The 
benefits from financial engineering derive from disciplining and tax benefits from 
higher debt, and improved incentives from managerial ownership. The governance 
engineering derives from better control of the board and management. Jensen (2007) 
emphasizes it as “PE funds enable the capture of value destroyed by agency problems 
in public firms – especially failures in governance”. The other source of value creation 
– operational engineering – relates to the belief that PE funds have a strong operational 
focus e.g. on specialization within industry knowledge and operational experience. The 
focus of this paper is on the first channel – the superiority of the PE fund governance 
model. 
 
                                                 
7 The focus of this study is on the PE buyout industry (excluding the venture capital market) which expanded in 
USA back in the 1980s and moved to Europe during the late 1990s. PE funds have a limited investment horizon of 
3-10 years. The organizational structure of portfolio firms normally changes because a holding company is often 
set up. The holding company controls the portfolio firm and is controlled by the PE fund. Notice that the focus 
here is on the parent company and not on the holding company because is a part of the economy also when the PE 
fund has exited. Holding companies are often liquidated after the exit. Since the focus is on the buyout market PE 
buyout funds are in the following denoted PE funds for simplicity.   
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The existing literature on estimating the economic effects of buyouts (management 
buyouts, leveraged buyouts, reverse leveraged buyouts) has mainly focused on the U.S. 
and U.K. in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g Kaplan, 1989a; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990; Wright et al., 1992; Wright et al., 
1997). The majority of these studies document a positive impact of this new form of 
corporate organization measured on operating profitability and productivity within the 
buyout firm – either while private or after exit (Kaplan, 1989a; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 
1990; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990; Wright et al., 1992; Wright et 
al., 1997; Harris et al., 2005; Cao and Lerner, 2006; Cressy et al., 2007; Guo et al., 
2007).8 Contradicting, studies by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Desbrières and 
Schatt (2002)9 document, however, a negative impact on firm performance 
characteristics of this ownership transition.  
 
The existing studies are not always easy to compare because there are subjected to 
different biases in data selection. As mentioned the literature has investigated 
management buyouts (MBOs), leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and reverse LBOs 
(RLBOs)10, however, studies of these transaction types are not completely comparable. 
                                                 
8 Different studies have investigated how a buyout has affected firm-specific performance – either while private or 
public again. In the U.S. Kaplan (1989a) and Smith (1990) analyzed, respectively 48 and 58, MBOs during the 
1970s and 1980s, and both found that industry-adjusted post-buyout operating profits were improved. 
Correspondingly, Wright et al. (1992) found improvements in profitability within 182 MBOs in U.K. during 
1980s. Further, Wright et al. (1997) examined 158 buyouts U.K. in the 1980s and found superior longer term 
performance compared to matched non-buyout firms. In a recent study Cressy et al. (2007) studies 122 U.K. 
buyouts during 1995-2002. Compared to a set of matched-paired firms return on assets were improved. The study 
Guo et al. (2007) focus on 89 public-to-private buyouts in the US during 1990-2006. The main result is that these 
buyouts are either comparable or exceed benchmarks performance-wise. Other studies have investigated reverse 
LBOs (RLBOs), for instance Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) studied 72 RLBOs from the U.S. during 1980s 
and found that revenues and asset turnover were improved compared to a random sample of publicly traded firms. 
Further, Cao and Lerner (2006) investigated 496 RLBOs in the U.S. from 1980-2002 and also found a positive 
impact on firm performance. In this study firm stock performance is compaed to stock performance of other initial 
public offerings (IPOs) together with the average stock market performance. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) used 
another approach while examining post-buyout changes in total factor productivity (TFP) among 1100 U.S. plants 
involved in LBOs during 1980s. They found that LBO-plants had significantly higher rates of TFP growth 
compared with non-LBO plants. Related Harris et al. (2005) examined the impact of MBOs at plant level 
economic efficiency of companies in U.K. during 1990s. The data covered 979 buyouts and 4877 plants and 
evidence suggested that economic efficiency was improved. 
9 Other studies document a negative impact on firm performance from buyouts. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) 
investigated 95 target firms in the U.S. from the 1970s and found that post-tender profitability dropped compared 
to industry benchmarks. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) studies 31 highly leveraged transactions (U.S.) that became 
financially distressed, and suggest that operating profitability declined in these deals. Desbrières and Schatt (2002) 
studied 161 MBOs in France during 1988-1994 and found that post-buyout performance dropped in these. 
10 It is not necessarily the case the lead acquirer in a LBO or MBO is a PE fund.  This is problematic in such analysis 
since the impact of PE fund ownership is not completely identified. 
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For example LBOs are examined while private, whereas RLBOs are analyzed after the 
exit. Hence, RLBOs studies therefore also reflect the impact of a new owner which is 
not a PE fund. Moreover, it is not always the case that the lead acquirer in LBOs or 
MBOs is a PE fund. Therefore there is a lack of research focusing explicitly on PE fund 
ownership (such as Cressy et al., 2007). 
Secondly, most of the LBOs and MBOs studies have been on public-to-private 
transactions (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990), however, during the recent decade 
about 80% of the European transactions (measured in value) where private-to-private 
transactions.11 The “Jensen hypothesis” indicates that private-to-private transactions 
should be associated with fewer agency cost savings.  
Thirdly, a severe problem is to obtain data suited for empirical testing. In most 
countries the quality of privately-held company information is poor. Therefore most 
studies are subjected to sample selection limitations, for instance some studies have 
focused on the post-exit situation of buyout firms and not while private, i.e. RLBOs 
studies (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Cao and Lerner, 2006). Further, it is 
typically not a full population of buyouts that are analyzed in these studies. Data 
limitation also relates to the fact that the majority of the literature uses aggregate 
industry averages as benchmarks instead of control groups of comparable firms 
(Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990). However, Alemany and Marti (2005) and Cressy et al. 
(2007) introduce proper methods of obtaining accurate matched samples of non-PE 
backed firms. 
 
There are three main contributions of this study: Firstly, new evidence on the recent 
buyout activity is provided and few studies have examined the PE buyout industry after 
the mid-1990s (only Cressy et al., 2007; Guo et al., 2007). A negative impact of PE 
fund ownership is found. As such it is (still) interesting whether this owner creates 
value. Moreover, different factors have changed in the more recent buyout wave such 
as potential transaction motivations, characteristics of target firms and transaction 
capital structures (Jensen et al., 2006; Guo et al., 2007). Therefore the results from 
recent activity could deviate from the previous and more examined buyout wave during 
1980s to mid-1990s. For instance target firms are nowadays not only turnaround or 
                                                 
11 Source: Statistics from European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA). 
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inefficient firms since more efficient firms with high cash flows are also targeted 
(Jensen et al., 2006). As a remark it is found theoretically that PE fund ownership is 
especially beneficial in turnaround firms (Cuny and Talmor, 2006). Moreover, the 
capital structures of the buyouts are less fragile today (Guo et al., 2007) which 
according to the “Jensen hypothesis” indicates fewer disciplining benefits of debt.  
The second contribution is that evidence is provided on a continental European country 
– in particular Denmark. Hence, Denmark is interesting since it resembles some 
stylized facts of the corporate structures in continental Europe and thereby may differ 
from USA and U.K. As mentioned the vast majority of the existing studies focus on 
USA and U.K. and evidence from e.g. continental European countries is missing. It is 
also relevant since the ownership structure of continental European countries deviates 
substantially from USA and U.K., e.g. there are more closely-held companies with 
large shareholders (e.g. Faccio and Lang, 2002). Generalized, this should diminish the 
expected benefits from PE fund ownership since companies have ex ante fewer 
theoretically agency problems.  
Thirdly, a selection bias is probably avoided in this study since it is possible to exploit a 
comprehensive population of Danish PE fund buyouts due to the data quality. Most 
related studies use a limited population depending on availability of data (e.g. Cressy et 
al., 2007; Guo et al., 2007). Moreover, this sample consist of both public-to-private and 
private-to-private transactions, however, the great majority of earlier studies focuses on 
public-to-private transactions mainly due to data limitations. However, if the total PE 
buyout industry is to be evaluated private-to-private transactions should also be taken 
into account. Especially since private-to-private transactions accounted for the vast 
majority of buyout transactions the last decade. Remember that the “Jensen hypothesis” 
in principle indicates that private-to-private transactions are associated with fewer 
agency cost savings. This suggests that at least in the continental European case we 
might expect and experience fewer gains from alignment of ownership and control. 
 
The present paper addresses the issues of how PE fund ownership affects post-buyout 
firm performance (portfolio firm) and whether the claimed superior governance model 
is able to explain the empirical findings. The superiority of PE fund ownership is 
examined by testing the ownership, the debt and the stakeholder expropriation 
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hypotheses respectively (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986a, 1986b, 1989; 
Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Renneboog and Simons, 2005; 
Cumming et al., 2007). Particularly, it is done by assessing whether changes in 
ownership structure, changes in debt structure affects firm performance, and whether 
different expropriation channels are affected.  
 
The analysis is performed on a dataset of 73 buyouts which took place in Denmark12 
during 1991-2004. The 73 buyouts are matched, on the basis of ownership change, 
industry and size, with 545 firms serving as controls. Surprisingly, the main finding is 
that post-buyout performance of portfolio firms falls.13 This is a different result 
compared with most of the evidence in the literature. In addition, it is found: 1) that 
portfolio firm performance was improved through better monitoring of management 
possibly resulting from less separation of ownership and control (the ownership effect). 
Moreover, the data show that post-buyout (majority) ownership concentration on 
average falls which then could explain the lower performance; 2) Furthermore, little 
evidence is found that monitoring by total debt improves portfolio firm performance 
relatively to control firms (the debt effect). It does seem, however, as if debt with 
shorter maturity has a positive monitoring effect; 3) portfolio firm’s pays out higher 
dividends compared to the benchmark firms. This result suggests that owners behave in 
an opportunistic manner which supposedly could be costly for stakeholders and the 
portfolio firm in the long term (the expropriation effect). However, there is not found 
evidence of layoffs in the data. Overall, the expected effects of the superior governance 
model of PE funds do not seem to appear in the data. 
                                                 
12 Even though Denmark is a small economy it has accounted for some of the biggest European deals (ISS and 
TDC – the TDC acquisition was at its time the largest deal ever in Europe) within the last couple of years. 
13 A Danish governmental report (ØEM, 2006) also analysed the Danish PE market. Generally few significant 
results are found. Compared to a group of reference firms during 1995-2005 they found that portfolio firms have 
significantly higher growth in employment, higher dividend ratio, and also a higher debt ratio. Yet the effect on 
TFP, labour productivity, and profits is positive but not significant. While comparing the economic situation of 
firms before and after the buyout they have significantly higher growth rates of employment and sales. But the 
portfolio firms tend to have insignificantly lower post-buyout profitability. To some extend these results differ 
from the findings of this analysis. There are different explanations for this - for instance ØEM main focus is on 
employment and sales, however as discussed later these measures are subject to limitations in this dataset. 
Secondly, ØEM apply a less precise control group since they define a reference firm as the ‘median firm’ with 
120 employees. Another caveat is that ØEM drop extreme observations while I truncate them. One problem with 
dropping these extreme observations is that especially portfolio firms could be exposed to either a post-buyout 
expansion or downsizing strategy, this is thus neglected by report of ØEM. Again this will bias the results. Other 
explanations could be a different period of analysis, and use of slightly different data sources. 
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The main finding could result from other sources. For instance selection bias could 
contribute to my result. However, portfolio firms are not different based on observable 
characteristics at the entry time, i.e. the selection bias argument is rejected. This also 
indicates that PE funds screening ability or strategy is surprisingly modest – it does not 
seem that they are able to ‘pick the winners’. Examinations of alternative performance 
measures did not support the governance model either, i.e. the valuation bias is 
rejected. Finally, the so-called J-curve predictions were investigated.14 In these 
predictions it is supposed that for instance strategic changes in portfolio firms cause 
under-performance for up to the 4th year after the buyout, and afterward portfolio firms 
will out-perform. This prediction is examined and little support is found for the out-
performance in the late years of ownership, meaning that such measurement errors do 
not seem to be important in this data.  
 
The analysis is carried out in four steps: 1) An adequate and unique data set with both 
pre-buyout and post-buyout accounting information on 73 portfolio firms and 545 
matched control firms is obtained. The data cover Danish firms within the period 1991-
2004; 2) empirically the post-buyout performance effect of PE fund ownership is 
examined; 3) the governance model is evaluated: three theoretical hypotheses - 
ownership, debt and stakeholder expropriation are empirically tested; 4) Alternative 
explanations are introduced since endogeneity problems could interfere with our 
findings. Since it is difficult to find valid instruments three possible alternative 
explanations of our result are discussed: selection bias, valuation bias and measurement 
errors.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the data are described. In section 3 
the empirical strategy is introduced and the theoretical hypotheses are explained. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings and the results of hypotheses 
testing together with discussing alternative explanations. Finally, I conclude and 
discuss.  
                                                 
14 It is commonly argued in the venture capital literature that the J-curve pattern is present, but it is also applicable 
to the buyout industry. The idea is that the evolution of venture capital returns (or firm profitability) over time is 
shaped as a J-curve (e.g. Burgel, 2000).  
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2. Data  
2.1. Sample selection 
 
The data cover firm level financial information from Købmandsstandens 
Oplysningsbureau (KOB) on all limited liability Danish firms. KOB data is assembled 
by a private firm using annual reports that all limited liability firms are required to file 
at the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. Firstly, data is unique since it 
consists of data on all privately-held firms which is not standard for most countries. For 
instance accounting data is generally not available for US private companies (see 
Cressy et al., 2007).  Secondly, all financial statements are structured identically by 
KOB.  
The dataset primarily contains selected accounting information of limited liability firms 
in Denmark – such as sales, profits, assets etc. and these are book values. Danish 
regulations only mandate disclosure of firms’ assets and measures of firm profitability, 
such as operating or net income. Moreover, the disclosure of alternative firm-level 
attributes, such as sales or employment, is not required, although some firms do 
selectively report them. Therefore constructed variables using sales and/or employees 
will not have my main focus since they could introduce biases. I also have industry 
information at the DB93 classification level and these correspond to the NACE-codes.15 
The KOB data also contains some ownership and management data, but does not 
include acquisition prices. The ownership data contains information of shareholder 
names and their respectively ownership stakes, however, documentation of ownership 
stakes is scarce (few report this). Moreover, it is not possible to state whether different 
shareholders are affiliated (e.g. in the same family). 
 
The data enable me to define a set of relevant variables for our analysis such as for 
instance primary result to total assets, return on capital employed, sales growth, (total) 
                                                 
15 European Industry Classification Codes. 
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debt etc.16 The data is corrected for extreme observations by truncating (e.g. if return on 
assets is below -100% it is registered as -100%). 
 
From this data source a dataset of 618 firms in the period 1991-2004 is constructed; 
where 7317 of them are portfolio firms and the remaining 545 firms are control group 
firms. Importantly, data selected on portfolio firms cover parent company information 
and not holding company information. This study investigates the impact of PE fund 
ownership on the (parent) company level. The main reason for this is that the parent 
company is the lasting entity after an exit whereas holding companies are closed down. 
Moreover, there is no pre-buyout data at the holding company level since these are first 
established at the buyout time. Remark that this buyout sample cover both private-to-
private and public-to-private transactions. The portfolio firm sample size is as complete 
as it can be using the KOB data18 and it also employs pre-buyout data. In total there are 
3071 firm-year observations which are almost on average 5 years of data for each firm. 
More specific, the sample contains 326 firm-year observations of PE fund ownership, 
i.e. on average 4 years of data per portfolio firm (post-buyout). The data set is 
unbalanced, meaning that it is not a criterion to have data for each firm for the entire 
period 1991-2004. Doing this a potential underlying survivorship bias in the data is 
avoided.  
 
Since the owner identity or relationship information is not available in this data it is 
pursued collected externally. It was possible to gather external information on 54 of the 
73 buyouts. The pre-buyout owners showed to be industrial, financial institutions, 
families, management or publicly listed (15 family buyouts and 11 public-to-private 
transactions were found). Furthermore, more detailed ownership data on 42 buyouts 
were also found.19 
 
                                                 
16 Debt is the sum of long-term (langfristet gæld) and short-term debt (kortfristet gæld). KOB does not provide 
information on whether companies issue corporate bonds. Return on capital employed is defined as primary result 
relatively to equity and debt. 
17 In other studies the sample ranges between approximately 40-160 buyout firms.  
18 Here the focus is on both private and public PE fund buyouts whereas earlier studies (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a; 
Smith, 1990) investigated effects of MBOs among publicly traded firms. Their procedure could introduce a 
survivorship bias in the findings since listed firms on average could be better performing on average. 
19 Additional information is obtained from webpages of PE funds and portfolio firms, newspaper articles and Polaris 
Private Equity helped as well. 
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The information on Danish (PE fund) buyout deals is based on three different sources; 
i) webpages of the PE funds, ii) the governmental report on the Danish PE industry by 
the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (ØEM, 2006), iii) Newspaper 
articles. A portfolio firm is defined as a firm which has been owned by a (locally or 
globally placed) PE fund during 1991-2004. Meaning that if a firm has been through a 
secondary (or more) buyout(s) it still only counts as one portfolio firm. Following this 
approach 73 portfolio firms with valid accounting data are found.20  
 
The KOB dataset further enables me to establish an accurate benchmark sample of 
identical firms. Each portfolio firm is matched with identical firms using the following 
matching methodology: A control firm must i) have experienced a change in ownership 
– by definition there must have been a 5 percent change in the ownership structure 
during 1991-2004; ii) be in the same industry (using the NACE classifications) and 
similar in size (total assets). Each portfolio firm is thus matched with up to the 5 
nearest21 firms, measured on assets in each year (before and after the buyout). This 
approach yields a control group sample of 545 firms. Studies as for instance Alemany 
and Martì (2005) and Cressy et al. (2007) use a somewhat similar matching 
methodology.22 
Notice that it varies over time which firms are incorporated as controls depending on 
whether a firm continues to exist, availability of information or changes in the industry 
positioning of firms. I would argue that it is an advantage of this methodology that 
portfolio firms are compared with as identical firms as possible in each year (before and 
after the buyout). For example a control firm could be comparable to a specific 
portfolio firm in the buyout year but it might not be comparable 3 years later – this 
                                                 
20 ØEM (2006) concludes that approximately 120 firms have been through a PE fund buyout since 1995. The 
explanation for their larger sample is firstly that 2005 and 2006 are included and a large number of deals have 
taken place within the last two years. Secondly, they count the number of deals whereas in this study the number 
of firms is accounted, hence their number is per definition higher. 
21 ‘Nearest’ is defined as the squared difference between absolute total assets of the portfolio firm and control firm in 
each year. The 5 nearest firms, if that many exists, are incorporated. Since the squared difference may change over time 
the control firms may also change over the period. 
22 Another method of matching is the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This approach employs a 
predicted probability of group membership – in our case portfolio firms vs. control group – based on observed 
characteristics. The propensity score is seen as an improved version of simple matching (similar to what is used in this 
study), however, it has many of the same limitations. For example hidden biases remains since it only, as in the simple 
version, controls for observed variables (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002).   
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matching procedure adjusts for this. Hence this approach adjusts for both changes in 
portfolio firms and control firms over time.  
 
The argument for the first criterion is that the ownership change decision may be 
endogenous. Acknowledging the target firm (historically) characteristics of the 
previous buyout wave inefficient firms are probably more exposed to changes in 
ownership. Therefore if this criterion is neglected a bias may occur since two samples 
which ex ante have a different situation are potentially compared. Since exact 
information on ownership stakes is restricted the most elaborate measure that can be 
employed for the purpose of matching is whether there has been an ownership change 
of 5 percent or more (which is reported). Ideally only firms with a majority change in 
ownership should be included, however since ownership information is not exact this is 
not possible. Indeed, as previously mentioned, it would be desirable if precise 
ownership identity information (e.g. family ownership, financial institutions etc.) was 
available. However, this is not an option in this setting. It may bias the results when 
comparing the portfolio firm sample to the control group (with different owners) 
because different owner identities are compared, but how it would bias the results is not 
clear.  
The reasoning behind the size and industry criteria is that it is desirable to identify as 
comparable firms as possible and thereby the explanatory power should increase 
together with avoiding selection bias. As discussed later (see table 2) following this 
methodology control firms are on average smaller firms which indicates that portfolio 
firms are large in their industries. However, one problem here with obtaining equally 
sized control firms are that observations would have to be excluded (portfolio firms).23  
 
Compared to earlier studies (e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 
1990; Desbrières and Schatt, 2002) I believe that the benchmark used in this study is 
more exact. Firstly, since the data cover the total population of Danish firms. Secondly, 
the sample size of the matched control companies is fairly large and comprehensive 
compared to other studies that have used similar approaches (e.g. Alemany and Marti, 
                                                 
23 As an illustrative example it would be impossible to find an equally sized (Danish) firm that could serve as control for 
the large Danish telecommunications company TDC. Hence, if it was a strict criterion that they should be equally sized 
TDC should then be dropped. 
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2005; Cressy et al., 2007). This present procedure also controls for ownership changes 
and time variation within the control group. Further, the ownership change matching 
criteria make the benchmark more comparable to the portfolio firms. Finally, due to the 
unique data I have the ability of defining different matched samples of control firms. 
Later in the analysis robustness checks are performed via changing the matching 
methodology with respect to neglecting the ownership change criteria, only using the 2 
nearest companies in each year as controls, and changing the procedure so that control 
firms are first matched by size and industry and then by ownership changes.    
 
2.2. Descriptive statistics 
2.2.1. Pre-buyout Firm Characteristics 
 
In table 1 portfolio firms and benchmark firms are compared before the time of the 
ownership change. The table presents summary statistics of firms on size, growth, 
performance, capital structure and other measures. Since considerable changes are 
usually implemented within the year of ownership change the preceding year and the 
preceding four-year average (including the year of entry) are analysed. When the exact 
time of the ownership change is used it is only possible to compare the portfolio firms 
with 325 control firms in which the ownership change takes place in the years were 
they serve as controls (following the matching procedure). Further, note that some 
observations are missing in table 1. This is most likely due to changes in accounting 
standards or period around the ownership change.  
 
Table 1 provides evidence of whether portfolio firms ex ante are different from other 
firms that also undergo an ownership change. It is crucial for the interpretation of the 
regression analysis described in section 3 whether PE funds tend to select turnaround 
firms (e.g. firms under financial distress) or so-called cash cows (i.e. well-performing 
firms with high profit margins and a high cash flow). In principle, table 1 should reveal 
the screening ability or strategy of the PE funds for the given measures.  
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Table 1
Pre-Buyout Firm Characteristics 
Portfolio firms Benchmark firms Portfolio firms Benchmark firms
A. Size
Ln(Net sales) 13.544 12.790 13.389 12.246 0.754 ** 1.143 ***
[1.489] [1.770] [1.462] [2.339] (0.314) (0.292)
[47] [59] [58] [119]
Ln(Total assets) 12.940 11.419 12.924 11.245 1.521 *** 1.679 ***
[1.741] [2.124] [1.656] [2.258] (0.315) (0.265)
[55] [100] [62] [196]
Ln(Employees) 6.244 4.912 6.090 4.572 1.332 *** 1.518 ***
[1.766] [1.929] [1.775] [2.020] (0.318) (0.277)
[52] [88] [61] [171]
B. Growth
Sales growth 0.104 0.088 0.113 0.102 0.016 0.011
[0.142] [0.131] [0.129] [0.151] (0.030) (0.032)
[42] [56] [42] [56]
Asset growth 0.158 0.088 0.170 0.083 0.070 0.087 *
[0.275] [0.132] [0.293] [0.150] (0.042) (0.047)
[50] [95] [50] [95]
Employee growth 0.115 0.049 0.118 0.056 0.066 * 0.062
[0.219] [0.104] [0.238] [0.129] (0.035) (0.037)
[47] [81] [47] [82]
C. Performance
Gross profit to total assets (GROA) 0.603 0.623 0.605 0.546 -0.020 0.059
[0.305] [0.317] [0.348] [0.383] (0.055) (0.054)
[50] [86] [59] [172]
Primary result to total assets (OROA) 0.109 0.098 0.100 0.063 0.011 0.037
[0.129] [0.162] [0.224] [0.253] (0.024) (0.034)
[54] [98] [61] [191]
Netincome to total assets (ROA) 0.066 0.050 0.042 0.023 0.016 0.019
[0.111] [0.131] [0.209] [0.202] (0.020) (0.031)
[55] [100] [62] [196]
Return on capital employed (ROCE) 0.100 0.093 0.107 0.074 0.007 0.033
[0.076] [0.145] [0.099] [0.197] (0.020) (0.021)
[41] [78] [49] [151]
Net sales to total assets (Asset turnover) 0.948 0.965 0.945 0.892 -0.017 0.053 *
[0.117] [0.069] [0.168] [0.236] (0.019) (0.031)
[47] [59] [58] [120]
D. Capital structure
Equity to total assets 0.354 0.354 0.362 0.352 0.000 0.010
[0.144] [0.183] [0.180] [0.235] (0.027) (0.029)
[55] [100] [62] [196]
Debt to total assets 0.584 0.607 0.581 0.612 -0.023 -0.031
[0.142] [0.178] [0.183] [0.231] (0.026) (0.029)
[55] [100] [62] [195]
Short-term debt to total assets 0.458 0.435 0.452 0.462 0.023 -0.010
[0.158] [0.182] [0.194] [0.236] (0.028) (0.030)
[55] [100] [62] [195]
Long-term debt to total assets 0.159 0.208 0.163 0.201 -0.049 ** -0.038
[0.110] [0.143] [0.142] [0.189] (0.023) (0.026)
[41] [80] [49] [153]
Debt to equity 2.264 2.840 2.628 2.940 -0.576 -0.312
[1.843] [2.103] [2.715] [2.855] (0.372) (0.459)
[41] [80] [49] [153]
E. Other measures
Dividends to net income 0.517 0.419 0.480 0.489 0.098 -0.009
[0.256] [0.260] [0.401] [0.393] (0.071) (0.075)
[23] [30] [40] [99]
Firm age (years) 43 28 15 **
[57] [30] (7.794)
[62] [195]
The 'year before the entry' is the year before the buyout or ownership change. Hence, changes within the first year of the new ownership is removed. The 'Pre'-situation 
accounts for all observations before the ownership change. Control group firms are matched on size and industry from a sample of firms that has been through an 
ownership change within the period. Each portfolio firm is matched with up to the 5 nearest firms within each year, measured on absolute asset size. According to the 
matching procedure it is not a criteria for the control firms that the exact year of ownership change is included. It enables me to use 325 control firms in this table, 
however the lower number of observations is explained by missing information in some years and changed industry positioning. The pre-values are given as 4 year 
averages (including the year of ownership change). The growth measures used for 'year befor entry' are 3 year averages (ex ante), including year of entry. 
Return on capital employed is defined as the ratio between primary result and the sum of equity and debt. Debt is defined as the sum of short term debt and longterm 
debt. Standard deviations and number of observations are reported in brackets for the descriptive statistics. Further the standard errors for the difference tests are also 
reported in brackets. The ***, **, * respectively denotes whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control group firms is significantly 
different from zero at a 1, 5, or 10-percentage level. Source: KOB and own calculations. 
Year before entry
Year before entryPre
Pre
Difference between portfolio firms and 
benchmark firms:
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Firstly, table 1 shows that portfolio firms are significantly larger (measured on log of 
net sales, log of total assets, and log employees) compared to the benchmark firms both 
measured on the four-year average and one-year before the ownership change. It is 
remarkable that portfolio firms are significantly larger taking the matching procedure 
into consideration. This suggests that PE funds acquire firms that are industry leaders, 
i.e. large firms. Since portfolio firms are in the top end of the industries (measured on 
size) the matching approach could be criticized for this. However, if the main goal is to 
match portfolio firms with equally sized control firms one might potentially end up by 
excluding (portfolio) firms in our sample.    
 
Growth measures of sales, total assets, and employees propose that portfolio firms in 
general seem to have higher growth rates although for most of the measures the 
differences are not significant. Note, that firms are not obliged to report sales or number 
of employees so these specific growth measures could be subjected to selection bias as 
explained earlier. This is somewhat surprising because as just noted these firms are 
already larger and maybe therefore not as exposed to high growth rates.  
 
Thirdly, there are few significant differences when diverse performance measures 
(gross profit to assets, GROA; primary result to assets, OROA; net income to assets, 
ROA; return on capital employed, ROCE; and net sales to total assets; asset turnover) 
are compared. Although performance is higher for portfolio firms for the above 
measures the only significant result is for asset turnover24 which is only significant at 
the 10-percentage level.  
 
Examining various measures of firm capital structure portfolio firms are on average less 
leveraged (debt to assets, short- and long-term debt to assets25, and debt to equity) – 
however only the long-term debt ratio is significantly lower measured on the four-
average before the entry of the PE funds. The average dividend payout ratio was not 
significantly different between the groups around the ownership change. Lastly, 
                                                 
24 Asset turnover can be interpreted as a proxy for managerial efficiency. 
25 Note that Danish banks formally give short term loans but these are in practice long term loans. Data is however not 
detailed in these matters. Therefore it is not possible to investigate the underlying conditions behind the debt contracts.    
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portfolio firms are on average 15 years older than the benchmark firms at the time of 
entry. 
 
The main finding of table 1 is that portfolio firms do not seem to be much different 
measured on profit margins, growth path and capital structure compared to the control 
firms which are matched on size and industry together with being subjected to an 
ownership change. This is different compared to a study (Desbrières and Schatt, 2002) 
on French firms involved in MBOs since the financial situation of these target firms is 
better than other firms in the same industry. Since data show that portfolio firms are 
significantly larger and older these findings suggest that PE funds acquire mature firms. 
Table 1 also indicate that the screening ability of PE funds is modest since they are not 
able to find targets that are very different from those of their competitors on the market. 
One explanation could be that the takeover market for privately-held firms is not 
sufficiently transparent and that firms (or initial owners) have the advantage of deciding 
when or if they should enter the process of selling. Especially, it might be the case for 
Denmark where many of the privately-held firms are family owned, and it is 
presumable not easy to persuade a family to sell their business. It also happens that it is 
the target firms themselves that approaches the PE funds in the pre-buyout process and 
not the other way around. Furthermore, it might be difficult for the PE funds to gather 
information and/or seek out potential buyout candidates. This might explain why PE 
funds in the recent years have focused a lot on public-to-private deals.    
 
2.2.2. Post-buyout Firm Characteristics 
 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of portfolio firms and the control group. The 
differences are tested between; i) PE fund ownership and non-PE fund ownership, ii) 
the post-buyout and pre-buyout situation of portfolio firms.  
Portfolio firms (PE fund owned firms) are larger (remember the pre-buyout 
characteristics) than non-PE fund owned firms. This suggests as also mentioned earlier 
that portfolio firms seem to be industry leaders. This difference may be caused by the 
matching methodology, however, it might be difficult to obtain perfectly matched 
samples with respect to firm size without excluding data. In section 4.3.1 I experiment 
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with different control groups and the difference (larger portfolio firms) remains robust. 
Table 2 also show that portfolio firms are on average not downsized, i.e. it does not 
seem like PE buyout funds overall divest subsidiaries of the acquired businesses. 
Actually, the portfolio firm’s keeps growing, however, not at the same pace as control 
firms but these are also smaller.  
 
When only investigating portfolio firm performance all five measures fall (significant at 
the 1 percentage level) after the PE fund transaction between 4 and 19 percentage 
points - though performance is still positive. Moreover, the figures show that portfolio 
firm performance is also lower ex post compared with non-PE fund ownership yet only 
significant for GROA, OROA and ROA.26 This preliminary result indicates that portfolio 
firms underperform and the result is supported by the related findings of Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1987) and Desbrières and Schatt (2002) but is in contrast with other 
related studies such as Kaplan (1989a), Smith (1990) and Cressy et al. (2007).   
 
The capital structure within the portfolio firm changes as would be expected. Firstly, 
firm equity for portfolio firms falls significantly post-buyout and is also lower than that 
of the benchmark. Moreover, portfolio firm leverage (debt to assets, debt to equity, 
short-term and long-term debt) increases significantly by 4-9 percentage points after the 
buyout and the debt to equity ratio increases significantly by approximately 25 percent. 
This result also holds for the debt-to-assets ratio when portfolio firms and non-PE fund 
owned firms are compared (increases by 4 percentage points). The increasing debt 
together with lower equity stakes (inversely related) is not very surprising since it 
demonstrates common features of buyouts (e.g. LBOs). These results are in line with 
other studies mentioned earlier (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Palepu, 1990; 
Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). In fact, one might have expected a more pronounced 
change in debt structure, but the modest effect might be due to the fact that only parent 
companies are considered in this analysis while most of the debt financing of the deal 
takes place at the holding company level.  
 
                                                 
26 If the differences in operating performance before and after the ownership change are examined between portfolio 
firms and control firms (using data as in table 1), it is also found that the performance of portfolio firms significantly 
drops post-buyout relatively to the pre-buyout situation and the control group (results not shown).  
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Table 2
Firm Characteristics - PE fund owned vs. non-PE fund owned
PE fund owned 
(Post-buyout)
Non-PE fund 
owned
Pre-buyout 
Portfolio firms
A. Size
Ln(Net sales) 13.192 12.262 12.962 0.930 *** 0.230 **
[1.214] [2.065] [2.079] (0.086) (0.118)
[300] [1733] [470]
Ln(Total assets) 12.794 11.347 12.406 1.447 *** 0.388 ***
[1.402] [2.044] [2.142] (0.087) (0.121)
[326] [2745] [547]
Ln(Employees) 5.929 4.647 6.001 1.282 *** -0.072 **
[1.376] [1.952] [1.923] (0.088) (0.117)
[308] [2453] [504]
B. Growth
Sales growth 0.082 0.120 0.137 -0.038 * -0.055 ***
[0.294] [0.371] [0.328] (0.020) (0.025)
[272] [1495] [390]
Asset growth 0.077 0.158 0.180 -0.081 *** -0.103 ***
[0.366] [0.426] [0.392] (0.023) (0.029)
[298] [2439] [472]
Employee growth 0.040 0.093 0.150 -0.053 ** -0.110 ***
[0.335] [0.353] [0.404] (0.021) (0.029)
[280] [2136] [426]
C. Performance
Gross profit to total assets (GROA) 0.470 0.568 0.657 -0.098 *** -0.187 ***
[0.318] [0.393] [0.396] (0.020) (0.026)
[315] [2435] [473]
Primary result to total assets (OROA) 0.050 0.070 0.105 -0.020 * -0.055 ***
[0.177] [0.203] [0.131] (0.011) (0.012)
[326] [2695] [525]
Netincome to total assets (ROA) 0.010 0.037 0.064 -0.027 *** -0.054 ***
[0.180] [0.164] [0.120] (0.010) (0.011)
[326] [2745] [547]
Return on capital employed (ROCE) 0.059 0.077 0.109 -0.018 -0.050 ***
[0.280] [0.199] [0.087] (0.017) (0.018)
[289] [1997] [424]
Net sales to total assets (Asset turnover) 0.893 0.886 0.936 0.007 -0.043 ***
[0.216] [0.246] [0.180] (0.014) (0.016)
[300] [1743] [472]
D. Capital structure
Equity to total assets 0.290 0.352 0.393 -0.062 *** -0.103 ***
[0.192] [0.227] [0.208] (0.011) (0.014)
[326] [2745] [547]
Debt to total assets 0.644 0.609 0.552 0.035 *** 0.092 ***
[0.192] [0.229] [0.210] (0.012) (0.015)
[326] [2740] [547]
Short-term debt to total assets 0.461 0.466 0.415 -0.005 0.046 ***
[0.212] [0.240] [0.192] (0.013) (0.015)
[326] [2740] [547]
Long-term debt to total assets 0.217 0.202 0.175 0.015 0.042 ***
[0.172] [0.180] [0.128] (0.011) (0.012)
[289] [2014] [430]
Debt to equity 3.013 2.791 2.446 0.222 0.567 ***
[2.580] [2.652] [0.230] (0.163) (0.191)
[289] [2014] [430]
E. Other measures
Dividends to net income 0.488 0.428 0.409 0.060 * 0.079 **
[0.431] [0.393] [0.350] (0.036) (0.042)
[161] [1237] [255]
Firm age (years) 36 30 6 **
44 34 (2.520)
[325] [2731]
Control group firms are matched on size and industry from a sample of firms that has been through an ownership transition within the period. 73 
portfolio firms and 545 controls firms are employed. Each portfolio firm is matched with up to the 5 nearest firms within each year, measured on 
absolute asset size. The 'PE fund owned' is the average of all observations while owned by a PE fund. 'Non-PE fund owned' corresponds to the 
average of all observations serving as controls. 'Pre-buyout' documents the average of the observations of portfolio firms when they were not 
owned by a PE fund. 
The growth measures are defined as 1 year changes. Return on capital employed is defined as the ratio between primary result and the sum of 
equity and debt. Debt is defined as the sum of short term debt and longterm debt. Standard deviations and number of observations are reported 
in brackets for the descriptive statistics. Further the standard errors for the difference tests are also reported in brackets. The ***, ** and * 
denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control group firms is significantly different from zero 
at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level. Source: KOB and own calculations.
Difference between:
PE fund vs. Non-PE 
fund owned
Post-buyout vs. Pre-
buyout (Portfolio 
firms)
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The dividend payout ratio is significantly higher for the portfolio firms compared to the 
non-PE fund ownership group. In addition, if dividends are compared at the portfolio 
firm level the post-buyout payout ratio increases significantly about 8 percentage 
points. Finally, as in table 1 it is documented that portfolio firms are older than firms 
without PE fund ownership. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Empirical specifications 
 
OLS regression methods are applied when examining the average post-buyout impact 
of PE fund ownership while taking the pre-buyout situation into account and a 
comparison relative to a control group of firms is also implemented. The general 
specification is then: 
 
itiitititit eIndustryAgeSizePEFy +++++= 4321 ββββα  
 
In this analysis the dependent variable (yi,t) is the measure of; growth (assets), operating 
performance (GROA, OROA, ROA), other performance measures (asset turnover, 
ROCE), capital structure (debt to assets) and the dividend payout ratio. I prefer to use 
operating performance measures relative to total assets mainly since the other suited 
base variable (sales) might be encumbered with a bias. Related studies also use similar 
performance measures (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; 
Cressy et al., 2007). It is critical to use net sales since it could introduce a bias in the 
analysis because reporting net sales is optional for many Danish firms. Using total 
assets also might introduce a bias since firm goodwill valuations often changes 
dramatically post-buyout. Hence this will lead to larger total assets which all else equal 
infer a downward pressure on our operating performance ratios and therefore the 
impact from PE fund ownership will be underestimated. However, since most of this 
potential asset boosting through changed goodwill depreciations takes place at the 
holding company level it is not judged problematic in the present analysis which deals 
with parent companies. Further, operating performance measures relative to total assets 
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may also be problematic if the portfolio firms undertake many acquisitions, because 
goodwill valuation thereby also changes. Yet, an active acquisition policy is clearly not 
limited to portfolio firms in the present comparative analysis.  
 
The key explanatory variable (PEFi,t) is a time-varying dummy variable that denote 
whether the firm is owned by a PE fund or not. It equals one if firm i is owned by a PE 
fund in year t and zero otherwise. Matched control firms are included as zeros.  
 
Furthermore, a set of control variables (Controls) are introduced which are commonly 
used in the literature – these are firm size (log of assets), firm age (log of the difference 
between 2004 and the year of establishment) and industry dummies (based on the 
NACE classifications). Firm size (Sizei,t) controls for any potential size effects 
(economies of scale) in the data. As seen in the summary statistics portfolio firms are 
on average larger than an average benchmark firm so when I control for firm size in the 
regression it is to make sure that the impact on the dependent variable cannot be 
explained by portfolio firms being larger. Moreover, I control for firm age (Agei,t)  to 
avoid survivorship bias in the data because older firms are prone to be better 
performing because they have survived longer. Portfolio firms are on average older 
than a benchmark firm and this necessitates the inclusion of firm age as a control. 
Finally, industry dummies27 (Industryi) are applied to correct for any potential industry 
variations in the data. In principle this is already done indirectly through the 
construction of the control sample.  
 
Then two types of models are regressed – one kind as explained above and another 
where fixed effects models are estimated, i.e. industry dummies are excluded. Fixed 
effects models are estimated since there might be firm-specific differences that are 
independent across time but could be correlated with the rest of the explanatory 
variables.  
 
The difference-in-difference methodology has been applied in similar studies (e.g. 
Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; Desbrières and Schatt, 2002; Guo et al., 2007). According 
                                                 
27 A 22 industry grouping is applied. 
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to this setup the dependent variable is defined as the difference between ex post 
performance and ex ante performance. Crucial to this approach is therefore the choice 
of event window. Usually, studies have used an event window between +/-4 years. 
Even though this methodology is practicable it is subject to important limitations; 
firstly, one caveat especially in these studies is the relatively low number of buyouts – 
and by using the difference-in-difference methodology one ends up with only one 
observation per firm. One can argue that as many observations for each firm as possible 
should be used – in this study all the years with PE fund ownership are used (see 
specification above).    
Another problem is to determine the optimal choice of event window. Availability of 
data could force limitations on the choice of event window.28 While the investment 
horizon of PE funds is usually 3-10 years it could be problematic to focus only on year 
two or three etc. This argument is also the basis of the J-curve effect, which claims that 
firm performance will first be improved after the 4th or 5th year of ownership. This 
further implies that the choice of event window is crucial for the results. Note, that if 
the J-curve predictions are present it should make it more difficult to obtain a result of 
improved performance (on average) in these analyses.  
As robustness check the difference-in-difference methodology is also applied here 
using windows of -1/+3 and -3/+3 years. 
 
Finally, endogeneity problems in the analysis will be addressed and discussed later 
since there might be some underlying effects (observed or unobserved) that could bias 
our result and lead to misleading conclusions. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
 
It is argued that benefits of PE fund ownership rises from financial and governance 
engineering at the firm level, i.e. it captures value destroyed by agency problems. The 
main idea is that this (new) owner is better at disciplining, controlling and provides 
better incentives for the firm management. Hence, theoretically the superiority of PE 
fund ownership has mainly been deduced from the agency theory: the incentive re-
                                                 
28 For instance Kaplan (1989a) and Smith (1990) only have data from the year before the event and onwards. 
 44
alignment hypothesis, the control hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, it has also been claimed that PE fund ownership destruct value from a 
redistribution of wealth from stakeholders to shareholders, i.e. expropriation. In the 
following three different hypotheses are discussed. 
 
3.2.1 The Ownership hypothesis  
 
The ownership hypothesis here mainly covers the incentive re-alignment hypothesis 
and the control hypothesis (e.g. Coase, 1937; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Grossman and 
Hart, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986a, Jensen, 1989) which both deals 
with agency costs driven by the potential separation of ownership and control within a 
firm.  
 
Related to the incentive re-alignment theory a divergence (conflict) in interests between 
the management and the shareholders may destroy firm value as stated by Berle and 
Means (1932). The main problem is that private benefits can be extracted by managers 
due to poor monitoring activities when ownership and control is separated (e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986a, 1989).  
The control hypothesis also relates to the separation of ownership and control. 
Grossman and Hart (1980) describe how the free-rider problem of monitoring the 
management in firms with dispersed ownership. The rationale is that shareholders with 
small equity stakes may underinvest in monitoring activities.29 Therefore especially 
public-to-private transactions experience improvements resulting from mitigation of 
problems raised by the incentive re-alignment and control hypothesis. 
Another problem in corporations is contractual incompleteness (Aghion and Bolton, 
1992). In this framework long-term financial contracts between entrepreneurs and 
investors are incomplete without reallocating the control rights. The optimal solution is 
                                                 
29 An argument opposing the positive agency cost theories of PE fund ownership is the over-monitoring theory. 
This theory introduces a negative impact from concentrated ownership (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Burkart, 
Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997). The intuition is that large shareholders are aware of the potential agency costs 
associated with the separation of ownership and control. Yet, with the goal of eliminating these agency costs 
owners may end up over-monitoring the management. This will dampen managerial initiatives, e.g. poorer firm 
innovation could lead to lower firm growth and worse long-horizon firm efficiency. It is difficult to test the over-
monitoring hypothesis directly.     
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to give all the control rights to the owner(s). This problem may especially occur in 
firms with dispersed ownership. Again this indicates that PE buyout funds are 
beneficial since they improve the incentive and control schemes within a firm. 
 
Since PE funds acquire majority ownership stakes (often 100 percent) benefits from re-
aligning the incentives, improved controlling mechanisms and/or a better contractual 
framework of control rights is expected to improve firm efficiency. Especially, these 
forms of wealth gains are evident in public-to-private deals. Hence the theories on 
incentive re-alignments, control and contractual completeness lead to what I denote the 
ownership hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Portfolio firms will experience larger wealth gains when ownership and 
control is reunified, i.e. the ownership concentration has increased post-buyout. 
 
This hypothesis clearly fits well for the public-to-private transactions due to the change 
in degree of ownership concentration. However, most of the PE fund deals are among 
already privately-held firms. Since these firms presumable ex ante have a concentrated 
ownership structure the wealth gains from this hypothesis may be non-existent. 
Furthermore, PE funds often acquire firms where the initial owner (e.g. a family) keeps 
an ownership stake or part of the firm is ex post owned by other co-owners such as 
pension funds, club-deals etc. Under these circumstances an reverse effect may occur, 
i.e. the ownership concentration is lower after the PE fund buyout meaning that the 
post-majority owner has a smaller fraction of the ownership compared to the pre-
majority owner.  
 
Using ownership information this hypothesis can be tested. Since the ownership data 
from KOB is scarce information on the exact ownership structure of the portfolio 
companies around the transaction is self-collected. More detailed ownership data on 42 
of 73 firms are found. The data cover ownership concentration information of the initial 
owner(s) and how much of the firm the PE fund has acquired. This collected data, 
however, comes with some limitations as well. Firstly, identity on the initial ownership 
types (family etc.) is not available. Secondly, exact initial ownership stakes are not 
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available in all cases. Moreover, as earlier explained I do not have exact ownership 
information of the benchmark firms this procedure only enables me to perform the 
hypothesis test on the reduced sample of portfolio firms.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is tested by examining whether there is an effect on portfolio firm 
performance from a changed level of ownership concentration around the buyout. Here 
the changed degree of ownership concentrated is a proxy for changed agency costs. It is 
expected that higher post-buyout ownership concentration leads to fewer agency costs. 
From the gathered data a variable is constructed which defines whether the difference 
between ownership stakes of the majority owner before and after the transaction has 
fallen or gone up. This variable is used to split the sample in the two subgroups. For 
example the pre-buyout owner could be a family or an industrial, whereas the post-
buyout majority owner is a PE fund. Thus two subgroups of portfolio firms are defined: 
1) portfolio firms where the ownership concentration has increased, 2) portfolio firms 
where the ownership concentration has decreased or remained the same. Then 
regressions for both subgroups are performed and the difference between the 
performance estimates of PE fund ownership in the subgroups is statistically tested. The 
econometric specification is similar to the previous one except that industry dummies 
are now left out due to the smaller sample size since only portfolio firms are 
investigated here.   
 
Another approach could be to investigate portfolio firms that were pre-buyout family 
owned, i.e. a proxy for concentrated ownership. Using ownership and management data 
from KOB it showed difficult since few firms could be characterized as family firms. 
The definition used is if the CEO of a firm owns more than 5% of the ownership it is 
categorized as a family firm (among others used by Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The 
few examples found are potentially due to a small sample of buyouts or that the CEO 
does not necessarily register the ownership in her own name (e.g. through a holding 
company). Due to these limitations this approach was further neglected. In addition 
data regarding ownership identity was collected, however, only 15 family buyouts were 
reported and due to this small sample further analysis was not pursued.  
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3.2.2. The Debt hypothesis  
 
The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986a, 1986b, 1989; Palepu, 1990) argues that 
the primary source of wealth gains in LBOs is brought about by organizational changes 
which lead to improvements in firm operating and investment decisions. Thus, in 
companies with large cash flows the management may have incentives or are prone to 
follow the so-called ‘empire building’ strategy, i.e. grow the firm beyond optimal size. 
The management can thus be tied through leverage (exchanging debt for equity) and is 
forced to ‘bond their promise’ to pay out future cash flows (interest payments), rather 
than investing in potentially poor projects. This is believed to be a more efficient use of 
the free cash flow. Further, the management is forced to produce enough cash flow to 
repay the debt obligations.  
Hence, the control function of debt arguably plays a crucial role in monitoring these 
companies. In particular, Jensen (2007) argues that one of the advantages of this 
organizational form is that debt is placed at the divisional level. The idea is that when 
debt is placed closer to the responsive management it affects their incentives 
beneficially. Especially this is different compared with the old setup of conglomerates 
where debt was placed at the top (headquarter) level.  
 
Remark that it might be that this hypothesis is less applicable in already privately-held 
firms since they usually initially have a strong owner. Hence, debt as a monitoring tool 
might at least theoretically be less influential.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Portfolio firms that are monitored through the debt tool are experiencing 
larger wealth gains.  
 
The question is whether the debt monitoring tool leads to performance improvements 
because the management is tied up. This proceeds in 3 steps. First, it is tested whether 
the debt ratio has an impact on portfolio firm performance. Secondly, it is tested how 
portfolio firm performance was affected by a change in capital structure around the 
buyout. Finally, I test whether the use of expensive financing has a severe effect, i.e. if 
short-term debt has an especially strong monitoring effect on portfolio firm 
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performance. Remark, that hypothesis 2 also uses the basic econometric specification 
from section 3.1., meaning that effects on portfolio firms are found relatively to control 
firms.  
 
The first test is performed by running a regression where the key explanatory variable 
is the interaction term between the PE fund ownership dummy variable (PEFi,t) and the 
firm-specific debt to assets ratio (DEBTASSi,t). This specification captures the effect of 
being PE fund owned combined with the firm leverage level. It should illustrate 
whether PE funds are able to improve performance from the level of debt-to-assets. If 
the free cash flow hypothesis holds β1 should be significantly positive. The econometric 
specification is otherwise as described earlier, the controls are firm size, firm age and 
industry.  
 
itjititit eControlsDEBTASSDEBTASSPEFy +++∗+= βββα 21 )(  
 
Next, I want to measure whether portfolio firms are doing better when leverage has 
increased after the ownership change. As a proxy for this a dummy variable assigns a 
firm with the value of one if the average post-buyout (post-ownership change) debt 
ratio is larger than the average pre-buyout (pre-ownership change) debt to assets ratio. 
Otherwise firms are assigned with the value of zero if the average debt to assets ratio 
has remained unchanged or fallen. This variable is denoted DEBT_MON and is a proxy 
for debt monitoring. Using this I introduce another interaction variable between the PE 
fund ownership dummy variable (PEFi,t), and the proxy for debt monitoring 
(DEBT_MONi). It measures the effect of being PE fund owned together with being 
exposed to debt monitoring and will more directly test the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 is thus satisfied if there is a positive significant impact on portfolio firm 
performance from this interaction term (proxy for the debt monitoring tool used by PE 
funds). In this specification there is controlled for the debt monitoring proxy together 
with the initial controls (firm size, firm age and industry affiliation). 
 
itjiitit eControlsMONDEBTMONDEBTPEFy +++∗+= βββα _)_( 21  
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In the final step short-term debt information is applied because debt with shorter 
maturity is traditionally more expensive and therefore will have a greater incentive 
effect (among others Cotter and Peck, 2001). Furthermore, it is relevant to test the 
impact of short term debt since it is widely used in these kinds of transactions (Cotter 
and Peck, 2001). The proxy of having large short-term debt obligations is defined as if 
the average short-term debt obligations accounts for more than 95 percent of the 
average total debt – which is corresponding to the 75-fractile. If this is the case the 
variable equals one, otherwise if the short-term debt accounts for less than that criteria 
the variable equals zero. Next, this dummy variable (STDEBT_MONi) is multiplied 
with the PE fund ownership dummy variable (PEFi,t). This interaction measures the 
effect of being PE fund owned together with being exposed to high short-term debt 
monitoring. If hypothesis 2 is satisfied there should be a positive effect on portfolio 
firm performance from this variable. I believe that this proxy is a better test of the free 
cash flow hypothesis. The controls are as before. 
 
itjiitit eControlsMONSTDEBTMONSTDEBTPEFy +++∗+= βββα _)_( 21  
 
As previously mentioned a limitation here is the focus on the portfolio company, i.e. 
not the holding company level. This is a problem since a substantial fraction of the debt 
is placed at the holding company level, however, debt is also issued at the portfolio 
firm. The full impact of debt is therefore not necessarily captured. Even though it is not 
the first best solution one might still get some useful insights on how portfolio firm 
level debt (it is still increasing) affects firm efficiency.  
 
3.2.3. Stakeholder Expropriation hypothesis 
 
The redistribution of rents from corporate stakeholders (employees, creditors, tax 
authorities etc.) to shareholders – the stakeholder expropriation hypothesis - states that 
owners may behave opportunistic such that they benefit themselves while harming 
stakeholders (e.g. Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Marais et al., 1989; Renneboog and 
Simons, 2005). Shleifer and Summers (1988) define expropriation as a breach of 
implicit contracts. The idea is that complete contracting is costly and therefore many 
 50
relationships between especially the management and stakeholders are based on trust. 
However, a new owner is not necessarily committed to uphold implicit contracts with 
stakeholders made by the incumbent management. For instance if the new owner 
removes the incumbent manager it can then renege on the contracts and expropriate 
rents from stakeholders. 
 
Expropriation can take different forms – leverage affects tax payments, monetary 
transfers through dividend, asset stripping, wage reductions or employee layoffs etc. 
Since increasing debt is part of the LBO design and are for other reasons potentially 
beneficial (see hypothesis 2) expropriation through debt will not be further pursued in 
this analysis. Taxes are also neglected due to poor data availability. Instead the 
primarily focus is on investigating the dividend policy. Further, it is also tested whether 
layoffs are present in data. However, stakeholder expropriation is not necessarily social 
economic inefficient. For instance, the operating improvements from layoffs may 
outweigh the social costs.  
 
Hypothesis 3: PE funds are more likely, and more sensitive if ‘shocks’ occur, to pay out 
higher dividends compared to other firms, i.e. leaving the portfolio firms with fewer 
funds for re-investments.  
 
In hypothesis 3 I test whether PE funds are more likely to expropriate than other 
owners. A direct test is therefore whether dividends are affected by PE fund ownership 
– and also if portfolio firms are more sensitive in the dividend payout policy than the 
control group. By sensitive it is meant that firms could overreact or under react due to 
economic ‘shocks’ in the aggregate industry trend of dividends. Influenced by the 
econometric methodology of Bertrand et al. (2002) on tunneling in business groups it is 
examined how sensitive portfolio firms are in their dividend policy towards changes in 
the predicted industry levels of dividends compared to similar firms. The dependent 
variable is the firm-specific dividend payout ratio (DIVi,t) and as explanatory variables 
the dividend payout industry average (DIV_INDi,t) and an interaction term between the 
dividend payout industry average and the PE fund ownership dummy variable (PEFi,t) 
are employed. This industry average measure (DIV_IND) can be interpreted as the 
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predicted firm-specific dividend payout ratio or the dividend payout ratio in absence of 
expropriation. The interaction variable captures the differential sensitivity of portfolio 
firms. So, if the expropriation hypothesis is apparent portfolio firms are expected to 
have higher dividend payout ratios and to be more sensitive towards changes in 
industry levels of dividends, i.e. β2 should be positive. Furthermore, firm size, firm age, 
industry dummies and year dummies (Yeart) serves as controls. Different measures of 
the industry dividend payout ratios averages are applied.   
 
Summing up, the coefficient β1 measures the general sensitivity of firms to industry 
dividend ratio levels, and the interaction term (PEF*DIV_IND) captures the differential 
sensitivity of portfolio firms. If portfolio firms are more sensitive, as expropriation 
would predict, then β2 should be positive. 
 
Finally, hypothesis 3 is also tested by assessing the impact of PE fund ownership on 
size and growth of employees, i.e. proxies for layoffs.  
 
itjititit eControlsINDDIVPEFINDDIVDIV ++∗++= βββα )_(_ 21  
 
4. Results 
4.1. The performance impact of PE fund ownership 
 
Table 3 presents the relative impact of PE fund ownership using different measures of 
firm performance (GROA, OROA, ROA, asset turnover, ROCE and asset growth).  
The measures of operating performance (GROA, OROA and ROA) all suggest that 
portfolio firms (at a 1-percentage significance level for all the estimations except 
OROA) underperform compared to a set of comparable firms. More specific, post-
buyout operating profitability is on average between 2 and 8 percentage points lower 
for portfolio firms relatively to the control firms – these are changes of substantial 
magnitude. The effect is largest on GROA. However, it appears from table 2 that the 
portfolio firms still have positive profit margins. The results are robust to different 
econometric specifications - using industry dummies or fixed effects.  
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Dependent variable
Constant 0.7350 *** 1.5240 *** -0.0808 * -0.1838 -0.0898 *** -0.0667 0.7669 *** 1.3483 *** -0.0078 0.1796 * 0.0725 -0.3721
0.0685 0.3588 0.0419 0.1389 0.0275 0.0772 0.0499 0.1401 0.0385 0.0971 0.0577 0.2663
PE fund ownership -0.0537 *** -0.0836 *** -0.0236 ** -0.0695 *** -0.0320 *** -0.0413 *** 0.0175 -0.0171 -0.0155 -0.0661 * -0.1057 *** -0.1051 ***
0.0190 0.0306 0.0103 0.0203 0.0104 0.0156 0.0132 0.0141 0.0156 0.0374 0.0233 0.0389
Log of totalassets -0.0321 *** -0.0910 *** 0.0076 ** 0.0237 * 0.0054 ** 0.0079 0.0038 -0.0511 *** 0.0045 * -0.0026 0.0205 *** 0.1359 ***
0.0060 0.0355 0.0035 0.0142 0.0023 0.0078 0.0044 0.0126 0.0026 0.0098 0.0054 0.0252
Firm age 0.0516 *** 0.0341 0.0173 *** -0.0045 0.0166 *** 0.0054 0.0352 *** 0.0542 ** 0.0130 *** -0.0219 -0.0623 *** -0.3523 ***
0.0077 0.0277 0.0039 0.0166 0.0031 0.0122 0.0059 0.0230 0.0043 0.0182 0.0107 0.0450
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2720 2720 2976 2976 3025 3025 2022 2022 2268 2268 2718 2718
R-square 0.114 0.062 0.070 0.146 0.061 0.060
R-square within 0.073 0.018 0.007 0.056 0.012 0.077
R-square between 0.015 0.005 0.021 0.003 0.034 0.029
R-square overall 0.021 0.008 0.018 0.007 0.002 0.024
Table 3
(2) (4) (6) (12)(1) (11)
The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy variable that equals one every year a PE fund owns the firm and otherwise zero (including control firms). Control group 
firms are matched on size and industry from a sample of firms that has been through an ownership transition within the period. 73 portfolio firms and 545 controls firms are employed. Each 
portfolio firm is matched with up to the 5 nearest firms within each year, measured on absolute asset size. Robust standard errors are below the parameter estimates. The ***, ** and * denotes 
respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control group firms is significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level.
The Impact from Private Equity Fund Ownership on Firm Performance
The table reports OLS regressions on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the period 1991-2004. Eqs. (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) use industry dummies while eqs. (2), 
(4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) use fixed effects. The dependent variables are yearly operating profit margins (gross profits to total assets, GROA; primary result to total assets, OROA; netincome to total 
assets, ROA; return on capital employed is measured as primary result relatively to debt plus equity, ROCE), yearly asset turnover (sales to total assets) and yearly asset growth. 
GROA Asset turnover
(9)
ROCE
(3)
OROA
(5)
ROA Asset growth
(7) (8) (10)
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Other performance measures are also examined but the effects are not as strong as for 
the operating measures. Asset growth is significantly lower by 11 percentage points. 
One explanation could be that since portfolio firms are larger ex ante the lower relative 
asset growth is due to the fact that control firms are smaller and therefore maybe in a 
better position to grow. Further, significantly lower growth rates in sales and in number 
of employees are also found for the portfolio firms but these results are not reported.30 
The effect on ROCE is negatively though only significant for the fixed effects model. 
Finally, the model estimated for asset turnover controlling for industry effects gives us 
the only positive result but insignificant for PE fund ownership. Remember from table 
2 that post-buyout portfolio firms have a significantly fall in this ratio. Notice that asset 
turnover is sometimes interpreted as a proxy for managerial efficiency, i.e. the more 
sales the management generate from firm investments (assets) the better. Thus 
managerial efficiency does not seem to be improved either. As discussed earlier firms 
are not obliged to report sales figures so the use of this measure may introduce a 
positive bias on the ratio if firms with sales growth are more likely to report.  
 
In table 4 I perform the equivalent analysis for operating performance by applying the 
difference-in-difference methodology. Using event windows of -1/+3 years and -3/+3 
years similar to earlier studies (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990) the present results are 
not altered. The impact is even larger since GROA is 13-15 percentage points lower, 
OROA is 6 percentage points lower, and ROA is 4-5 percentage points lower than the 
benchmark firms. The main findings are thus supported and crucially it does not seem 
as if the results are driven by the choice of econometric specification – standard OLS or 
difference-in-difference methodology. However, I proceed with the initial empirical 
methodology due to the reasons discussed earlier.  
 
The main finding is inconsistent with the majority of the most comparable studies 
(Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; Cressy et al., 2007; Guo et al., 2007) yet it is supported 
by Desbrières and Schatt (2002) and also partly by Guo et al. (2007). These mentioned 
                                                 
30 Remember that the asset growth is examined since, as earlier noted, firms are not obliged to report firm sales or 
firm employment – hence looking at sales and employment could introduce a bias because a firm may only report 
numbers of e.g. sales if they had improved. On average these are significantly 5 and 8 percentage points lower for 
respectively sales growth and employee growth. 
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studies have documented highly diverse magnitude of effects on firm performance. For 
instance Kaplan (1989a) finds that the operating income of 48 MBOs in the U.S. during 
1980-1986 increased by 42% over a three-year period after the buyout. Whereas Cressy 
et al. (2007) documents an increase in operating profitability of about 4-5%. A study on 
USA that investigated a similar period 1990-2006 found that gains in operating 
performance are either comparable to or exceeding applied benchmarks (Guo et al., 
2007). Depending on event window and performance measures used the significantly 
change ranges between minus 8% to plus 29%. Hence, according to this study the 
results from the more recent buyout activity indicate a weaker association between PE 
fund ownership and operational performance improvements.31   
 
Dependent variable
Constant -0.0073 -0.0286 0.0262 0.1435 0.0028 0.0002
0.0950 0.0882 0.0660 0.1503 0.0828 0.0544
PE fund ownership -0.1458 *** -0.0570 ** -0.0461 * -0.1299 ** -0.0595 *** -0.0404 *
0.0479 0.0247 0.0241 0.0636 0.0231 0.0239
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 610 689 698 374 435 441
R-square 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.030 0.009 0.014
Table 4
-1/+3 year event window -3/+3 year event window
(1) (2) (3)
The Impact from Private Equity Fund Ownership on Firm Operating 
Performance: Difference-in-Difference approach
The table reports OLS regressions on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the period 
1991-2004. The dependent variables measures the differences in yearly operating profit margins (gross profits to 
total assets, GROA; primary result to total assets, OROA; netincome to total assets, ROA) - and the event 
windows are: minus 1 year before the buyout to 3 years after the buyout, and minus 3 years before the buyout to 3 
years after the buyout. 
OROAGROA OROA ROA ROA
The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy variable that equals one in the year of 
entry - and zero for control firms. Control group firms are matched on size and industry from a sample of firms 
that has been through an ownership transition within the period. Each portfolio firm is matched with up to the 5 
nearest firms within each year, measured on absolute asset size. The event year corresponds to the buyout year. 
The controls are firm size (log of total assets) and firm age (log). Robust standard errors are below the parameter 
estimates. The ***, ** and * denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms 
and control group firms is significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level. 
(4) (5) (6)
GROA
 
 
Overall, the results from table 3 and 4 support the evidence from table 2. To sum up, 
PE fund ownership and its so-called superior corporate governance model does not 
                                                 
31 A related study on hedge fund ownership shows that accounting performance drops after the entry of hedge funds in 
the ownership of target firms (e.g. Klein and Zur, 2006). 
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seem to have a beneficial impact on portfolio firm performance – on the contrary post-
buyout performance measures falls relatively to a set of comparable firms.32  
 
4.2. Goodwill-adjusted performance effects 
 
The results so far could be driven by asset boosting within the portfolio firms. Asset 
boosting is a common feature in acquisitions and especially PE fund transactions where 
post-buyout goodwill is often written up. Goodwill adjustments are mainly due to 
differences in takeover price and actual firm values. Asset boosting or large asset 
growth is problematic for this analysis since it increases the asset base and thus 
automatically lowers the used performance measures. In the present data, however it 
does not seem to be the case since asset growth in portfolio firms is lower than for the 
benchmark firms (see table 2). It could be that asset boosting takes place at the holding 
company level and not at the portfolio firm level which is my focus.  
 
Even though there is little support for the asset boosting argument in my data it will be 
investigated thoroughly by attempting to goodwill adjust the results. This is done by 
estimating the size of goodwill adjustments. It is proxied that goodwill adjustments 
equal the change in firm equity plus retained earnings (net income subtracted dividend 
payments, REarnings). Hence, it measures changes in equity which are not attributable 
to retained earnings. This estimate is then subtracted from the total assets and the new 
goodwill adjusted total assets are now used as the base when calculating the 
performance measures and the potential bias from goodwill valuations are removed.  
 
( ) tttt REarningsEquityEquityGoodwill +−= −1  
tttadjusted GoodwillsTotalassetsTotalasset −=,  
                                                 
32 The results remain robust when only PE fund ownership with more than 2 years duration is investigated (not 
reported).  
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Table 5
Dependent variable
Constant 0.7883 *** 1.7670 *** -0.0713 -0.2206 -0.0838 ** -0.0797 0.8325 *** 1.3575 *** -0.0228 0.2122 * -0.0477 -0.5668
0.0819 0.4684 0.0533 0.1985 0.0337 0.0958 0.0586 0.1751 0.0442 0.1153 0.0691 0.3803
PE fund ownership -0.0663 *** -0.0901 *** -0.0122 -0.0772 *** -0.0223 ** -0.0402 ** 0.0114 -0.0236 -0.0089 -0.0532 * -0.0578 ** -0.1316 ***
0.0205 0.0347 0.0131 0.0248 0.0109 0.0175 0.0132 0.0146 0.0159 0.0311 0.0288 0.0466
Log of totalassets -0.0354 *** -0.1090 ** 0.0083 * 0.0241 0.0061 ** 0.0090 -0.0008 -0.0470 *** 0.0067 ** -0.0139 0.0224 *** 0.1288 ***
0.0070 0.0455 0.0043 0.0190 0.0028 0.0093 0.0053 0.0150 0.0031 0.0105 0.0065 0.0349
Firm age 0.0493 *** 0.0329 0.0120 *** 0.0094 0.0129 *** 0.0075 0.0306 *** 0.0398 0.0086 * 0.0149 -0.0341 *** -0.2662 ***
0.0085 0.0354 0.0040 0.0202 0.0033 0.0142 0.0070 0.1751 0.0048 0.0234 0.0124 0.0637
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2011 2011 2162 2162 2188 2188 1533 1533 1698 1698 1675 1675
R-square 0.148 0.049 0.064 0.129 0.060 0.036
R-square within 0.102 0.021 0.008 0.052 0.009 0.058
R-square between 0.013 0.025 0.046 0.001 0.001 0.009
R-square overall 0.021 0.009 0.014 0.006 0.001 0.013
GROA
(11)
Asset turnover
(9)
ROCE
The Impact from Private Equity Fund Ownership on Firm Performance - Goodwill Adjusted
Asset growth
(7) (8) (10)(3)
OROA
(1)
ROA
The table reports OLS regressions on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the period 1991-2004. Eqs. (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) use industry dummies while eqs. (2), (4), 
(6), (8), (10) and (12) use fixed effects. The dependent variables are yearly goodwill-adjusted operating profit margins (gross profits to goodwill adjusted total assets, GROA; primary result to 
goodwill adjusted total assets, OROA; netincome to goodwill adjusted total assets, ROA; return on capital employed (ROCE) is measured as primary result relatively to (goodwill adjusted) debt plus 
equity, ROCE), yearly asset turnover (sales to goodwill adjusted total assets) and yearly goodwill adjusted asset growth. 
The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy variable that equals one every year a PE fund owns the firm and otherwise zero (including control firms). Control group 
firms are matched on size and industry from a sample of firms that has been through an ownership transition within the period. 73 portfolio firms and 545 controls firms are employed. Each portfolio 
firm is matched with up to the 5 nearest firms within each year, measured on absolute asset size. Goodwill is proxied as retained earnings in year t minus the change in equity in year t. Goodwill-
adjusted total assets equals total assets minus the calculated goodwill proxy, and this measure is instead used as base variable when calculating the performance measures. For ROCE goodwill are 
also subtracted in the denominator. Robust standard errors are below the parameter estimates. The ***, ** and * denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms 
and control group firms is significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level. 
(2) (4) (6)(5) (12)
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Table 5 presents the goodwill adjusted models otherwise similar to the models from 
table 3. The models that are controlled for industry affiliation (1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11) 
again suggest a negative significant impact of PE fund ownership. The results are not as 
highly significant as the base models presented in table 3, for instance the negative 
effect on OROA is not significant on a 10 percentage level and the negative impact on 
asset growth is now also only significant on a 10 percentage level. The fixed effects 
models (2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12) are all except asset turnover strongly supportive of 
portfolio firm underperformance at a 10 percentage significance level.  
 
Overall, after controlling for goodwill adjustments a negative impact of PE fund 
ownership is still found. Nevertheless, the findings also suggest that goodwill 
adjustments could be responsible for a small effect in the analysis. One problem with 
this approach is that many observations become excluded. It is therefore preferred to 
use non-adjusted performance measures in the following. Firstly, the results are not 
greatly altered and secondly since data limitations are avoided.  
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
4.3.1. Control groups 
 
One concern is whether the results are depending on the choice of control group. This is 
addressed by modifying the matching criteria in three ways. Firstly, the condition that 
control firms must have realized a change in ownership is relaxed – meaning that 
control firms are now (only) matched by industry and size as described before. This 
approach yields 868 control firms. Appendix table A1 (panel A) shows the results and 
report that the negative impact on operating performance is significant at a 10 
percentage significance level for all operating performance measures. It is a natural 
consequence since larger variation is introduced in the data, thus control firms are 
presumable not as identical to portfolio firms as in the first approach.  
 
Next, the criteria for how many control firms should be incorporate are relaxed. Instead 
of including maximally 5 control firms per portfolio firm each year it is eased to 
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maximally 2 control firms per portfolio firm and year (before and after the buyout). The 
matching criteria are now the following; i) been through an ownership change; ii) is in 
the same industry (NACE classifications) and similar in size. Each portfolio firm is 
now matched with up to the 2 nearest firms measured on assets in each given year and 
industry. Nearest is defined as the squared annual difference between absolute values of 
total assets of portfolio firms and control firms. Using this approach 367 control firms 
are now employed. These estimations (panel B) show a strong significant result of 
underperformance of portfolio firms at a 5 percentage significance level for all 
operating performance measures together with asset growth. Again results on ROCE 
and asset turnover are insignificant.  
 
Finally, the matching methodology is changed such that portfolio firms are first 
matched on size and industry, and secondly control firms that have not experienced an 
ownership change are excluded. Following this approach 446 control firms are now 
employed. The results are reported in panel C and show that PE fund ownership is 
(still) associated with lower portfolio firm performance.  
 
In panel D firm size is compared between portfolio firms and control firms in the 
different control groups. Portfolio firms are larger (log of total assets) which is 
consistent with the characteristics of the main control group. This indicate that it is not 
(only) the matching methodology that explains diverging firm sizes between portfolio 
firm sample and control group sample.  
 
The initial control group is preferred because a greater pool of firms is used as 
comparison and thereby the results are not depending on whether those (maximum) 2 
control firms are well-suited as benchmarks.   
 
4.3.2. Firm size 
 
The results could depend on firm size and therefore firm size effects are treated in the 
following. It could be that PE funds are better at managing larger firms or that large 
buyouts proxy for highly-skilled PE funds with impressive prior results. I have already 
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controlled for firm size through log of assets in the econometric specifications but 
appendix table A2 shows the post-buyout impact on portfolio firms depending on firm 
size. It is defined that the average total assets of a large firm must exceed the median 
value33 – thus below this threshold firms are considered as small. There are statistically 
differences between the subgroup regressions. In general large firms are worse off with 
PE fund ownership. PE fund ownership now has a positive but not significant impact on 
GROA for small firms. Further, managerial efficiency (asset turnover) is now very 
significantly improved by PE fund ownership among small firms. Both measures are 
statistically different between large and small firms. Overall, the main finding does not 
seem to be greatly affected by firm size – however if anything the results favour PE 
fund ownership in small firms. To some extend similar results are found in the venture 
capital (VC) literature since VC-backed firms34 out-performs comparable firms (e.g. 
Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Gompers et al., 2006).35  
 
4.4. Hypotheses testing 
4.4.1. The Ownership hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis 1 is tested by investigating how changes in ownership structure affect post-
buyout performance. The hypothesis predicts that portfolio firms which experience an 
increase in the ownership concentration around buyout time will benefit from 
elimination of agency costs, i.e. improved firm performance. 
 
The test procedure is carefully explained earlier but the two following sub-samples are 
compared; 1) Where (majority) ownership concentration has increased (Panel B). 2) 
Where (majority) ownership concentration has fallen or remained the same (Panel C).  
Remember that availability of data only allows me to analyse the impact on the reduced 
sample of portfolio firms and not relatively to control firms. Through external data 
                                                 
33 109 mill. DKR is the median of an average firm’s total assets in the sample. Remember that compared with 
other countries Danish firms are traditionally small or middle-sized. 
34 VC-backed firms are per definition small and in a growth-phase. 
35 The results are not greatly affected if the sample is divided into two groups by sample mean instead of sample 
median results. However, it should be noted that the statistical differences become more severe in favour of large 
firms (unreported). It is also checked whether the results were driven by specifically large portfolio firms. In 
particular the following large Danish companies - Nycomed, Superfos and Falck - are either separately or 
simultaneously excluded. Excluding these specific firms does not alter the results (not reported).  
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collection information on 42 of the 73 portfolio firms is gathered and approximately 
thirty percent of these portfolio firms experience an increase in the (majority) 
ownership concentration after the buyout. This alone is interesting since it is commonly 
argued that one benefit of the PE fund corporate governance model is improved 
monitoring through higher ownership concentration. On contrary, this data justify that 
the post-buyout ownership concentration in many cases fall. One reason could be that 
the initial owner stays in the ownership as a minority owner, e.g. a founding-family that 
keeps an ownership stake. However usable information on this is rather limited. 
Moreover, many deals concerns already privately-held firms thus the changes in the 
ownership concentration are relatively small. Altogether it indicates the presence of an 
opposite effect from the change in ownership concentration. This could explain the 
main finding of low portfolio firm performance. 
 
In table 6 hypothesis 1 is tested by statistically testing the difference in the parameter 
estimates between the two sub-samples of portfolio firms. Table 6 shows that portfolio 
firms with a post-buyout increase in (majority) ownership concentration realizes a 
positive although insignificant impact on firm performance for all performance 
measures except asset growth from PE fund ownership (Panel B). Even though the 
impact is insignificant it is notable since previous results were strongly negative. 
Portfolio firms with a post-buyout decrease in ownership concentration experience a 
negative significant impact on firm performance as predicted (Panel C). Hence, it 
seems like changes in ownership concentration matters. Further, if these differences in 
the estimates are tested they are all significantly different except for asset turnover. 
Note, that even though the sample is small the results are still strongly significant. One 
could also compare the 95% confidence intervals of the estimates and similar to what is 
already found GROA, OROA, ROA and ROCE all falls outside each others confidence 
intervals (unreported). 
 
The results found here seems to support hypothesis 1 which predicts that agency costs 
savings from better control and incentives leads to portfolio firm performance 
improvements. Moreover, the results support somewhat related studies (Kaplan, 1989a; 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990) thus implying that PE funds 
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accomplish gains from eliminating agency cost within firms where post-buyout 
ownership concentration is higher.  
Furthermore, the result suggest that at least in this data portfolio firm underperformance 
could be explained by the fact that vast portfolio firms realizes a fall in the ownership 
concentration which leads to theoretically larger post-buyout agency costs.36  
 
This finding also relates to the broader literature on ownership and firm performance. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no empirically relationship between ownership and 
performance, however, Morck et al. (1988) documented a non-linear relationship 
between ownership and performance. According to their study board ownership has a 
positive impact when the ownership stake ranges between of 0-5% and above 25%. In 
between (5-25%) there is a negative effect. Their finding somewhat support the PE 
fund (majority) ownership model. Furthermore, McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
investigated how equity ownership relates to corporate value. They suggest that 
corporate value increases with insider equity ownership up to approximately 40-50% of 
ownership and afterward there is a slightly negative relationship.  
 
In this study it can only be demonstrated that post-buyout ownership concentration on 
average decreases, (mainly) due to high pre-buyout ownership concentration. Remark 
that Danish firms traditionally have a concentrated ownership, caused by the severe 
presence of family firms (Bennedsen et al., 2007). This spurs fewer potential benefits 
from post-buyout agency cost savings from ownership structure. A related study 
(Desbrières and Schatt, 2002) from France found that post-buyout performance dropped 
and that it was mainly caused by the large fraction of family buyouts, i.e. firms with 
pre-buyout concentrated ownership. 
 
                                                 
36 An analysis was also performed on 2 subgroups of the reduced sample of portfolio firms: 1) portfolio firms with one 
owner at the buyout time (proxy for concentrated ownership), 2) portfolio firms with more than one owner at the buyout 
time. However, the regression results between these groups did not differ – both experienced a significant fall in 
performance. These results are not reported.   
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Table 6
Testing the Ownership Hypothesis 
Dependent variable
A. All portfolio firms
Constant 1.1792 *** 0.1298 *** 0.0751 *** 1.0972 *** 0.0236 *** 0.1611
0.1344 0.0459 0.0114 0.0896 0.0427 0.1061
PE fund ownership -0.1771 *** -0.0576 *** -0.0544 *** -0.0417 *** -0.0548 *** -0.1056 ***
0.0250 0.0111 0.0114 0.0144 0.0171 0.0279
Log of totalassets -0.0501 *** -0.0052 -0.0044 -0.0128 -0.0096 *** 0.0118
0.0107 0.0035 0.0033 0.0084 0.0037 0.0094
Firm age 0.0365 *** 0.0140 *** 0.0146 *** 0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0425 **
0.0107 0.0053 0.0048 0.0097 0.0055 0.0165
Observations 779 832 853 763 707 759
R-square 0.096 0.045 0.044 0.025 0.026 0.030
B. Post-buyout increase in ownership concentration 
Constant -0.8314 ** 0.0421 0.0699 * 1.1234 *** 0.3486 *** 0.1400
0.3843 0.0567 0.0409 0.0748 0.1025 0.3499
PE fund ownership 0.0266 0.0287 0.0295 0.0141 0.0290 -0.1542 ***
0.0474 0.0225 0.0224 0.0178 0.0219 0.0565
Log of totalassets 0.1187 *** 0.0080 * 0.0023 -0.0121 * -0.0166 ** 0.0287
0.0385 0.0049 0.0032 0.0069 0.0083 0.0373
Firm age -0.0850 ** -0.0161 ** -0.0102 * 0.0045 -0.0048 -0.0988
0.0396 0.0072 0.0056 0.0087 0.0081 0.0610
Observations 103 111 116 107 100 106
R-square 0.167 0.059 0.035 0.019 0.124 0.109
C. Post-buyout fall in ownership concentration 
Constant 2.0076 *** 0.2248 0.1221 0.9642 *** 0.0429 0.2228
0.3072 0.1506 0.1582 0.1581 0.1450 0.3133
PE fund ownership -0.1382 *** -0.0689 *** -0.0485 ** -0.0205 -0.0880 ** -0.0405
0.0386 0.0214 0.0217 0.0250 0.0412 0.0559
Log of totalassets -0.1198 *** -0.0100 -0.0048 -0.0048 0.0065 0.0135
0.0254 0.0128 0.0137 0.0137 0.0127 0.0250
Firm age 0.0753 *** 0.0080 0.0025 0.0148 -0.0059 -0.0767 ***
0.0156 0.0076 0.0072 0.0132 0.0097 0.0267
Observations 276 292 296 275 233 259
R-square 0.216 0.043 0.025 0.009 0.022 0.036
Difference in estimates 
(Panel B-C)
0.1648 *** 0.0976 *** 0.0780 *** 0.0346 0.1170 *** -0.1137 **
Standard error 0.0412 0.0217 0.0219 0.0232 0.0365 0.0561
The table reports OLS regressions on the reduced sample of portfolio firms (excluding control firms) over the period 1991-2004. 
The dependent variables are yearly operating profit margins (gross profits to total assets, GROA; primary result to total assets, 
OROA; netincome to total assets, ROA; return on capital employed is measured as primary result relatively to debt plus equity, 
ROCE), yearly asset turnover (sales to total assets) and yearly asset growth. 
(6)
Asset growth
The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy variable that equals one every year a PE fund owns the 
firm and otherwise zero (the control firms are excluded). The data is divided into the two subgroups by measuring the difference in 
(majority) ownership concentration after and before the buyout. Thus if the ownership concentration has increased it falls in the 
group of firms with a post-buyout increase in ownership concentration. Otherwise if portfolio firms experience a fall in ownership 
concentration or if it remains unchanged it falls in the group with post-buyout decrease in ownership concentration. Robust standard 
errors are below the parameter estimates. The ***, ** and * denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the 
portfolio firms and control group firms is significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level.
GROA OROA ROA Asset turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ROCE
 
 
The support for hypothesis 1 therefore provides us with a motive for public-to-private 
deals, i.e. PE funds should focus on publicly-traded firms since the ownership structure 
all else equal is more disperse than in privately-held firms. However, during 1991-2004 
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only about 15 percent of the Danish PE fund transactions were public-to-private 
transactions, but this may have changed lately. For example Thomsen and Vinten 
(2007a, 2007b) documents that the incidence of European going private transactions 
has increased the last decade. 
 
4.4.2. The Debt hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis 2 is examined through three different tests as discussed earlier. The results 
are shown in table 7. The first preliminary finding which is also supported by the 
results in table 2 is that PE fund ownership has a positive significant impact on the 
portfolio firm’s debt ratio. On average the debt ratio increases by approximately 5 
percentage points which is rather low when the LBO structure is taken into 
consideration. However, this is not surprising since most of the debt issuing takes place 
at the holding company level.  
 
The first test of hypothesis 2 shows that there is a negative significant (except on asset 
turnover) impact from the interaction between PE fund ownership and the debt ratio 
level (see model 2, 5, 8, 11 and 14). Thus this specific test does not support the free 
cash flow hypothesis, yet this method does not take the pre-buyout debt structure or 
debt decomposition into account.  
 
The second test of hypothesis 2 is performed by assuming that the debt monitoring tool 
is employed if the average post-buyout debt to assets ratio is above the average pre-
buyout debt to assets ratio, i.e. a proxy for whether the debt monitoring tool is used. 
The key measure in this test is the interaction variable between the PE fund ownership 
dummy and the debt monitoring proxy. When using this definition approximately 70 
percent of the portfolio firms are exposed to debt monitoring. The following models (3, 
6, 9, 12 and 15) also suggest a negative significant impact on portfolio firm 
performance from this measure of the debt monitoring tool. Again the predictions from 
hypothesis 2 do not manifest themselves in the present data. It should be emphasized 
that a measurement problem might occur when this procedure is applied, due to a low 
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sample of portfolio firms in the non-debt monitoring tool sample. This is also why 
different empirical tests of the hypothesis 2 are performed. 
 
Finally, I focus on determining the monitoring effect of debt with shorter maturity. 
Theoretically this monitoring tool is striking because the capital cost compared to 
longer termed debt obligations is higher. The models (4, 7, 10, 13 and 16) present 
evidence of the free cash flow hypothesis. Estimations show that this debt monitoring 
proxy has a positive and significant impact on GROA and asset turnover but a negative 
insignificant effect on OROA and ROA. The results on GROA and asset turnover are the 
ones which lends support to the free cash flow hypothesis. However, it is a crude proxy 
since according to it only 20 percent of the portfolio firms are exposed to short-term 
debt monitoring – however this should only make it more difficult to obtain significant 
results.37 
 
Little evidence of the free cash flow theory is found in my analysis. This contradicts the 
findings of earlier studies (e.g. Baker and Wruck, 1989; Kaplan, 1989a; Cotter and 
Peck, 2001; Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2005; Cressy et al., 2007).38 However, it seems 
like short-term debt is a more sufficient monitoring tool since it may lead to 
performance improvements. One main reason why little evidence of the free cash flow 
hypothesis is found could be that this analysis is performed at the parent company level. 
However, in many such deals capital structure is mostly affected at the holding 
company level. This will unfortunately not be captured by this approach. Another 
explanation could be that buyouts are today less leveraged compared earlier 
transactions in the 1980s (Kaplan and Stein, 1993; Guo et al., 2007). However, since 
data from the 1980s is not available here this argument can not be further tested. 
 
Intriguingly, Axelson et al. (2007) raises a different motivation for high firm debt – 
namely that debt mitigates governance problems between limited partners and general 
partners at the PE fund level. 
                                                 
37 The positively significant results becomes insignificant when the assumption of having large short-term 
obligations are lowered from the 75-fractile (95% of the total debt is short-termed debt) to the median (80% of the 
total debt is short-termed debt). This indicates that these results are dependent on choice of short-term debt level. 
38 Other studies has also suggested that the free cash flow hypothesis determines LBO activity (e.g. Lehn and Poulsen, 
1989; Opler and Titman, 1993). 
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Table 7
Testing the Debt Hypothesis
Dependent variable
Constant 0.690 *** 0.673 *** 0.736 *** 0.744 *** -0.019 -0.073 * -0.094 **
0.031 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.037 0.043 0.044
PE fund ownership (PEF) 0.047 ***
0.012
PEF*DEBTASS -0.092 *** -0.028 *
0.030 0.016
PEF*(DEBT MONITORING) -0.053 ** -0.018 *
0.024 0.010
PEF*(SHORT-TERM DEBT MONITORING) 0.135 ** -0.021
0.065 0.038
Debt to assets ratio 0.083 ** -0.089 ***
0.041 0.023
DEBT MONITORING 0.007 -0.010
0.015 0.008
SHORT-TERM DEBT MONITORING 0.005 0.033 ***
0.021 0.010
Log of totalassets -0.001 -0.032 *** -0.033 *** -0.034 *** 0.007 ** 0.007 ** 0.008 **
0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004
Firm age -0.024 *** 0.054 *** 0.051 *** 0.053 *** 0.015 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 ***
0.005 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.004
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3020 2718 2720 2720 2972 2976 2976
R-square 0.063 0.116 0.113 0.113 0.071 0.062 0.065
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Constant 0.008 -0.085 *** -0.102 *** 0.724 *** 0.780 *** 0.772 *** 0.016 0.054 0.062
0.026 0.028 0.028 0.059 0.050 0.052 0.065 0.058 0.088
PEF*DEBTASS -0.034 ** 0.024 -0.161 ***
0.016 0.019 0.037
PEF*(DEBT MONITORING) -0.035 *** 0.014 -0.114 ***
0.012 0.017 0.028
PEF*(SHORT-TERM DEBT MONITORING) -0.025 0.096 *** -0.158 **
0.040 0.027 0.066
Debt to assets ratio -0.142 *** 0.062 * 0.086 *
0.018 0.036 0.048
DEBT MONITORING -0.006 -0.023 ** 0.049 ***
0.007 0.011 0.018
SHORT-TERM DEBT MONITORING 0.034 *** -0.012 0.025
0.009 0.015 0.022
Log of totalassets 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.006 ** 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.018 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Firm age 0.013 *** 0.017 *** 0.018 *** 0.036 *** 0.037 *** 0.035 *** -0.060 *** -0.066 *** -0.061 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.011
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3020 3025 3025 2021 2022 2022 2714 2718 2718
R-square 0.104 0.070 0.073 0.149 0.147 0.147 0.062 0.061 0.056
ROA Asset turnover Asset growth
Debt to assets 
ratio
(4) (5)
The table reports OLS regressions with industy dummies on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the period 1991-2004. The dependent 
variables are yearly debt-to-assets ratio and yearly operating profit margins (gross profits to total assets, GROA; primary result to total assets, OROA; netincome 
to total assets, ROA), yearly asset turnover (sales to total assets) and yearly asset growth. The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy 
variable that equals one every year a PE fund owns the firm and otherwise zero (including control firms). Control group firms are matched on size and industry 
from a sample of firms that has been through an ownership transition within the period. 73 portfolio firms and 545 controls firms are employed. Each portfolio 
firm is matched with up to the 5 nearest firms within each year, measured on absolute asset size. 
DEBTASS is the debt-to-assets ratio so PEF*DEBTASS is the interaction term between PE fund ownership and firm debt-level (see eqs. (2), (5), (8), (11) and 
(14)). DEBT MONITORING is a dummy variable which assigns a firm with the value of 1 if the average pre-buyout (ownership change) debt-to-assets ratio is 
below the median and if the average post-buyout (ownership change) debt ratio is above the median. Otherwise zero. PEF*DEBT_MON is thus the interaction 
term between PE fund ownership and the use of the debt monitoring tool (see eqs. (3), (6), (9), (12) and (15)). SHORT-TERM DEBT MONITORING is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the average short-term debt accounts for more than 95 percent of the total debt. Otherwise zero. PEF*SHDEBT_MON is thus the 
interaction between PE fund ownership and the use of the short-term debt monitoring tool (see eqs. (4), (7), (10), (13) and (16)) . Robust standard errors are below 
the parameter estimates. The ***, ** and * denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control group firms is 
significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level. 
(3)(1) (6)
GROA OROA
(2) (7)
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4.4.3. Stakeholder Expropriation hypothesis 
 
Table 2 may already indicate expropriation since dividend payouts increases together 
with falling equity ratio after the takeover. The number of employees does not 
significantly fall but post-growth in number of employees is lower compared to the 
control firms.  
 
Table 8
Dependent variable
Constant -5.6225 *** -0.0986 ** 0.3787 *** 0.2199 ** 0.3501 ***
0.1569 0.0470 0.0897 0.0896 0.0963
PE fund ownership (PEF) 0.2773 *** -0.0527 ** 0.0869 **
0.0478 0.0229 0.0369
PEF*DIV_IND 0.1320 **
0.0594
PEF*DIV_IND_AGG 0.1449 ***
0.0502
DIV_IND 0.2441 ***
0.0390
DIV_IND_AGG 0.0498
0.0547
Log of totalassets 0.8741 *** 0.0190 *** -0.0152 *** -0.0134 ** -0.0158 **
0.0120 0.0049 0.0065 0.0063 0.0065
Firm age 0.1496 *** -0.0461 *** 0.0461 *** 0.0439 *** 0.0468 ***
0.0185 0.0093 0.0126 0.0122 0.0126
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2735 2413 1390 1390 1390
R-square 0.8219 0.0587 0.053 0.084 0.055
Employee 
growth Dividend payout ratio
Testing the Stakeholder Expropriation Hypothesis - Layoffs and the Dividend 
Policy
The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy variable that equals one every year a PE 
fund owns the firm and otherwise zero (including control firms). Control group firms are matched on size and 
industry from a sample of firms that has been through an ownership transition within the period. 73 portfolio firms 
and 545 controls firms are employed. Each portfolio firm is matched with up to the 5 nearest firms within each 
year, measured on absolute asset size. Notice that different measures of the dividend payout industry average are 
used - DIV_IND_AGG is the one that applies the most aggregate measure of industry affliation (22 grouping 
compared to 56 grouping). Robust standard errors are below the parameter estimates. The ***, ** and * denotes 
respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control group firms is 
significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level. 
(4) (5)(3)
The table reports OLS regressions on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the period 
1991-2004 including industry dummies and year dummies. The dependent variable in model 1 and 2 is 
respectively log of number of employees, whereas in model 3-5 it is the yearly dividend payout ratio - dividends to 
netincome. 
(1) (2)
Ln(Employees)
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In table 8 (log of) the number of employees and growth of employees are used as 
dependent variables (model 1 and 2). The regressions show that PE fund ownership has 
a positive effect on the number of employees, and a negatively significant impact on 
growth of employees (the impact is insignificant in the fixed effect model). This 
suggests that layoffs are on average not present in the data. However, portfolio firms 
grow less than comparable firms but note that these are also smaller.   
 
Another direct proxy for expropriation is dividend payout which is the focus in the 
following. Especially, it is tested: i) whether portfolio firms are more likely to pay out 
dividends, and ii) whether the dividend policy of portfolio firms is more sensitive to 
changes in their own industry averages of dividend payout ratio.  
 
Model 1 from table 8 shows that portfolio firms has on average a 9 percentage point 
higher dividend payout ratio than the control firms. Further we see that all tested 
models (2-3) document that portfolio firms are significantly more sensitive in their 
dividend payout policy. Hence, it could be interpreted as portfolio firms are over-
responding to own industry changes in dividends, even though it seems like these firms 
initially are paying high dividends (see table 1). The results are robust to different 
aggregate measures of industry affiliations and thereby different definitions of the 
predictions of industry average.  
 
These results regarding the dividend policy therefore indicate that expropriation or 
redistribution of wealth (hypothesis 3) is evident in the data. However, this approach 
says nothing about if this variation of expropriation leads to lower firm efficiency in the 
long run – nonetheless fewer funds are kept within the portfolio firms for new 
investments etc. Nor it says nothing about the social economic impacts. 
 
The empirical literature has not paid much attention to these kinds of wealth transfers 
(Renneboog and Simons, 2005). Shleifer and Summers (1988) argues that new owners 
mainly expropriate the employees in hostile takeovers by reducing employment and 
wages. This present study does not find support for this. Lowenstein (1985) and Kaplan 
(1989b) shows that tax-related benefits should be added to the list of potential 
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expropriation of other stakeholders. Marais et al. (1989) finds through examining 
successful buyouts that bondholders are expropriated through downgradings in 
Moody’s ratings. It is not possible to test tax and creditor exploitation using this data. 
 
4.5. Alternative explanations 
 
In the following different potential endogeneity problems in this analysis are addressed. 
There might be some underlying effects (observed or unobserved) that could bias the 
results. Since it is always difficult to find valid instruments the focus is instead on three 
alternative explanations: selection bias, valuation bias and measurement errors. 
 
4.5.1. Selection bias 
 
One problem with the interpretation of these kinds of analyses is the screening ability 
and preferences of PE funds. Hence, PE funds look for target firms with certain 
characteristics – for instance turnarounds or cash cows. This would introduce a 
selection bias in the results either positively or negatively. For instance back in the 
1980s PE funds focused on acquiring inefficiently run firms, whereas in the latter LBO 
wave the focus is not only on inefficiently run firms. The selection bias will therefore 
interfere with our result if we compare portfolio firms with benchmark firms which 
might have the different characteristics. It has been argued in the literature that PE 
funds are especially good at managing turnaround firms (e.g. Cuny and Talmor, 2006). 
Yet, it is also documented that initial profitability in portfolio firms plays a major role 
in post-buyout performance, i.e. PE fund investment selection is crucial (Cressy et al., 
2007).  
 
This is also why the specific identification strategy is employed when matching the 
control firms because it aims at avoiding selection bias. In this data portfolio firms are 
slightly better performing than the benchmark firms both at the time of the buyout and 
at the four-year averages up to the ownership change (see table 1). It suggests a positive 
selection bias. Thus, a negative selection bias seems to be absent at the entry time. 
Nevertheless, the two groups of firms are not significantly different which indicates that 
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the positive selection bias does not prevail. Moreover, the main finding of lower post-
buyout performance of portfolio firms also seems to reject the importance of the 
positive selection bias.  
  
4.5.2. Valuation bias 
 
If the performance measures applied are not appropriate for a comparison a valuation 
bias could occur. It may be claimed that portfolio firms differ from other privately-held 
firms and publicly-traded firms in various ways therefore operating performance is not 
necessarily the optimal performance measure to use.  
Thus, other firm performance measures are also applied in the analysis – specifically 
asset growth, asset turnover and ROCE. Table 3 and 4 documented that these 
performances shows overall a lesser negative trend following the takeover compared to 
the operating measures. However, none of the measures documents a positive 
significant impact of PE fund ownership. Hence, the main finding of low performance 
in PE fund owned firms is not greatly affected by choice of performance measure.  
 
From the point of view of PE funds appropriate operating performance measures should 
be held relative to total equity. If these performance measures (gross profits and 
primary results, all relative to equity) are applied results becomes insignificant in 
similar regressions to those in section 4.1 (see table 9). Problematically, when return on 
equity measures are used a positive bias is introduced since the post-buyout equity 
stakes are usually lowered. As a consequence such performance measures would 
automatically become positively biased which is also why this approach is neglected in 
the present analysis. 
 
Sales or employees could be used as the base variable instead of assets. It will, 
however, introduce a potential bias in the analysis (as discussed earlier) since firms are 
not obliged to report this information. If these operating measures to sales or employees 
are investigated the overall conclusion remains the same - PE fund ownership is 
associated with lower performance (see table 9). However, the results for primary result 
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Constant 1.009 *** 1.400 *** 0.210 *** 0.366 189.698 *** -85.487 0.394 *** 0.488 * -0.199 ** 0.098 ** -19.522 -70.461
0.123 0.384 0.066 0.223 34.144 104.803 0.077 0.287 0.080 0.100 15.732 51.734
PE fund ownership -0.036 -0.089 -0.061 *** -0.065 *** -33.664 ** -30.057 ** 0.021 -0.042 -0.003 -0.037 ** -17.198 *** -28.948 ***
0.054 0.061 0.012 0.018 15.212 15.279 0.036 0.056 0.012 0.019 6.577 8.340
Log of totalassets 0.012 0.045 0.008 0.013 21.305 *** 35.156 *** -0.015 ** 0.015 0.012 * -0.011 6.654 *** 9.867 **
0.011 0.038 0.006 0.021 3.148 9.314 0.007 0.028 0.006 0.008 1.415 4.689
Firm age 0.084 *** -0.209 *** 0.026 *** -0.038 * -9.731 * 52.025 *** 0.010 -0.123 *** 0.023 *** 0.027 0.708 12.773 *
0.020 0.062 0.006 0.020 5.573 13.706 0.013 0.046 0.008 0.023 2.514 7.659
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2720 2720 1848 1848 2527 2527 2976 2976 1989 1989 2709 2709
R-square 0.043 0.116 0.119 0.019 0.057 0.083
R-square within 0.012 0.032 0.044 0.006 0.005 0.012
R-square between 0.037 0.024 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.018
R-square overall 0.013 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.011
Dependent 
variable:
(10)(7)
Net sales
Table 9
(1) (9)
The Impact from Private Equity Fund Ownership on other Firm Performance
The table reports OLS regressions on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the period 1991-2004. Eqs. (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) use industry dummies while eqs. (2), (4), (6), 
(8), (10) and (12) use fixed effects. The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy variable that equals one every year a PE fund owns the firm and otherwise zero (including 
control firms). Control group firms are matched on size and industry from a sample of firms that has been through an ownership transition within the period. 73 portfolio firms and 545 controls firms are 
employed. Each portfolio firm is matched with up to the 5 nearest firms within each year, measured on absolute asset size. Robust standard errors are below the parameter estimates. The ***, ** and * 
denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control group firms is significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level.
(11) (12)(8)(3) (5)
EmployeesNet sales
(2) (4) (6)
Employees
Gross profits to:
Total equity
Primary result to: 
Total equity
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become less significant. Moreover, note that a lot of information is excluded when sales 
is used as base variable. 
Another approach could be to look at profit margins of the reduced sample of portfolio 
firms. In simple valuation models of firm value (among others Brealey and Myers, 
2003) we know that firm valuation is very sensitive to profit margins. Hence, post-
buyout profit margin development can be taken as a simple proxy for firm valuation. 
The analysis on the reduced sample is already conducted, see table 6 panel A. It finds 
that post-buyout profit margins drop which therefore can be interpreted as a (or a proxy 
for) drop in firm value. In the present data there is no information on firm pricing, 
hence, it is not possible to test whether it also holds when the portfolio firms are sold. 
However, a study on Danish data (Nielsen, 2005) documents that during 1995-2004 
pension funds return on private equity had underperformed compared to public equity 
returns. 
  
Another caveat could be that the accounting information of portfolio firms becomes 
less transparent. However, the study by Beuselink, Deloof and Manigart (2005) finds 
no support of this claim. On contrary Beuselink et al. finds that the quality of reported 
earnings becomes higher within PE fund backed firms. 
 
4.5.3. Measurement errors 
 
Another concern could be whether portfolio firms are evaluated at the proper time-span. 
Maybe the analysis should merely focus on portfolio firms where the PE fund has 
exited because it should be a more adequate way of measuring the exact impact of PE 
fund ownership (e.g. Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Cao and Lerner, 2006). 
Focusing on the intervening years of PE fund ownership potentially introduces a 
measurement error since we are not able to determine the ultimate impact of this owner 
class. However essential value creation or destruction could occur within the years of 
ownership. Only examining exits may also introduce an error – since it is most likely 
the well-performing firms that the PE funds are able to exit. Obviously, PE funds stay 
longer in distressed firms. Moreover, problematic with portfolio firm samples – are that 
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relatively few exits has taken place for the time being and therefore the analysis will be 
very limited. Further it requires a longer period of post-exit information which is not 
available since many exits has first taken place the recent years. Consequently I neglect 
this specific analysis.  
 
Instead I address the timing issue differently by taking the time-length of the ownership 
into consideration, i.e. the J-curve effect. For example Burgel (2002) argues that 
venture capital investments follow such a J-curve pattern as explained earlier. This 
evolution is also applicable to the buyout market since portfolio firms may tend to 
underperform up to assumable the fourth year of PE fund ownership due to 
restructurings etc., and around the fourth year portfolio firms begin to outperform. This 
effect is examined by splitting up our main explanatory variable (PE fund ownership 
time-varying dummy variable) so it depends on the time-length of the ownership. 
Specifically, three different dummy variables are applied: 1) equals one when PE fund 
ownership is 1-2 years old, otherwise zero; 2) equals one when PE fund ownership is 
between 3-4 years old, otherwise zero; 3) equals one when PE fund ownership is more 
than 4 years old, otherwise zero. Thus these three variables should capture the impact 
on portfolio performance in respectively year 1-2, 3-4, and 5+. The general econometric 
specification is as previously explained. 
 
From table 10 we see there is a significant negative impact on all operating 
performance in year 1-2 except for asset turnover. The parameter estimates are also 
significantly negative for the performance measures except OROA and asset turnover 
when evaluating year 3-4. Nevertheless, the results are not as robust for year 5+ and 
only ROA is significantly negative but at the 10 percentage significance level – while 
GROA and OROA are negatively affected but not significantly. Moreover, interestingly 
asset turnover now become strongly positively significantly affected by PE fund 
ownership in year 5+. However, as before this measure should be treated carefully due 
to data limitations. It does not seem like measurement errors are a major concern in this 
analysis, however result suggest that there might be some support for the J-curve 
predictions.  
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Table 10
Measuring the J-Curve Effects of Private Equity Fund Ownership
Dependent variables Obser-vations R-square
GROA -0.0668 ** -0.0832 *** -0.0466
0.0266 0.0321 0.0392
OROA -0.0246 * -0.0120 -0.0230
0.0135 0.0144 0.0150
ROA -0.0353 ** -0.0416 ** -0.0442 *
0.0152 0.0195 0.0235
Asset turnover 0.0070 -0.0061 0.0665 ***
0.0222 0.0255 0.0191
Debt to total assets 0.0488 *** 0.0864 *** 0.0853 ***
0.0191 0.0202 0.0231
PE fund ownership
0.069
0.067
3102
3097
2082 0.133
The table reports OLS regressions on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the 
period 1991-2004. The dependent variables are yearly operating profit margins (gross profits to total assets, 
GROA; primary result to total assets, OROA; netincome to total assets, ROA), yearly asset turnover (sales 
to total assets) and debt to assets ratio (debt is defined as the sum of short term debt and longterm debt). 
The three explanatory dummy variables equals one when the private equity (PE) fund ownership is 
respectively 1-2, 3-4, and 5+ years old - otherwise zero (including control firms). Control group firms are 
matched on size and industry from a sample of firms that has been through an ownership transition within 
the period. 73 portfolio firms and 545 controls firms are employed. Each portfolio firm is matched with up 
to the 5 nearest firms within each year, measured on absolute asset size. The OLS regressions are otherwise 
similar to the ones in table 3 - thus we also apply the following controls: firm size (log of total assets), firm 
age (log), and industry affiliation. Robust standard errors are below the parameter estimates. The ***, ** 
and * denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control 
group firms is significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level.
0.111
0.061
Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Year 5+
2779
3053
Explanatory variables
 
 
Finally, another possible measurement error in this study is related to capital structure 
because the focus is on the parent company level. Thus holding company leveraging is 
neglected and therefore the entire effect on firm leverage from PE fund ownership as 
already discussed may not be completely captured. Thus, the effect on the capital 
structure within portfolio firms will be underestimated (measurement error). As 
mentioned the motivation of this study is to analyse value creation (or destruction) at 
the parent company level since these entities are the ones left after the exit, i.e. the 
long-term social perspective.  
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5. Discussion 
 
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of PE buyout fund ownership on 
portfolio firm performance and on their governance abilities during the recent buyout 
activity. Analysing the population of 73 Danish portfolio firms compared with 545 
benchmark firms I find strong evidence for a fall in firm performance of portfolio firms, 
also relatively to a control group. The results are also robust in comparison with 
different control groups and when performance measures are goodwill adjusted. This 
main finding indicates that the so-called superior PE fund governance model (“Jensen 
hypothesis”) is rejected in the present data. Therefore this study contradicts the majority 
of the studies from the U.S. and U.K. (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; Cressy et al., 
2007; and partly Guo et al., 2007). 
 
It is furthermore tested whether the PE fund governance model explains the main 
finding. Three theoretical hypotheses are tested – ownership, debt and stakeholder 
expropriation. One of the tests suggests that PE funds should focus on public-to-private 
deals due to possible gains from fewer agency costs, i.e. supportive of the ownership 
hypothesis. However, few of the Danish buyout deals were public-to-private 
transactions (15%) which also resemble the European case. This could explain why the 
expected effects of the PE fund governance model are not manifested in the present 
data. Moreover, in many of the deals the post-buyout ownership concentration 
decreased which thereby helps explain the main finding. Recent data from EVCA show 
that during the last 10 years European public-to-private transactions have only 
accounted for about 4% and 20% of respectively the number of all buyout deals or total 
deal value. This indicates that benefits from PE fund ownership are probably less likely 
to arise from changes in ownership structure. 
It is also claimed that debt is a useful monitoring tool often used by the PE funds when 
controlling the management. Nevertheless, little support for this is found because it 
does not have a positive impact on portfolio firm performance, i.e. the crude form of 
the free cash flow theory (debt hypothesis) is not supported when the portfolio firm 
level is examined. However, it seems like debt with short maturity have a beneficial 
effect on firm efficiency. Also related to this result Guo et al. (2007) documents a fall 
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in how leveraged US buyouts have been compared to prior activity. Conversely, it is 
also argued in the literature that the monitoring advantage of debt is not at the firm-
level but instead debt helps mitigate other governance problems at the fund level 
(Axelson et al., 2007).  
It is also found that portfolio firms pay out higher dividends and are more positively 
sensitive in their dividend policy – this indicates the presence of expropriation. 
However, there are no indications of employee layoffs.  
 
Additionally, alternative explanations are considered - selection bias, valuation bias and 
measurement errors. Overall, I find little support for these alternative explanations 
which validates the main results. Even though no strong support for the J-curve 
predictions are found it still appears that portfolio firms may undergo considerable 
changes in the first years of PE fund ownership and that the expected positive effects 
are first realized in the late years of ownership, i.e. PE funds maximise firm value given 
the time of exit.  
 
According to the majority of the existing literature it is surprising that the effects from 
superior PE fund governance cannot be detected in the present data. The present 
findings are in line with a related French study (Desbrières and Schatt, 2002) which 
also found a drop in post-buyout portfolio firm performance. Desbrières and Schatt 
claim that their result is driven by high pre-buyout concentrated ownership since many 
of these transactions were family buyouts. Additional data suggest that only about 20% 
of the deals were family buyouts. Desbrières and Schatt’s explanation may still apply 
here since a general attribute of the Danish ownership structure is the presence of 
highly concentrated ownership relatively to the U.S. and U.K. (e.g. Faccio and Lang, 
2002; many family-owned firms, Bennedsen et al., 2007). Moreover, as described 
almost 85% of these deals were private-to-private transactions, hence, indicating pre-
buyout concentrated owned portfolio companies. These considerations, as earlier 
mentioned, therefore suggest that due to high structural ownership concentration fewer 
benefits of the PE fund governance model are likely present. This could indicate that 
the superior governance model is not as applicable to the Danish PE market or in 
countries with traditionally high ownership concentration. 
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Thus there could be influential differences at the PE industry level between countries – 
for instance the Danish PE market is possibly at an early stage compared to the U.S. 
and U.K. Therefore Danish-based PE funds are maybe not as skilled and/or experienced 
as international competitors. This argument is however rather unlikely since most PE 
funds are now globally active and LBO transactions have been taking place for 
decades. Also related to the skills of PE funds it was found in this data that the acquired 
firms are not different performance-wise to comparable firms before the buyout, which 
might (weakly) indicate that PE funds are on average not able to ‘pick the winners’. 
 
On this background it may be relevant to raise the question – is private equity a 
superior investment? Using simple valuation methodology this present study indicates 
that it is most likely not. However, private equity may still be a good or even superior 
investment from the investors’ point of view (e.g. Berg and Gottschalg, 2005). One 
reason could be that PE funds are good merchants – buying at the right time when 
prices are low and sell at a high. Or PE funds may have strong skills in the buyout 
negotiation process and by that end up paying less than other investors would. This 
view is, however, empirically supported by following studies Bargeron et al. (2007) and 
Thomsen and Vinten (2007b). Nevertheless, these value drivers have in principle 
nothing to do with the ability of PE funds to improve firm efficiency at the operational 
level. Moreover, if there is an underlying bubble in company pricing is present value 
creation may take place at the fund-of-fund level. Several studies find empirical 
evidence of an overheated buyout market hypothesis (Kaplan and Stein, 1993; Gompers 
and Lerner, 2000; Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003). These studies also show that 
returns could become squeezed during a ‘bubble’ in firm takeover prices. Contradicting 
the argument that superior returns are made at the fund-of-fund level other studies find 
that private equity investments give a lower return than appropriate benchmarks (e.g. 
Gottschalg et al., 2004; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Nielsen, 2006; Gottschalg and 
Phalippou, 2007). Related to this, even though it is a firm-level study, I interestingly 
found that the screening ability or strategy of PE funds seem to be no better than other 
buyers because the portfolio firms at the entry time are on average not statistically 
different to an average benchmark firm performance-wise. Hence it does not seem like 
77 
PE funds are able to ‘pick the winners’ which could lower the returns at the fund-of-
fund level. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1
Dependent variable
A. Alternative control group 1 - without ownership change condition
Constant 0.7106 *** -0.0795 ** -0.0885 *** 0.6311 *** -0.0521 0.0099
0.0594 0.0357 0.0239 0.0482 0.0539 0.0554
Private equity fund ownership -0.0340 * -0.0225 ** -0.0338 *** 0.0208 -0.0181 -0.1208 ***
0.0190 0.0102 0.0104 0.0135 0.0162 0.0233
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3707 4024 4096 2611 2990 3687
R-square 0.103 0.047 0.048 0.147 0.051 0.057
B. Alternative control group 2 - max. 2 control firms per portfolio firm within each year
Constant 0.8149 *** -0.0560 -0.0730 ** 0.7709 *** 0.0309 0.1196
0.0772 0.0462 0.0333 0.0643 0.0554 0.0731
Private equity fund ownership -0.0632 *** -0.0245 ** -0.0304 *** 0.0090 -0.0217 -0.1061 ***
0.0197 0.0100 0.0104 0.0134 0.0152 0.0243
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1888 2044 2079 1491 1602 1869
R-square 0.120 0.061 0.061 0.110 0.045 0.067
C. Alternative control group 3 - first matched by size and industry and then by ownership change
Constant 0.7515 *** -0.1232 ** -0.1192 *** 0.7522 *** -0.0341 0.0427
0.0808 0.0503 0.0329 0.0562 0.0473 0.0648
Private equity fund ownership -0.0600 *** -0.0267 *** -0.0327 *** 0.0066 -0.0165 -0.1098 ***
0.0194 0.0102 0.0104 0.0133 0.0154 0.0238
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2336 2536 2578 1762 1947 2311
R-square 0.116 0.066 0.072 0.131 0.057 0.070
D. Descriptive statistics - firm size
Firm size (log of total assets)
PE fund owned 12.79 12.79 12.79
Standard errors 0.08 0.08 0.08
Non-PE fund owned 11.16 11.58 11.33
Standard errors 0.03 0.05 0.04
Difference 1.63 *** 1.21 *** 1.46 ***
Standard errors 0.08 0.12 0.09
Panel A Panel B Panel C
The table reports OLS regressions on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the period 1991-2004. The dependent 
variables are yearly operating profit margins (gross profits to total assets, GROA; primary result to total assets, OROA; netincome to total 
assets, ROA; return on capital employed is measured as primary result relatively to debt plus equity, ROCE), yearly asset turnover (sales to total 
assets) and yearly asset growth. The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy variable that equals one every year a 
PE fund owns the firm and otherwise zero (including control firms). 
(5)
ROCE
(6)
Asset growth
The matching criteria of panel A's control group are: i) is in the same industry and similar in (total asset) size - up to the 5 nearest firms 
measured on absolute total assets within each year are employed. In this data set we have 4162 firm-year observations which is distributed 
among 868 control firms and 73 portfolio firms. The matching criteria of panel B's control group are: i) been through an ownership change, ii) is 
in the same industry and similar in (total assets) size. But here we only compare the portfolio firms with up to the 2 closest firms within each 
year measured on assets. In the data set in panel B there are 2113 firm-year observations, and there are 367 control firms and 73 portfolio firms. 
The matching criteria of panel C's control group are: i) is in the same industry and similar in (total asset) size - up to the 5 nearest firms 
measured on absolute total assets within each year are employed, i) been through an ownership change. Compared to the main approach used I 
here exclude control firms that have not experienced a change in ownership after matching on size and industry. In this data set we have 2621 
firm-year observations - 446 control firms and 73 portfolio firms. 
The Impact from Private Equity Fund Ownership on Firm Performance - Alternative Control Groups
Again firm size (log of total assets), firm age (log of age) and industry dummies are used as controls. Robust standard errors are below the 
parameter estimates. The ***, ** and * denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control group 
firms is significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level.
GROA OROA ROA Asset turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table A2
Dependent variable
A. Large firms
Constant 0.8914 *** 0.1727 *** 0.1097 *** 1.0378 *** 0.2126 *** 0.1183
0.0776 0.0231 0.0217 0.0799 0.0294 0.1009
Private equity fund ownership -0.0868 *** -0.0186 * -0.0314 *** -0.0117 -0.0271 -0.1019 ***
0.0191 0.0110 0.0116 0.0148 0.0187 0.0276
Log of totalassets -0.0429 *** -0.0102 *** -0.0071 *** -0.0114 -0.0104 *** 0.0160 *
0.0066 0.0023 0.0019 0.0075 0.0030 0.0089
Firm age 0.0394 *** 0.0071 0.0047 0.0130 -0.0019 -0.0667 ***
0.0095 0.0043 0.0035 0.0079 0.0055 0.0147
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1355 1453 1495 1361 1229 1354
R-squared 0.150 0.112 0.101 0.151 0.094 0.060
B. Small firms
Constant 0.6274 *** -0.2676 ** -0.2015 *** 0.5493 *** -0.1285 -0.2203 *
0.1774 0.1156 0.0688 0.1303 0.0936 0.1288
Private equity fund ownership 0.0712 -0.0520 ** -0.0512 ** 0.0762 *** 0.0113 -0.1135 **
0.0502 0.0260 0.0254 0.0240 0.0227 0.0471
Log of totalassets -0.0231 0.0232 ** 0.0117 0.0079 0.0150 * 0.0520 ***
0.0170 0.0109 0.0065 0.0116 0.0087 0.0128
Firm age 0.0639 *** 0.0233 *** 0.0270 *** 0.0722 0.0229 *** -0.0642 ***
0.0126 0.0070 0.0055 0.0109 0.0078 0.0165
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1365 1523 1530 661 1039 1364
R-squared 0.102 0.086 0.100 0.379 0.094 0.077
Difference in estimates -0.1580 *** 0.0334 * 0.0198 -0.0879 *** -0.0384 * 0.0116
Standard error 0.0380 0.0201 0.0198 0.0183 0.0206 0.0386
ROCE
(6)
Asset growthGROA OROA ROA Asset turnover
The Impact from Private Equity Fund Ownership on Firm Performance - Depending on 
Firm Size
The explanatory variable private equity (PE) fund ownership is a dummy variable that equals one every year a PE fund owns the 
firm and otherwise zero (including control firms). Control group firms are matched on size and industry from a sample of firms 
that has been through an ownership transition within the period. 73 portfolio firms and 545 controls firms are employed. Each 
portfolio firm is matched with up to the 5 nearest firms within each year, measured on absolute asset size. A firm is considered 
as large when average total assets are above (the sample median) 109 million DKR. Again firm size (log of total assets), firm 
age (log of age) and industry dummies are used as controls. Robust standard errors are below the parameter estimates. The ***, 
** and * denotes respectively whether the difference in the means between the portfolio firms and control group firms is 
significantly different from zero at a 1, 5 or 10-percentage level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
The table reports OLS regressions on all companies (PE fund owned and non-PE fund owned) over the period 1991-2004. The 
dependent variables are yearly operating profit margins (gross profits to total assets, GROA; primary result to total assets, 
OROA; netincome to total assets, ROA; return on capital employed is measured as primary result relatively to debt plus equity, 
ROCE), yearly asset turnover (sales to total assets) and yearly asset growth. 
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Abstract: 
 
 
In recent years there bas been a dramatic increase in delistings from stock exchanges 
in the US and Europe, and this trend has been partly attributed to increasing 
administrative costs in listed companies. Has corporate governance regulation gone 
too far? We examine delistings from European stock exchanges 1995-2005 and find 
that standard corporate governance regulation - like investor protection and corporate 
governance codes - is associated with more delistings and in particularly going private 
transactions. In contrast, the tendency to go private is found to be lower, when the 
quality of overall governance (World Bank governance index) is high. The results 
continue to hold when we take into consideration that governance policy may be 
endogenous. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent years have produced a wave of corporate governance regulation. Examples from 
the US are the Sarbanes-Oxley act and codes of best practice on both NASDAQ and 
NYSE. Commentators argue that the administrative costs of these initiatives have 
spurred delistings from US exchanges (Block, 2004; Engel et al., 2005; Marosi and 
Massoud, 2005; Kamar et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2006).42 Moreover, it has also been 
argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation have led international companies to list 
elsewhere, e.g. in London. However, studies that have examined cross-listings (Doidge 
et al., 2007; Zingales, 2007) show that the benefits of being listed on a US stock 
exchange have not been eroded by the costs associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
compared to the UK. Although Europe has not been subject to the rigor of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act, European corporate governance has also become increasingly 
regulated with directives and recommendations from the EU Commission, changes in 
national company law and codes of best practice. Further, Pagano and Volpin (2006) 
document a general international increase in the level of minority investor protection. 
Hence, the main question examined in this paper is whether corporate governance 
regulation has spurred delistings in Europe during the period 1995-2004. We argue that 
delistings are a good proxy for the cost and benefits of corporate governance 
regulation.43 
 
In the literature different definitions of corporate governance have been proposed. For 
instance Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that two main corporate governance 
mechanisms are legal investor protection and concentrated ownership. Especially, in 
                                                 
42 The recent going dark literature in the US has analyzed the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on the decision to 
deregister (go dark). Marosi and Massoud (2005) find that higher audit costs induced by the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
have had a significant impact on the decision to delist. Engel et al. (2005) also find a significant effect of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act on firms’ going private decision, particularly for small firms. Further Kamar et al. (2006) and 
also Block (2004) find that small firms tend to exit due to the Sarbanes-Oxley act. In contrast,  Leuz et al. (2006) 
find that cost savings alone are unlikely to matter for the decision to delist, but may push more poorly performing 
firms to go dark. Note, however, that there is a difference between going private and going dark. When a firm 
goes private it becomes fully private whereas stocks of a firm going dark can still be traded in over-the-counter 
market.      
43 The listing and cross-listing decision is not entirely comparable to the delisting decision. For instance corporate 
governance regulation is known ex ante a listing or cross-listing, however, while public new regulation serves as 
external shocks.  
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public stock markets with dispersed ownership, investor protection becomes an 
important corporate governance mechanism.  
 
The influential Law and Finance approach championed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2007) further emphasizes the role of the law in protecting 
minority investors. The general implication of this approach is that stronger minority 
investor protection is preferable as it tends to produce larger stock markets, more 
investments, better allocation of capital and higher economic growth (Beck et al., 2000, 
2001, 2003a, 2003b; Beck and Levine, 2004; Djankov et al., 2007). However, 
complying with the legal rules from investor protection may also spur costs, since it 
could be that very strong protection of minority investors, such as comprehensive 
disclosure requirements, strong legal responsibility of non-executive directors, strict 
limitations on board composition etc. would increase the cost of governance to a point 
where transaction costs exceed benefits to investors. This could then lead to lower stock 
prices, fewer initial public offerings (IPOs) and more delistings. It is also possible that 
the costs and benefits of investor protection regulation differ by country and that some 
countries are better served with less stringent regulation (cf. Djankov et al., 2003). 
Along these lines Bruno and Claessens (2007) found that for companies with strong 
corporate governance practices, excessive country corporate governance regulation can 
harm firm valuation. They interpreted this as a cost of overregulation. Further, Boot et 
al. (2006) theoretically emphasizes that corporate governance regulation can lead to 
overmonitoring of firm management which dampens firm efficiency.   
 
The costs of applying with investor protection regulation include extra auditing costs, 
disclosure costs, legal assistance, compensation premiums for non-executive and 
executive directors, board insurance, administration costs, strategic distortion of 
decision making, and several other items. These costs are difficult to estimate with any 
degree of precision; however an indirect test examining the effects of corporate 
governance regulations on delistings could be conducted. The underlying idea of the 
test is that companies will choose to leave stock exchanges if the governance costs 
come to exceed the benefits of being listed. Hence, we test whether investor protection 
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levels affects the decision to delist – especially the going private decision - while 
controlling for other determinants. In principle, by doing so, we test whether the costs 
of investor protection regulation exceed the benefits.  
 
Delistings from a stock exchange can take place in different ways. A company may be 
acquired by another company or merged with it. It may be acquired by new owners 
(e.g. a private equity fund) and delisted. It may go bankrupt or be liquidated by the 
incumbent owners. In rare cases it may even be involuntarily delisted by the stock 
exchange because of failure to comply with the listing standards. These types of 
delistings are to some extent determined by different causal mechanisms, which we 
analyze in the following, but there are also some common drivers. For example, as 
mentioned, higher listing costs ceteris paribus provide an incentive for firms to escape 
these costs by merger, acquisition or by going private.  
 
Mergers and acquisitions are essential features of corporate governance in countries 
with well-developed stock markets. A strong market for corporate control may be a 
competitive advantage for these countries so M&A can to some extent be regarded as a 
sign of vitality (Pagano and Volpin, 2005a). Going private transactions may be an 
efficient response to agency problems of free cash flow in large listed firms (Jensen, 
1986). Even a high number of bankruptcies can be a positive indicator, i.e. a sign of 
entrepreneurship or intense competition. So delistings do not constitute a problem per 
se, although for a stock market to remain strong, these delistings must be balanced by 
IPOs.  
 
In contrast, going private transactions can be regarded as a sign that the buyers find it 
more valuable to operate the company as a private entity, i.e. without disclosure, 
investor meetings, corporate governance regulations and other listing costs, as well as 
avoiding the costs of separating ownership and control. The buyers may be outsiders, 
e.g. private equity funds, or insiders (incumbent managers or majority owners), who 
find it easier to manage their company without having to apply to legal rules of 
minority investor protection which spur for instance administrative costs. In either case, 
companies vote with their feet when going private and voluntarily forego the 
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advantages of being listed. While these transactions may be motivated by other firm 
specific and macroeconomic factors (which need to be controlled for) we therefore pay 
special attention to them.  
 
There has in fact been a wave of delistings from European stock exchanges post 2000 
which coincides with a number of new governance initiatives, e.g. the spread of codes 
to continental Europe. In total 30% of the population of listed European firms ceased to 
be quoted and approximately 40 percent of the asset value vanished in this way over the 
period 1995-2005.  
 
In this paper, we thus examine delistings in Europe 1995-2005 and to what extent they 
can be attributed to governance regulation, industry effects and firm specific factors. In 
the absence of a generally accepted measure of governance regulation we use the La 
Porta et al. measure of investor protection (revised by Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) as a 
proxy, but we also experiment with other measures. We do believe that this investor 
protection measure is a proxy that captures the general trends in governance regulation. 
Using logistic and multinomial logistic regressions, we find evidence that stronger 
investor protection increases the likelihood of exit by M&A and going private 
transactions, but reduces the probability of bankruptcy and liquidation. We also provide 
instrumental variable estimates of determinants and effects of investor protection 
regulation while taking into consideration that corporate governance policies may be 
endogenously determined (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2001, 2005b; 
Perotti and von Thadden, 2006; Roe, 2006).  
 
2. Theory 
 
According to the Law and Finance view corporate governance shapes the attractiveness 
of public stock markets. In this paper we address the link between the Law and Finance 
view and the decision to delist – in particular how investor protection regulation affects 
this decision. Investor protection is important since as mentioned, legal protection of 
minority shareholders is a fundamental part of corporate governance regulation 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, we also discuss firm characteristics as 
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determinants of delistings. In the following, we will motivate and discuss how the 
benefits and costs of investor protection regulation are realised, how investor protection 
regulation affects delistings, and we motivate the use of investor protection regulation 
as a determinant. Later, we provide more evidence on what shapes investor protection 
regulation. We focus mainly on going private transactions but will also discuss other 
potential determinants of going private, M&A and bankruptcy and liquidation which we 
control for in our empirical analysis. 
 
Firstly, we describe regulatory costs and benefits of being a listed company. A stock 
exchange creates a market in shares (Mulherin et. al., 1991). The market is attractive to 
buyers and sellers of shares because it economizes on their transaction costs – that is 
their search, information, bargaining, decision, policing and enforcement costs (Coase, 
1992; Mulherin et al., 1991; Dahlman, 1979). An important instrument in this is a 
certain standardization of the shares traded (Telser, 1981) which reduces the need for a 
continuous detailed assessment of individual firms and transforms their stock into 
“homogenous, fungible securities” (Pirrong, 1995). Standardization and other rules are 
provided by both law, by the exchanges themselves (Coase, 1992) through listing 
requirements and corporate governance codes (Cadbury Commission, 1992). This 
regulation applies to ownership and board structure, corporate governance practice, 
financial reporting, disclosure, capital structure and firm size, but more subjective 
criteria like growth (NYSE listing requirements) may also be considered. This 
regulation is generally prompted by a desire to protect (minority) investors and improve 
market conditions.  
 
Governance rules and standards are valuable to investors and therefore also to issuers, 
because they reduce their cost of capital, but they come at a cost. There are direct costs, 
which include listing fees, fees for auditors and lawyers, liability and insurance costs, 
larger fees for non-executive and executive directors etc. In the US the costs of 
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley act would fit into this category.44 Indirect costs 
                                                 
44 A survey of the 224 largest public firms in the USA by Financial Executives International with regard to the 
direct costs of complying with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act finds that the average first-year estimate is 
almost $3 million for 26,000 hours of internal work and 5,000 hours of external work, plus additional audit fees of 
$823,200, or an increase of 53% (Zhang, 2005). 
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would include costs of disclosure to competitors, loss of flexibility with regard to board 
structure, opportunity costs of top management time, box-checking and bureaucratic 
procedures. We hypothesize that the likelihood of delisting will depend on both costs 
and benefits of investor protection regulation. The rationale for this is that the 
probability of delisting will depend on transaction costs, particularly whether the fixed 
cost of being listed exceed the benefits of relatively low marginal trading costs.  
 
Firms can avoid fixed listing costs by going private, but at the cost of higher variable 
cost of trading shares outside the organized market. We believe that going private 
transactions are essential to evaluate when determining the costs and benefits of 
investor protection regulation. Alternatively, firms can save on listing costs by merging 
with other listed companies, but in the absence of synergies the savings may be 
drowned by higher administration costs in a larger company (Williamson, 1995, 2005). 
Finally, firms can choose to delist in order to list on another stock exchange (Focault 
and Parleur, 2004).  
 
It is difficult to determine the optimal level of regulation with any degree of precision 
because regulation is so multifaceted. The widely used investor protection (level) index 
originally proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) was justified to a large extent by a positive 
effect on the size of the stock market. More generally, however, this so-called anti-
director rights index summarized measures which were believed to strengthen the rights 
of minority investors vis-à-vis company boards. But for instance the right to file 
lawsuits against boards involves costs, so does the right to call an annual meeting and 
the proxy by mail system probably also introduces administrative costs. 
 
As another example La Porta et al. consider that investors are better protected where an 
investor can call an extraordinary general meeting, if she has more than 10% of the 
stock. It is clear that extraordinary meeting involves costs not just for the managers who 
have to defend their decisions, but also for the other shareholders who have to attend 
the meeting or live with the outcome if they stay away. But what if this threshold was 
lowered to 5% - would investor protection then be higher? If so how about 1%? Or 
should any shareholder be able to call a shareholder meeting any time? In most 
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situations the transaction costs for both the shareholder and the company would 
probably become to high at some point, and the other shareholders would consider 
delisting or at least the company’s market value would drop. In contrast few would 
argue with the proposition that a qualified majority of the shareholders should be able 
to call an extraordinary meeting. 
 
The study by Bruno and Claessens (2007) examines how company corporate 
governance practices and country regulatory regimes affect firm valuation. Similar to 
our approach the authors argue that country level overregulation can be present. Their 
argument is mainly backed by two theoretical explanations that also apply here. Firstly, 
Burkart et al. (1997) argue that too much monitoring and legal protection may dampen 
managerial initiatives and consequently worsen firm efficiency. Secondly, Boot et al. 
(2006) find that corporate governance controls can prevent management from doing 
what it should. Bruno and Claessens’ empirically findings suggest that for firms with 
strong corporate governance practices, country level corporate governance regulation 
may have a negative impact on firm valuation. This could hence be interpreted as a sign 
of overregulation. 
 
We therefore conjecture that there is a cost of investor protection regulation as well as a 
benefit, that more regulation is not necessarily better. This is also recognized by the 
political economy view and these political determinants are discussed next. Whether a 
given investor protection regulation measure will have a positive or negative effect on 
stock market attractiveness is essentially an empirical question, which we will try to 
address in the following by focusing on delistings. 
 
2.1. Political determinants of delisting 
 
Until recently, research in international corporate governance emphasized that national 
corporate governance systems are stable and historically determined by legal origin (La 
Porta et al., 1998), cultural and ideological differences between countries (Roe, 2003) 
or demography (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). However, recent research on the politics of 
governance has emphasized that corporate governance policies actually do change over 
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time and sometimes in ways which impede rather than facilitate large stock markets 
(Pagano and Volpin, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Perotti and von 
Thadden, 2006; Roe, 2006). Over the last decade European corporate governance has 
arguably changed as a result of changes in company law (e.g. the EU takeover 
directive) and the diffusion of corporate governance codes (Pagano and Volpin, 2006). 
Moreover, structural changes such as the common European currency have facilitated 
the internationalization of European stock markets (e.g. Stultz, 2005) in a way which 
may be helpful in revealing the effect of underlying differences in national governance 
policies.  
 
This raises the question whether corporate governance policies have the desired effects. 
In principle, well-intended regulation by benevolent policymakers may increase 
investor protection, lower discount rates, raise stock prices and market values and 
thereby make it more attractive to list or stay listed and less attractive to delist. 
However regulation may also impair stock market development (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003), which recent research has tried to explain by interest group politics and the way 
politics is shaped by constitutions (Pagano and Volpin, 2001, 2005b; Perotti and von 
Thadden, 2006). Interest group politics will only rarely lead to socially optimal 
regulation (Olson, 2000). Djankov et al. (2003) recognize that politics may lead to 
socially wasteful regulation, for example ascendant interest groups may choose 
institutions that protect their political and economic rents. They highlight how uncritical 
transfer of institutions – such as colonial transplants – may lead to inefficient 
regulation.45 “Politics has a bad name in economics”, they note, but maintain that 
policies are often welfare-enhance despite the general scepticism. 
  
The political economy view of governance invites questions concerning the effects of 
corporate governance regulation across shareholder and stakeholder groups. In 
particular, corporate governance regulation arguably influences the balance of power 
between minority shareholders and controlling owners (Stultz, 2005). Strong protection 
                                                 
45 While the idea of colonial transplants is not directly applicable to recent changes in corporate governance 
regulation, the remarkable spread of quite uniform regulation (codes of best practice, EU directives, increases in 
investor protection measures) to countries with quite different corporate governance systems does nourish a 
suspicion that not all of this regulation is efficiently adapted to the local context. It is not clear whether for 
example smaller countries can improve their stock markets simply by adopting Anglo-American standards.   
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of minority investors may reduce the control premia and private benefits of dominant 
owners. In this paper our main focus is on investor protection regulation. However, we 
do make a distinction between two types of regulation: 1) minority investor protection, 
which influences the distribution of rents and benefits between controlling shareholders 
(insiders) and minority investors (outsiders), and 2) general legal infrastructure (e.g. 
protection of property rights, efficiency of the courts), which we measure by the World 
Bank governance indices. The general legal infrastructure may capture a more 
structural dimension of a country’s legal system which may also affect the 
attractiveness of public stock markets. Especially this effect might be present in 
emerging markets.   
 
We distinguish between two different hypotheses concerning the costs and benefits of 
investor protection regulation on European delistings in this period. According to the 
efficiency hypothesis (benefits of investor protection regulation outweighs the costs) 
new regulation is enacted to improve the functioning of stock markets and is therefore 
likely to have a positive effect on company performance and stock prices, which will 
strengthen the incentives to list and remain listed. On the contrary, according to the 
overregulation hypothesis (costs outweighs the benefits), regulation is a result of rent 
seeking by powerful economic constituencies, which seek to further their own interests, 
for example in the last decade institutional investors and their service providers 
(investment banks, auditing firms). If the costs of new regulation to protect minority 
investors exceed the benefits in terms of lower costs of capital, companies will tend to 
leave the exchange. 
 
In the case of going private transactions, incumbent controlling shareholders may 
decide that the listing benefits are too small and buy out minority investors. This will be 
especially likely if there are private benefits of control which the incumbent owners can 
retain by delisting. Alternatively, private equity buyout funds may find that they can 
create value by taking over listed companies because they can cut down on information 
costs and have greater flexibility with regard to board structure, compensation systems, 
capital structure and the like.   
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Companies may also choose to economize on governance costs by merging with other 
listed companies, or they may gain the same benefits as going private if they are taken 
over by a privately held company. Moreover, lower private benefits of control as a 
consequence of higher governance standards may make it more attractive for incumbent 
owners to sell out: the private benefits of control are lower and minority investors are 
willing to pay a higher price for the same reason (La Porta et al., 2000a, 2002). Rossi 
and Volpin (2004) and Pagano and Volpin (2006) find that minority investor protection 
is associated with more mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Finally, bankruptcy/liquidation is arguably less likely in countries with high corporate 
governance standards where well-performing firms are less likely to be capital- and 
cash-rationed, while bad performance is presumably more likely to be detected and 
corrected before the firm fails. In particular, higher transparency should make it easier 
for banks and other lenders to avoid bad loans. We recognize that the absolute number 
of bankruptcies may well be higher in countries with higher investor protection, but our 
hypothesis concerns frequencies.  
 
Investor protection regulation is, however, not the only determinant of delistings. In the 
following we describe other potential determinants of going private, M&A and 
bankruptcy and liquidation which we attempt to control for in our empirical analysis. 
 
2.2. Determinants of going private transactions 
 
Jensen (1986, 1989) proposed that going private transactions (leverage buyouts) can be 
regarded as an efficient response to agency problems in publicly listed companies. For 
example, private equity funds can target companies which – for whatever reason – 
deviate substantially from shareholder value maximization. This type of transaction 
could be directed at companies with weak owners (low ownership concentration) that 
suffer from owner-manager agency problems which going private transactions address 
(Jensen, 1986). For example, companies with high equity to assets ratios could benefit 
from financial leverage. Inefficiency – and scope for value creation by restructuring - 
could be found among companies that have many employees or low rates of asset 
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turnover compared to industry benchmarks. Going private may be a particularly 
appropriate solution to agency problems in companies with substantial free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986) which is not paid out as dividends. Jensen also emphasized that 
industries with stable free cash flows are particularly suited for financial leverage. 
Not all going private transactions involve leveraged buy-outs, however, such agency 
costs savings may also apply to other acquirers.  
 
In addition, stock liquidity may be an important driver of delistings as emphasized by 
Bharath and Dittmar (2006). If a stock is not liquid (easily tradeable), it may be priced 
at a discount, which implies lower advantages of being listed. This could imply that 
companies with more concentrated ownership (less free float), less traded stocks and 
operating in less liquid national stock markets will be more inclined to go private. 
 
Another line of research maintains that the shareholder gains from going private 
transactions arise from a zero sum game with incumbent stakeholders whose wealth is 
being expropriated (e.g. Shleifer and Summers, 1988). This could mean that companies 
with high debt-to-equity ratios are more likely to go private because a substantial part 
of the cost is paid by increasing risk among incumbent debtholders (e.g. Marais, 
Schipper and Smith, 1989, for the case of bondholders). The incumbent shareholders 
may also be expropriated by the incumbent management (Lowenstein, 1985; Harlow 
and Howe, 1993) or controlling owners: Low dividends and low reported earnings per 
share could signal that managers or controlling owners try to depress prices prior to 
delisting. Taxation benefits can be a cause of delistings (Kaplan, 1989) if buyouts 
involve substituting debt for equity which many private equity funds presumably do. 
The value of the tax shield should be a function of tax and interest rates, and changes in 
the tax shield would be expected to influence the decision to delist. 
 
Finally, going private can be influenced by stock prices (e.g. under/overvaluation of a 
company’s shares relative to fundamentals). High stock prices relative to fundamentals 
or prospects mean that it is relatively less attractive to take over a company. According 
to the undervaluation hypothesis high stock prices and by implication high firm value 
(q) should therefore be associated with a lower propensity to go private (Palepu, 1986). 
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We also note that correctly highly valued companies have better growth prospects and 
may therefore find it profitable to remain listed to finance further expansion.  Moreover, 
we conjecture that market timing – e.g. perceived high or low stock prices in general - 
seems to be an element in the decision to delist similarly to what Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) and others found for the IPO decision. To potential private buyers it may seem 
more attractive to take a company private if stock prices are low. 
 
2.3. Determinants of M&A 
 
The extensive literature on M&A identifies several determinants of delistings by 
acquisition or merger (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Palepu, 1986; Cudd and Duggal, 
2000). Firm size could have a negative effect on the likelihood of becoming a target for 
merger or acquisition, if it is easier to finance small transactions and if acquisition costs 
are smaller for small firms (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984). However, fixed transaction 
costs of acquisition imply that unit costs are lower when large firms are acquired. In 
fact the merger activities in the 1980s compared to those of other periods were mainly 
characterized by the large size of targets (Barnes, 2000). Managerial inefficiency could 
show up in bad company performance making the firm a more likely target for 
acquisition because of liquidity problems or dissatisfaction among the incumbent 
owners (Jensen, 1986; Palepu, 1986). The new owner could replace inefficient 
management and increase earnings in the long run. If agency problems are more severe 
in large firms (Nuttal, 1999), this would make it more attractive to take over large 
firms, particularly those with agency problems because of low ownership concentration. 
Financial Leverage is important according to the failing firms’ hypothesis which 
regards merger or acquisition as a civilized alternative to bankruptcy (Dewey, 1961). 
Leverage (loss of equity dues to past bad performance) may also signal inefficient 
management. Nuttal (1999) finds that avoiding bankruptcy or financial distress is an 
important motive to sell. Industry shocks (like deregulation or new technology) can 
necessitate horizontal mergers to restructure an industry. Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2001) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that merger activity in 1990s in 
the U.S. was clustered by industry. Undervaluation (low Market-to-Book or Price-
Earnings ratio) implies that targets are less expensive and so more attractive to buy 
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(Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Palepu, 1986; Cudd and Duggal, 2000; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). 
 
2.4. Determinants of Bankruptcy and liquidation 
 
Both bankruptcy and liquidation may involve large losses to creditors and shareholders, 
but may also involve more orderly dissolution of the company without losses to 
creditors or reorganization and continuation of the business in some form (White, 
1989). In our data we find that companies perform better prior to liquidation than prior 
to bankruptcy in terms of accounting profitability and market valuation, but we group 
them in one category because they influence delisting frequencies relatively little. 
Insolvency could imply that a company cannot repay its debt due to a lack of liquidity 
(Altman, 1968, 1993; Schary, 1991; Bechetti and Sierra, 2003; Hillegeist et al., 2004; 
Buehler et al., 2006). This may or may not ultimately lead to bankruptcy. Accounting 
ratios for profitability, liquidity and solvency have been proposed as useful measures 
for predicting whether firms are likely to default or go bankrupt (Altman, 1993): Net 
working capital to total assets (liquidity), equity to total liabilities (solvency) and asset 
turnover, i.e. sales to assets, (to measure efficiency of management). Like acquisition 
by a private equity fund or another firm bankruptcies may also be the result of 
managerial inefficiency. 
 
3.  The data 
3.1. Data sources 
 
Our dataset (from Thomson Financial and Worldscope) consists of all listed European 
companies over the period 1995-2005, including both companies that are listed in any 
given year and companies that are not, but were listed at some point during the period.  
We do not have full coverage, for example we miss data from countries like Iceland, 
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Switzerland, Russia and other members of the former Soviet Union, but we do have a 
fairly comprehensive sample.46  
 
Since we would like to analyze changes in the population and their determinants we 
loose one year (1995). To ensure completeness of the dataset we also drop 2005 from 
the sample to avoid registering a delisted company as listed because it reports late in the 
year. The observation period 1996-2004 both contains bull and bear years, e.g. the stock 
market bubble of the 1990s, the decline 2000-2003 and the partial recovery in 2004-
2005. In terms of corporate governance the period is characterized by rapid growth in 
government regulation, EU directives, new national laws and best practices codes, most 
of which started in the UK and spread subsequently to the rest of Europe. It can perhaps 
be characterized as the heyday of corporate governance and provides an excellent 
period for studying the effects of these new initiatives. 
 
Based on the information from Thomson Financial/Worldscope we can distinguish 
between five types of delisting - merger, acquisition, bankruptcy, liquidation or going 
private. We classify the cause of delisting as merger if a firm is delisted because of 
merger with another firm. A firm is denoted as acquired if it is taken over by another 
firm. In M&A it is the target firms which become delisted. Going private firms are 
categorized as such if they are taken over and delisted by a private non-corporate buyer, 
for instance an individual or a private equity fund. Finally, we have direct information on 
whether a firm delists due to bankruptcy or liquidation. This key firm status variable 
published by Thomson Financial is based on their own research on company filings, press 
releases and other news available. A potential problem with this classification is overlap 
between groups due to misspecifications. For example it may be difficult to distinguish 
between an acquisition and a going private transaction in private equity buyouts where 
private equity funds set up a holding company (controlled by the fund) which buys the 
target firm. We checked for this and other measurement problems where we have good 
secondary information and found only two misspecifications in which going private firms 
were grouped as acquired. In the present study we combine the 5 different types of 
                                                 
46 The data consists of information from the following 21 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
100 
delisting into 3 groups: merger and acquisition, going private and bankruptcy/liquidation. 
We do not have access to detailed information about buyers and so we cannot distinguish 
between private equity funds and incumbent blockholders in going private transactions or 
between foreign and domestic acquirers in M&A transactions. 
 
Data on UK includes Alternative Investment Market (AIM) listings. AIM was launched 
in 1995 and AIM has been growing in terms of new listings since then. The AIM is 
regulatory flexible compared to the main London market. This could bias our analysis, 
however, AIM companies are encouraged to follow same corporate governance codes as 
companies listed on the main market are required to follow. The AIM actually seem to 
resemble the general patterns of other stock exchanges since about 30% of firms that had 
become listed during 1995-2005 became delisted (LSE, 2005), hence, indicating that 
including AIM companies does not seem to bias our results.  
 
We only have information on where the primary issue trades. However, several firms do 
choose to cross-list and this could introduce a bias in data since we can not control for 
this. For instance, it is problematic when European firms cross-list in New York since 
they will have to apply to US corporate governance requirements etc. However, our 
scope is also different since we examine the decision to delist and not the decision to 
cross-list, or the IPO decision – and the determinants of these may differ greatly. We 
argue that examining delistings capture a more direct effect of the costs and benefits of 
corporate governance regulation. Moreover, firms that contemplate to go public can take 
current regulation into account, whereas listed firms need to adjust to the regulation. 
Which might explain the diverging impact of Sarbanes Oxley on cross-listings and 
delistings (e.g. Engel et al., 2005; Marosi and Massoud, 2005; Kamar et al., 2006; Doidge 
et al., 2007).     
 
We have yearly observations of the standard accounting and market variables, for 
example company size in terms of assets or turnover, market value, return on assets 
(ROA), debt, cash flow, sales growth, ownership concentration, main industry47, 
country of origin etc. as well as the nature of the delisting (merger, acquisition, going 
                                                 
47 The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. 
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private transaction, liquidation or bankruptcy). We correct for extreme observations by 
truncation (e.g. ROA < -100% is registered as ROA = -100%). By country of 
incorporation we link to country information on the LSSV investor protection index 
(updated by Pagano and Volpin, 2005b), and World Bank governance ratings, for which 
we have time series information. We can also link to structural variables like legal 
origin, self-dealing indices etc. Moreover, we link to GDP growth (OECD) and the 
aggregate volume of private equity investments (Deloitte, 2005). 
We calculate a simplified proxy for the q ratio which is the ratio between market value 
plus book value of debt relatively to the book value of total assets as a proxy for the 
replacement value of the assets. Perfect and Wiles (1994) discuss that simple Tobin’s q 
measures are probably to simplifying, however, the measure used here is applied in 
related studies (e.g. Doidge et al., 2007). The firm-specific q is measured by using annual 
data on market value and book values of debt and assets. Average firm value is the 
annual country averages equally weighted of the firm-specific q defined above. 
 
We study the impact of alternative measures of governance regulation on delistings. 
One important and widely used measure is the investor protection index constructed by 
La Porta et al. (1998) and updated by Pagano and Volpin (2005b) to vary by country 
and year.48 This measure is a sum of six dummy variables: 1) whether or not proxy by 
mail is allowed, 2) if shares are not blocked before a shareholder meeting or whether 
they are, 3) whether or not cumulative voting for directors is allowed, 4) whether or not 
oppressed minorities are protected, 5) whether the percentage of share capital required 
to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting is less than 10 percent, and 6) whether or 
not existing shareholders have pre-emptive rights at new equity offerings. We 
abbreviate this variable the LSSVPV investor protection index. Pagano and Volpin 
extend and revise the La Porta et al. survey from 1993. Based on a new survey 
questionnaire they are able to evaluate the interval from 1993 to 2002. In their 
questionnaire they ask how the regulation today (2002) is different from the previous 
La Porta et al. measure, and when and how the law changed. Hence, this index not only 
corrects some of the misspecifications of the previous index it also adds time-variation 
to the index. Investor protection has increased over the observation period, but there are 
                                                 
48 The Pagano and Volpin (2005b) dataset is available at http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept05_data_pagano.zip. 
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still substantial country differences. We lack information after 2002 and therefore 
assume no changes in 2003 (since we predict delistings one year ahead up to 2004 we 
do not need the 2004 figures). 
 
There is a great debate about these measures being incomplete, mainly because of the 
indices ad hoc nature and for several conceptual ambiguities and outright mistakes in 
coding. However, as raised Pagano and Volpin (2005b) addresses these issues when 
revising the index. Another argument for using their revised index is that Pagano and 
Volpin introduces the time dimension in their measure – the investor protection index 
varies over time which is not the case for La Porta et al.’s index. This is relevant for our 
analysis since we investigate how the development in investor protection regulation has 
changed the delisting decision. Secondly, the revised index by Pagano and Volpin is 
highly correlated with other measures such as the revised anti-director index and the 
anti self-dealing index (about 0.75). This also suggests that the revised Pagano and 
Volpin measure is applicable in our analysis.  
 
We regard the LSSVPV investor protection index as a proxy for minority investor 
protection in general including disclosure requirements, accounting standards and 
insider trading rules, which we believe to be correlated with the index.49 We do not 
mean to imply that introducing mandatory cumulative voting or proxy by mail will have 
much of a direct effect on delistings or other economic variables. However, the 
LSSVPV index is correlated with other kinds of minority investor protection, for 
example the Djankov et al. (2007) anti self-dealing index, our measure of code adoption 
or a measure of regulatory costs (Jackson, 2005) and can therefore be used as a proxy 
for more general trends in governance regulation. Among the important changes during 
this period we can mention EU directives on transparency (2004), prospectus (2003), 
transparency, market abuse (2003), takeovers (2004), financial instruments (2004), 
which have to a large extent been implemented in the national law of EU member 
                                                 
49 Other related indices regarding securities laws such as disclosure requirements and liability standards (see La Porta et 
al., 2006) could also be used but they are also not time-varying. They also show to be strongly correlated (not reported) 
with our used measure of investor protection regulation (0.5-0.8). 
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countries and associated countries during our study period (Thuesen, 2007).50 For 
example, the takeover directive enforces a mandatory bid rule (in control block trades 
all shareholders must get the same offer), which makes it difficult to undertake control 
block transactions without delisting companies. The disclosure directive obligates 
companies to disclose stock transactions for managers and large owners and to quickly 
disclose relevant inside information to all shareholders. This could reduce the private 
benefits of control for large owners. The prospectus directive implies an uncertain 
increase in the legal liability of board member for risk management and internal 
control. This new regulation applies only to listed companies, none of it applies to 
private equity funds and privately owned companies. 
 
As a measure of general legal infrastructure the World Bank governance index is used. 
The index combines measures of political freedom (e.g. freedom of speech, association, 
voting), regulatory quality (e.g. costs of regulation, efficient enforcement, presence of 
generally accepted codes company law) and quality of the legal system (e.g. quality of 
contract enforcement and court system). Every second year since 1996 the World Bank 
has published a set of six different country level governance indicators for 209 
countries; see Kaufman et al. (2005, 2006). The six governance indicators are: i) Voice 
and accountability, ii) Political instability and violence, iii) Government effectiveness, 
iv) Regulatory quality, v) Rule of law, and vi) Control of corruption. The governance 
indicators are constructed through 37 different data sources with more than 300 
different underlying variables. More specifically, the main data sources cover 
information gathered from surveys of firms’ and individuals’ perception of governance, 
as well as assessments by commercial risk rating agencies. Basically, the advantage of 
this approach is that the World Bank governance indicators are more informative about 
unobserved governance characteristics than other comparable data sources. These 
governance indicators are measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, where higher 
values correspond to better governance. Since our focus is Europe we decide only to 
use the governance indicators which we find most important for our sample of 
(developed) countries. Thus we define a new World Bank governance indicator which 
                                                 
50 EU Directive on the market for financial instruments (2004/39/21. April 2004), EU Directive on prospectus 
(2003/71/4. November 2003), EU Directive on Market Abuse (2003/6/28. January 2003), EU directive on 
Transparency (2004/109/15. December 2004), EU directive on Takeovers (2004/25/21. April 2004).  
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is the sum of three indicators: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and rule of 
law, i.e. our measure ranges from -7.5 to 7.5. We assume unchanged index values for 
years with no index values reported (1997, 1999 and 2001).  
 
To examine the effect of informal corporate governance codes which have been an 
important element of corporate governance regulation we construct a code adoption 
variable based on information from the European Corporate Governance Network 
website. We use a simple binary variable (code adoption = 1 if a country has a 
corporate governance code in a given year and 0 otherwise). Hence, for example if a 
country introduces its first corporate governance code in 1999 then the code adoption 
variable is 0 until 1999 and 1 onwards. This measure is intended to measure the effect 
of corporate governance codes on delistings. A generally accepted aim for these codes 
is to improve investor confidence, which could increase incentives to remain listed 
(Cadbury Commission, 1992). But governance codes have also been criticized for 
leading to senseless box checking and for arbitrary restrictions on board membership, 
board organization etc. (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2005). 
 
As we will argue later there is reason to believe that the World Bank governance and 
the LSSVPV indices measure different dimensions of corporate governance regulation. 
Whereas the World Bank is concerned with the overall quality of social institutions, the 
LSSVPV index more specifically measures minority investor protection. The two 
measures are not strongly correlated.  
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The first major finding in this data set is the magnitude of the changes. We register a 
total of 12612 companies listed at European exchanges during the period, of which an 
astounding 30 percent have been delisted. In market values this corresponds to 
approximately $3.7 trillion or 40 percent of total market value. Obviously firm 
dynamics are very important, and the studies which abstract from them by balanced 
panels or cross sections miss an important part of economic reality.  
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For an overview we begin with a few graphs. Figure 1 shows the number of listed 
firms, delistings and IPOs over the period 1996-2004. We observe a steady growth in 
the number of listed firms up to the year 2001, reflecting more listings than IPOs, a 
drop in 2002-2003 because of fewer newlists and more delistings with a pick up in 
numbers in 2004. The trend follows market trends (average firm value) with a lag: The 
number of listed firms increases when stock prices (and firm value) increase and 
decrease when stock prices decrease.  
 
Figure 1: Listed firms, IPOs, Delistings, and average firm value
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Figure 2: Delisting-frequencies by country 
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Figure 2 shows the incidence of delistings by countries. We observe a high incidence of 
M&A in the UK, Finland, and the Netherlands, which are on the top 5 in Europe 
measured by the LSSVPV investor protection index or by the World Bank governance 
index. In contrast, we observe particularly high going private frequencies in Austria and 
Portugal. These countries tend to be mid-level in terms of investor protection (La Porta 
et al., 1998), but both countries experienced an increase in minority protection in 1999-
2000 (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) prior to a massive increase in going private 
transactions. Johnson (2003, p. 36) describes how “Many Austrian managers clearly 
feel the attention a company receives from Austrian investors doesn’t merit the growing 
burdens of maintaining a listing“. 
 
Finally, figure 3 tracks the evolution of delistings by type over time. We note a wave of 
M&A during the bull market up to 2000, after which the number of transactions 
dropped in the bear market, but picked up again in 2003. In contrast, there is a strong 
increase in the frequency of going private transactions over time, although with a drop 
in 2004. The frequency of bankruptcies and liquidations peaked when the bull market 
burst in 2000-2001, but stayed at a low level during the whole period.  
 
Figure 3: Delisting-frequencies by type over time
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From table 1, which shows descriptive statistics by type of delisting, we observe that 
going private transactions tend to be preceded by significantly higher rates of 
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ownership concentration, 56%, against 44% on average for firms that continue as listed. 
One explanation could be that low stock liquidity makes it less attractive for firms with 
concentrated ownership to remain listed. Alternatively, it may be easier for insiders to 
take a company private if they already have substantial ownership. A typical scenario 
seems to be that insiders (e.g. a founding family) list their company by selling a 
minority stake to the public, but later for different reasons (low market valuation, 
financial problems) decide to go private again. Bankruptcy candidates tend to have 
lower ownership concentration, which is consistent with less risk aversion for more 
dispersed ownership. We define ownership concentration as the ratio between closely-
held shares and common shares where closely-held shares represents shares held by 
insiders. 
 
In terms of size (log accounting assets), M&A targets are typically larger than firms that 
continue to be listed which is a surprise since size has historically been regarded as a 
takeover deterrent. In contrast firms that go private are typically smaller than the firms 
that remain listed. And the subsequently bankrupted or liquidated firms are even 
smaller. It may be easier for insiders or equity funds to finance the acquisition of 
smaller firms which may also benefit less from remaining listed. 
 
In terms of capital structure, firms going private or bankrupt have lower equity-to-assets 
ratios than firms that continue as listed. This is more consistent with expropriation of 
existing debtors than with efficiency gains of post transaction leveraging. The average 
equity ratio for merged and acquired firms is closer to the average for listed firms. 
Firms that subsequently go into liquidation or bankruptcy tend to have particularly low 
equity ratios as might be expected. 
  
Growth rates (sales growth) tend to be highest among the firms which continue to be 
listed, slightly lower for M&A firms and lowest for firms that go private. It seems 
understandable that high growth firms would want to remain listed to finance their 
expansion more easily. In contrast low-growth firms will benefit less from being listed. 
Within the bankruptcy and liquidation group there is a big difference between 
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bankrupted firms which have high prior growth rates and liquidated firms which have 
zero growth rates, but the number of observations is small for both groups.  
 
Accounting profitability tends to be higher among merged and acquired firms than 
among firms that remain listed, but lower for firms going private. In other words, the 
failing firms hypothesis (Dewey, 1961) is more convincing for going private 
transactions than for M&A. Following Jensen (1986) it may be easier to restructure 
companies which are privately held. Surprisingly, firms going private tend to have 
negative ROA51 on average, while negative ROA is expected for bankrupted and 
liquidated firms. Apparently firms that go private tend to be low performers. Later in 
the paper we check for differences between profitable and unprofitable firms. 
Alternatively, accounting profitability may be manipulated by insiders to make 
companies cheaper which would then indicate expropriation of minority investors. 
Sales per employee is, however, higher for both M&A and going private transactions 
compared to remaining listed firms and the overall average. 
 
Firm value, q,52 is higher for firms that remain listed, which makes sense, since they are 
more expensive to buy or have better growth prospects, but the differences between 
delisted firms are small.  
 
Being newly listed (IPO within the period 1996-2004) makes the firm a less likely 
M&A target, but a more likely target for going private or for bankruptcy/liquidation. 
54-55% of the firms that subsequently went private or bankrupt were listed during the 
period whereas the percentage for firms remaining listed was 40% and 30% for 
merged/acquired firms. 
 
In addition to the firm specific variables we include a number of country variables to 
capture the impact of country differences. We use average firm value by country and 
year53 as a measure of general market sentiment/expectations (Shleifer and Vishny, 
                                                 
51 ROA is defined as netincome before preferred dividends plus interest expense on debt-interest capitalized after 
taxes relatively to last year’s total assets.  
52 Firm value, q, is defined as the sum of market value and debt book value to book value of total assets. 
53 Average firm value is therefore the annual country averages of the firm-specific q-values. 
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2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). The decision to delist may for example 
be influenced by the value of the company relative to other listed firms. Average firm 
value does not vary much between exiting firms and firms that remain listed or by type 
of delisting. But it is slightly lower for going private firms compared to M&A firms. 
Perhaps a positive market sentiment (high average q) induces more M&A because 
acquiring companies have lower costs of capital or believe to have better growth 
prospects, while high average q leads to fewer going private transactions because it 
seems more expensive to buy listed companies in good times. 
 
We use average market liquidity as an indicator of trends in liquidity, since there the 
firm level information is relatively scarce. It is measured as yearly country averages of 
the ratio between common shares traded and common shares outstanding. Stock market 
liquidity tends to be high for merged or acquired companies, but low for firms going 
private or bankrupt, if we compare to firms that remain listed. Apparently, low stock 
market liquidity is an incentive to delist (Bharath and Dittmar, 2006). 
 
We also include aggregate measures of M&A activity (annual country M&A 
frequencies) and private equity investment (Deloitte, 2005) to be able to control for 
macro-trends which happen by chance to be correlated with corporate governance 
policies. For example it is well known that M&A tend to come in waves which appear 
to be serially correlated, but difficult to explain by standard economic variables 
(Harford, 2005). We find that merged or acquired companies are preceded by a high 
incidence of previous M&A, but going private transactions appear not to be preceded 
by a higher going private frequency. Since the surge of private equity investment are 
said to be partially motivated by a wish to get around governance costs in listed 
companies, this involves some risk of overcontrolling, but out results remain the same if 
we leave this variable out. We also see few differences between M&A and going 
private transactions related to the development of GDP.    
 
As for the governance policy variables, M&A tends to occur in countries and time 
periods with slightly better investor protection and slightly better overall governance. 
Investor protection is also slightly higher in companies that later go private.  Previous 
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increases in investor protection appear to be smaller among firms that subsequently 
delist, particularly among those delisting by bankruptcy/liquidation and M&A. 
 
Summing up, companies being delisted by merger or acquisition are attractive in the 
sense that they tend to be larger, have higher accounting returns and growth rates than 
firms that remain listed. In contrast, the firms going private or into 
bankruptcy/liquidation are relatively unattractive measured on the same variables.  
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. For overall delistings we observe many 
significant, but small correlations with our explanatory variables. Delisted firms are 
slightly larger, have more concentrated ownership and higher sales per employee, but 
do worse in terms of equity-to-assets ratio, sales growth, return on assets, cash flow and 
firm value. The correlation analysis tends to confirm the impression that M&A targets 
are attractive, while firms going private are poor performers. Firms that are 
subsequently acquired or merged tend to be larger, have more concentrated ownership, 
be more profitable, be lower valued, to have been listed for longer, and to be listed in 
countries with better overall corporate governance (according to the World Bank 
index), but to grow slower than other firms. Firms that later go private tend to be 
smaller, have more concentrated ownership, to underperform in terms of sales growth, 
firm value and accounting profitability, and to be located in countries with better 
investor protection, but a poorer World Bank governance score. Firms that subsequently 
enter into bankruptcy or liquidation tend to be small and to have less equity. The 
correlations between explanatory variables are low so multicollinearity is not an 
important problem.   
 
In previous analysis we found that the cash flow to sales ratio (a possible measure of 
free cash flow) was highly correlated with return on assets and decided to leave it out. 
We also experimented with a number of other firm specific variables (e.g. asset 
turnover, dividends) and national institutional variables (e.g. corporate tax rates, interest 
rates, the Djankov et al. (2007) anti self-dealing index), which turned out not to have 
significant effects or to be highly correlated with other explanatory variables. We 
therefore omitted them in subsequent analysis. 
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Overall 
average
Remaining 
Listed M&A
Going 
private
Bankruptcy & 
Liquidation
Ownership concentration, % 44.9 44.3 46.1 55.8 39.9
[40511] [36446] [1571] [853] [86]
[28.1] [27.5] [29.1] [30.5] [26.5]
Log of assets 5.153 5.114 5.698 4.553 4.229
[64880] [53477] [1978] [1324] [125]
[2.421] [2.366] [2.214] [1.950] [1.633]
Sales/employee, per million $ 0.519 0.491 0.690 1.062 0.186
[54617] [47683] [1828] [1098] [80]
[4.252] [3.763] [7.174] [13.021] [0.205]
Equity to assets, % 39.2 40.6 38.6 30.1 27.5
[61981] [53437] [1977] [1324] [125]
[36.4] [35.4] [33.3] [48.4] [60.0]
One-year growth in sales, % 12.7 13.3 8.7 5.9 7.4
[56949] [49814] [1937] [1271] [123]
[34.2] [34.5] [31.0] [38.6] [44.3]
Return on assets, % 2.1 2.2 3.5 -3.9 -10.1
[56690] [49631] [1935] [1269] [124]
[23.7] [23.9] [16.9] [25.5] [26.4]
Firm value, q 1.334 1.354 1.106 1.107 1.238
[55320] [50665] [1961] [1312] [125]
[1.498] [1.526] [1.083] [1.276] [1.773]
Average firm value 1.343 1.340 1.408 1.271 1.304
[65454] [53798] [1979] [1326] [125]
[0.401] [0.415] [0.404] [0.369] [0.336]
Total Private Equity investments 
relative to market value, % 0.633 0.629 0.644 0.639 0.667
[65080] [50071] [1914] [1235] [121]
[0.381] [0.388] [0.335] [0.399] [0.261]
Stock liquidity 0.289 0.286 0.309 0.248 0.230
[61441] [50385] [1918] [1235] [118]
[0.222] [0.223] [0.217] [0.193] [0.155]
M&A frequency 0.038 0.037 0.053 0.037 0.039
[65454] [53798] [1979] [1326] [125]
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.027]
Newlist 0.370 0.414 0.309 0.544 0.552
[65454] [53798] [1979] [1326] [125]
[0.483] [0.493] [0.462] [0.498] [0.499]
GDP growth 4.868 4.873 4.909 4.812 4.611
[65080] [53461] [1979] [1314] [125]
[1.956] [1.992] [1.885] [2.166] [1.474]
World Bank Governance index 4.260 4.235 4.367 4.173 4.284
[59543] [49349] [1818] [1292] [116]
[0.786] [0.801] [0.707] [0.801] [0.776]
LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor 
protection index 3.733 3.696 3.983 3.786 3.670
[63369] [51954] [1959] [1243] [121]
[1.163] [1.153] [1.164] [1.087] [1.227]
Code adoption 0.735 0.728 0.809 0.775 0.800
[65454] [53798] [1979] [1326] [125]
[0.441] [0.445] [0.393] [0.418] [0.402]
Number of observations and standard deviations are reported in brackets.
The World Bank governance variable is defined as the sum of three indicators: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, 
and rule of law. The LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor protection index (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) is the updated investor 
protection index by La Porta et al. (1998). Code adoption is a dummy variable with the value of one (and onwards) when a 
country's first corporate governance code is adopted.
Variable explanations:  Ownership concentration is defined as the ratio between closely-held shares and common shares 
outstanding. Closely-held shares represents shares held by insiders. Firm value, q, is defined as market value plus total debt 
to total assets. Average firm value is annual country averages based upon the firm-specific q's. The total private equity 
investment ratio is the ratio between total private equity investments and stock market value by year and country. 
Information on private equity investments is gathered from Deloitte (2005). Stock liquidity is measured as country averages 
(per year) of common shares traded relatively to common shares outstanding. The M&A frequency is the annual country 
averages. Newlist is a dummy variable which assigns a firm with the value one if the firm has become listed after 1995 
otherwise zero. Growth in GDP is from OECD. 
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Table 2
Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Delisting-dummy 1
2 M&A-dummy 0.7368* 1
3 Going private-dummy 0.6239* -0.0298* 1
4 Bankruptcy & Liquidation-dummy 0.1876* -0.0090* -0.0076 1
5 World Bank Governance index 0.0229* 0.0370* -0.0093* 0.0064 1
6 LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor protection index 0.0433* 0.0451* 0.0131* 0.0022 0.2627* 1
7 Code adoption 0.0421* 0.0340* 0.0223* 0.0095* 0.1176* 0.5036* 1
8 Ownership concentration 0.0438* 0.0115* 0.0604* -0.0079 -0.2964* -0.3651* -0.1905* 1
9 Log of total assets 0.0094* 0.0472* -0.0371* -0.0176* -0.0637* -0.1025* -0.0486* -0.0666* 1
10 Sales per employee 0.0175* 0.0080 0.0189* -0.0030 0.0012 -0.0332* -0.0130* 0.0298* 0.0459* 1
11 Equity to assets -0.0384* -0.0093* -0.0441* -0.0168* 0.0382* 0.0778* 0.0497* -0.1019* -0.1443* 0.0049 1
12 Sales growth -0.0399* -0.0241* -0.0314* -0.0076 -0.0422* 0.0022 -0.0219* -0.0197* -0.0326* 0.0138* 0.0484* 1
13 Return on assets -0.0191* 0.0135* -0.0391* -0.0247* -0.0580* -0.0624* -0.0558* 0.0182* 0.1495* 0.0294* 0.0839* 0.0687* 1
14 Firm value, q -0.0392* -0.0303* -0.0241* -0.0033 0.0393* 0.0578* 0.0413* -0.0396* -0.2647* -0.0151* 0.0605* 0.1689* -0.0401* 1
15 Average firm value 0.0032 0.0291* -0.0281* -0.0031 0.2027* 0.2936* 0.1781* -0.2183* -0.1057* 0.0005 0.0667* 0.1212* 0.0181* 0.2709* 1
16 Stock liquidity 0.0073 0.0260* -0.0174* -0.0082* 0.0678* 0.0163* -0.0566* -0.0112* -0.0263* 0.0080 -0.0140* 0.0088* 0.0274* 0.0192* 0.0418* 1
17 M&A frequency 0.0756* 0.1162* -0.0195* 0.0008 0.3011* 0.3824* 0.2476* -0.2500* -0.0543* -0.0062 0.0268* 0.0105* 0.0018 0.0740* 0.2989* 0.1902* 1
18 Total private equity investments ratio 0.0085* 0.0063 0.0037 0.0066 0.1954* 0.2893* 0.3028* -0.1628* -0.0720* -0.0051 0.0366* -0.0165* -0.0468* 0.0221* 0.1430* 0.0192* 0.0650* 1
19 Newlist 0.0090* -0.0342* 0.0493* 0.0154* -0.0988* -0.0444* 0.0762* 0.0007 -0.2794* -0.0155* 0.1245* 0.1016* -0.1290* 0.1901* -0.0348* -0.0441* -0.1339* 0.0280* 1
20 GDP growth -0.0033 0.0031 -0.0068 -0.0064 0.0540* 0.2780* 0.1147* -0.2070* -0.0471* -0.0209* 0.0770* 0.0712* -0.0005 0.0531* 0.1978* 0.0757* 0.0063* 0.1116* -0.0296* 1
Ownership concentration is defined as the ratio between closely-held shares and common shares outstanding. Closely-held shares represents shares held by insiders. Firm value, q, is defined as market value plus total debt to total assets. Average firm value is annual country averages 
based upon the firm-specific q's. Stock liquidity is measured as country averages (per year) of common shares traded relatively to common shares outstanding. The M&A frequency is the annual country averages. The total private equity investment ratio is the ratio between total private 
equity investments and stock market value by year and country. Information on private equity investments is gathered from Deloitte (2005). Newlist is a dummy variable which assigns a firm with the value one if the firm has become listed after 1995 otherwise zero. Growth in GDP is 
from OECD. The * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Variable explanations: The World Bank governance variable is defined as the sum of three indicators: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and rule of law. The LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor protection index (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) is the updated investor protection index 
by La Porta et al. (1998). Code adoption is a dummy variable with the value of one (and onwards) when a country's first corporate governance code is adopted. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Overall delistings 
 
We begin by estimating determinants of overall delisting using logistic regression and 
determinants of delisting by type using multinomial logistic regression while taking 
into consideration clustering of residuals by firm. We estimate the probability of 
delisting in year t relative to remaining listed (or more precisely the log odds ratio) as a 
function of a set of explanatory variables measured in the year prior to delisting (year t-
1). We control for fixed industry effects54 and (in subsequent models) for fixed country 
effects. We assume a linear relationship between the likelihood of delisting and 
measures of governance regulation mainly since the countries analyzed are all at a high 
investor protection level. However, we acknowledge that our main finding may imply a 
non-linear relationship. 
 
We find that a higher level of investor protection is associated with more delistings 
(model 1), both by M&A and going private transactions (model 2), but fewer 
bankruptcy/liquidation cases. The positive effect on M&A transactions is consistent 
with previous results by Rossi and Volpin (2004), and Pagano and Volpin (2006) and 
can be regarded as an indication of a more active market for corporate control in 
nations with stronger protection of minority investors. Moreover, better minority 
investor protection also leads to more going private transactions which appear to 
support the overregulation hypothesis: apparently stronger protection of minority 
investors makes it less attractive to remain publicly listed.  
 
We test the robustness of this result in subsequent tables. For example there are many 
dimensions of corporate governance policy and it is unclear whether they are all 
adequately captured by our policy variables, and we therefore examine the impact of 
fixed country effects and other governance policy measures. Moreover, theoretically 
corporate governance policy may be an endogenous variable which needs to be taken 
into account when estimating its effects. Finally, a complete analysis also needs to take 
                                                 
54 We have information of the firms’ main industry (SIC codes) affiliation from which we aggregate industry 
affiliation to 25 different industry groups. 
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into account new listings. It turns out that the frequency of new listings is 
insignificantly or negatively correlated with the available measures of corporate 
governance quality. We address these issues later in the paper after reviewing the 
impact of firm specific effects on both overall delistings and delisting types. 
 
As for the control variables we find that firms are more likely to delist (regardless of 
type) if they grow slowly, have low firm value (q) and low liquidity (i.e. if market 
liquidity is low or ownership concentration is high). 
 
According to the recent delisting wave there is a possibility of a time trend in delistings 
which should be controlled for in the analysis. We therefore control for trend or wave 
effects on M&A and going private transactions by including past M&A delisting 
frequency by country and aggregate private equity investments in the country as control 
variables. Both appear to lead to more delistings. We believe that these measures are 
able to control for the potential time trend since they individually captures the 
disaggregated time effects on the type of delisting. Regarding, our focus on going 
private transactions we would argue that our measure of volume of private equity 
investments relatively to public stock market value would capture the main time trend 
in this period. 
 
In our model both firm valuation and country valuation (average firm value) serve as 
controls. The delisting decision is thus controlled for the firm-specific value relatively 
to the average value of other listed firms.55 The reason why we employ both measures 
is that they capture a firm and market valuation effect on the likelihood of delisting. 
 
There are interesting differences between types of delistings. Companies going private 
are smaller and less profitable than merged or acquired companies.   
 
                                                 
55 Instead if the difference between firm-specific q and country average q is employed as an explanatory variable we 
find that when a firm is relatively ’overvalued’ compared to country average it is less likely to delist (results not 
reported). 
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Determinants of Delisting
Explanatory variables
Ownership concentration 1.243 *** 1.247 *** 1.641 *** -0.738
0.106 0.127 0.202 0.615
Log of assets 0.053 *** 0.122 *** -0.078 *** -0.077
0.012 0.015 0.022 0.089
Sales/employee 0.006 0.004 0.009 ** -2.889 *
0.004 0.004 0.004 1.532
Equity to assets -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** -0.014 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
Growth in sales -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.003 *** 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005
Return on assets -0.005 ** 0.002 -0.011 *** -0.018 **
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.008
Firm value, q -0.157 *** -0.170 *** -0.176 *** -0.135
0.026 0.035 0.044 0.142
Average firm value 0.078 0.197 ** -0.141 0.473
0.080 0.097 0.147 0.516
Stock liquidity -0.604 *** -0.292 ** -1.240 *** -2.518 *
0.129 0.145 0.263 1.325
M&A frequency 19.046 *** 27.823 *** 1.752 -13.722
1.126 1.368 2.125 11.211
Private equity investment ratio 14.489 ** 4.328 26.791 ** 21.267
6.109 7.858 11.213 20.643
Newlist 0.011 -0.170 ** 0.305 *** -0.006
0.058 0.073 0.097 0.375
GDP growth 0.043 *** 0.072 *** 0.021 -0.028
0.014 0.016 0.027 0.067
LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor 
protection index
0.098 *** 0.128 *** 0.105 ** -0.654 ***
0.028 0.036 0.050 0.198
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations (firm-year) 31607
Log pseudolikelihood -7348
Pseudo R2 0.042
-8625
Table 3
(1)
Delisted
Delisting due to:
M&A Going private Bankruptcy & Liquidation
(1) is a logit regression where the response variable is delisting. (2) is a multinomial logit regression where the 
response variable outcomes (delisted) are either due to a merger or acquisition, going private transaction, or 
bankruptcy and liquidation. 
Variable explanations:  Ownership concentration is defined as the ratio between closely-held shares and common 
shares outstanding. Closely-held shares represents shares held by insiders. Firm value, q, is defined as market 
value plus total debt to total assets. Average firm value is annual country averages based upon the firm-specific 
q's. The (total) private equity investment ratio is the ratio between total private equity investments and stock 
market value by year and country. Information on private equity investments is gathered from Deloitte (2005). 
Stock liquidity is measured as country averages (per year) of common shares traded relatively to common shares 
outstanding. The M&A frequency is the annual country averages. Newlist is a dummy variable which assigns a 
firm with the value one if the firm has become listed after 1995 otherwise zero. Growth in GDP is from OECD. 
The LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor protection index (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) is the updated investor 
protection index by La Porta et al. (1998). 
31607
0.069
(2)
Robust standard errors are reported below parameter estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
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Relatively few companies exit by bankruptcy or liquidation and the two groups are not 
homogenous which implies that it may be difficult to find significant results, but we 
choose to estimate only one set of determinants for them given their limited numerical 
significance. Nevertheless, the results conform well to our a priori expectations. We 
find that bankrupted and liquidated companies are likely to be less profitable, to have 
lower equity-to-asset ratios, and to be more common when stock market liquidity is 
low. Finally – as expected – better investor protection is found to reduce the probability 
of bankruptcy and liquidation.  
 
4.2. Analysis of going private transactions 
 
In table 4 we focus on going private transactions which is our primarily focus. The 
impact of the control variables is broadly similar to what was found in table 3 so we 
comment only on the measures of corporate governance regulation. We include more 
regulatory measures and break down the sample to get more information on how 
regulation affects going private transactions.  
 
In table 4 model 1, we introduce a measure of general legal infrastructure (a modified 
version of the World Bank governance index) in addition to the investor protection 
index. It could be interpreted as an overall governance measure. We also control for 
fixed country effects to capture country differences apart from governance regulation. 
We find that the World Bank governance index is associated with a lower probability of 
going private, while a high level of minority investor protection tends to increase this 
probability (as we reported in table 3). The World Bank governance index combines 
measures of political freedom (e.g. freedom of speech, association, voting), regulatory 
quality (e.g. costs of regulation, efficient enforcement, presence of generally accepted 
codes company law) and quality of the legal system (e.g. quality of contract 
enforcement and court system). Apparently, better overall governance measured in this 
way makes it more attractive to stay listed, for example because of lower transaction 
costs, better monitoring and higher investor confidence. Measuring these effects using 
odds ratios (not reported) the odds of going private go up by approximately 90 percent 
when the minority investor protection index increases by one unit. The odds of favour 
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of going private go down by approximately 60 percent when the overall governance 
index increases by one unit. Large year-on-year changes in these specific indices are 
quite rare, but there are still large cross-country differences.56  
 
In table 4 model 2 we add code adoption as an additional independent (binary) variable 
indicating whether a country has adopted a corporate governance code in a given year 
and a value of 0 if it has not. Our estimates indicate that the adoption of corporate 
governance codes has led to more going private transactions which could be seen as a 
response to increased corporate governance bureaucracy. However, code adoption is 
highly correlated (+0.5) with the LSSVPV index, so it may be difficult to disentangle 
the effect of these two variables.  
 
In table 4 model 3 we break down the sample by period (before and after the stock 
market high in 2000). We find that our measures of investor protection regulation had 
no significant impact in the pre-2001 period when stock prices were increasing rapidly. 
In contrast, the effects are significant in the post-2000 period and somewhat stronger in 
magnitude than for the overall period (c.f. model 1). Apparently both investor 
protection and overall governance regulation are less important for delisting decisions 
in a favourable stock market climate when stock price increases outweigh governance 
costs. 
 
In table 4 model 4 we check for differences between newly listed firms, i.e. firms listed 
after 1995 and firms listed before the beginning of the period (1995). It turns out that 
the impact of the governance regulation variables is significant with the same signs for 
both groups, although the effect of overall governance regulation is stronger for newly 
listed firms. 
 
In table 4 model 5 we check for differences between small and large firms. We define 
firms as large if they have above average sales (per country and year), and small if they 
have sales below average. We find that the effects of governance regulation are weaker 
                                                 
56 If a cumulative measure of changes in the LSSVPV index is used as an explanatory variable a significantly positive 
impact from this variable is found on the likelihood of going private (results not reported). 
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and insignificant for large firms, while it is stronger and significant for small firms.57 
Presumably, the benefits of being listed are larger for large firms while fixed 
administration costs are easier to carry for large firms. Marginal variations in corporate 
governance regulation therefore have less of an impact on large firms, while the costs 
can more easily come to exceed the benefits for small firms. This is similar to Block 
(2004), Engel et al. (2005) and Kamar et al. (2006), who find a particularly significant 
effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on going private for small firms. 
 
In table 4 model 6 we examine differences between companies with low and high rates 
of return on accounting assets (defined by ROA > 0 and ROA ≤ 0). We find that the 
effect of investor protection is insignificant for companies with negative rates of return 
whose delisting probably has more to do with firm specific financial difficulties. 
Apparently, higher protection of minority investors leads more well-performing 
companies to go private. In contrast, the high overall governance standards appear to 
lead to significantly fewer delistings for both profitable and unprofitable companies. In 
contrast, Leuz et al. (2006) find that there is more of a Sarbanes-Oxley effect among 
poorly performing firms in the US. 
 
We also examined whether the influence of governance regulation differed by 
ownership concentration (not reported). It might be that companies with high levels 
ownership concentration are more likely to go private when the private benefits of 
control are lower, particularly if the owners are insiders as is common in continental 
Europe. We do find that investor protection has a positive significant impact on going 
private transactions among companies with a concentrated ownership but no impact on 
companies with dispersed ownership.58  
Finally, we also find that the effects of governance regulation are robust if we drop the 
Eastern European countries in the sample. 
 
                                                 
57 This results hold if instead of the mean, as robustness check, a similar test is performed using the 75% percentile.  
58 Concentrated ownership is defined as either above the mean or median ownership concentration. 
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Explanatory variables
Ownership concentration 1.813 *** 1.807 *** 1.955 *** 1.782 *** 0.881 *** 2.440 *** 2.864 *** 1.669 *** 2.211 *** 0.924 ***
0.210 0.210 0.335 0.267 0.322 0.280 0.765 0.221 0.276 0.339
Log of assets -0.078 *** -0.080 *** -0.118 *** -0.058 ** -0.047 -0.087 *** -0.301 ** -0.003 -0.060 ** -0.112 **
0.023 0.023 0.037 0.029 0.038 0.031 0.138 0.032 0.029 0.044
Sales/employee 0.024 *** 0.024 *** 0.033 *** 0.023 *** 0.025 ** 0.020 *** 0.016 0.034 *** 0.026 *** 0.030
0.007 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.013 0.004 0.017 0.011 0.007 0.038
Equity to assets -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.009 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.006 *** -0.008 * -0.006 *** -0.005 ** -0.006 ***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001
Growth in sales -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 * 0.009 * -0.004 *** -0.007 *** 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002
Return on assets -0.011 *** -0.010 *** -0.015 *** -0.007 ** -0.006 ** -0.019 *** 0.013 -0.012 *** -0.004 -0.008 ***
0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.017 0.002 0.007 0.003
Firm value, q -0.164 *** -0.164 *** -0.227 *** -0.096 * -0.117 ** -0.200 *** -0.146 -0.157 *** -0.043 -0.275 ***
0.045 0.045 0.072 0.055 0.056 0.072 0.180 0.046 0.067 0.064
Average firm value -0.869 *** -0.825 *** 0.738 -2.469 ** -1.877 *** -0.440 -2.484 ** -0.789 *** -1.134 *** -0.280
0.244 0.243 0.459 0.995 0.434 0.307 0.986 0.252 0.306 0.404
Stock liquidity -1.136 *** -1.011 *** -2.408 *** 0.185 -0.681 -1.375 *** -0.998 -1.159 *** -1.073 *** -1.972 **
0.375 0.385 0.719 0.730 0.775 0.484 1.683 0.378 0.409 0.827
M&A frequency 3.205 2.894 6.325 5.395 0.283 7.976 ** 19.272 * 2.109 7.802 ** -1.053
2.464 2.460 4.732 3.519 3.867 3.388 10.225 2.567 3.074 4.240
Private equity investment ratio 14.169 12.015 51.881 * 0.901 16.788 11.905 54.291 ** 9.116 3.838 28.309 *
11.252 11.514 30.492 12.897 14.663 17.062 21.378 12.875 17.294 15.123
Newlist 0.118 0.097 -0.118 0.087 -0.959 *** -0.344 0.184 * 0.245 ** -0.130
0.100 0.101 0.198 0.123 0.299 0.483 0.103 0.118 0.176
GDP growth 0.017 0.014 0.029 0.004 0.084 -0.008 -0.122 0.028 0.020 0.011
0.032 0.032 0.050 0.062 0.057 0.040 0.125 0.034 0.039 0.061
LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor 
protection index
0.618 *** 0.576 *** 0.138 1.058 *** 1.114 *** 0.656 *** 0.613 0.636 *** 0.832 *** 0.184
0.183 0.196 0.212 0.409 0.387 0.254 0.386 0.210 0.257 0.203
World Bank Governance index -1.010 *** -1.056 *** -0.285 -1.817 *** -1.915 *** -0.640 ** -0.946 -1.038 *** -0.789 *** -1.288 ***
0.211 0.215 0.385 0.495 0.397 0.263 0.793 0.221 0.250 0.403
Code adoption 0.294 *
0.154
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations (firm-year) 26939 26939 15255 11576 9297 17509 3618 22523 20821 5927
Log pseudolikelihood -2758 -2756 -1140 -1569 -1108 -1596 -214 -2507 -1812 -875
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.072 0.100 0.056 0.066 0.100 0.163 0.066 0.082 0.088
(1) (2) (3)
Table 4
(4)
Newly listed Listed before 1995
(5)
Large 
Robust standard errors are reported below parameter estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Determinants of Going private
Small
(1) - (6) are logit regression models where the response variable equals zero if listed and one if going private. 
Variable explanations:  Ownership concentration is defined as the ratio between closely-held shares and common shares outstanding. Closely-held shares represents shares held by insiders. Firm value, 
q, is defined as market value plus total debt to total assets. Average firm value is annual country averages based upon the firm-specific q's. The (total) private equity investment ratio is the ratio between 
total private equity investments and stock market value by year and country. Information on private equity investments is gathered from Deloitte (2005). Stock liquidity is measured as country averages 
(per year) of common shares traded relatively to common shares outstanding. The M&A frequency is the annual country averages. Newlist is a dummy variable which assigns a firm with the value one 
if the firm has become listed after 1995 otherwise zero. Growth in GDP is from OECD. The World Bank governance variable is defined as the sum of three indicators: voice and accountability, 
regulatory quality, and rule of law. The LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor protection index (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) is the updated investor protection index by La Porta et al. (1998). Code adoption is a 
dummy variable with the value of one (and onwards) when a country's first corporate governance code is adopted. 
(6)
Positive ROA Negative ROABefore 2001 After 2000
Newly listed are firms listed after 1995. If firm-specific sales are above or equals the average sales per year and country in the delisting year they are characterized as large firms. Otherwise as small 
firms. Firms with ROA above zero are denoted as positive ROA firms, otherwise as negative ROA firms.  
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4.3. Endogenous politics 
 
Recent advances in the political economy of corporate governance have emphasized 
that corporate governance policies are to some extent endogenously determined (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2001, 2005b; Perotti and von Thadden, 2006; 
Roe, 2006). Among other factors such as legal origin, cultural, ideology, demography 
are believed to shape corporate governance regulation (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Roe, 
2003; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). This implies that statistical estimates of the effects of 
these policies need to take into consideration how the policies are determined. In this 
section we attempt to take a step in this direction. Following the literature we focus on 
the legal system, the voting system and unionization as likely determinants of corporate 
governance policies.59  
 
The importance of history in shaping corporate governance has been emphasized by La 
Porta et al. (1998), who argue that the legal origin (civil vs. common law) remains a 
key determinant of corporate governance policies. It is documented that (market-
supporting) common law countries are associated with stronger investor protection (e.g. 
La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2007). Roe (1994a, 1994b) and Bebchuck and Roe 
(1999) argue that rent seeking and transaction costs can contribute to path dependency.  
Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1998) state that “in principle a strong system of legal 
enforcement could substitute for weak rules”. Hence, according to this legal systems 
are formed by both legal design (origin) and legal enforcement. Empirically in Western 
Europe enforcement seems to be greater in civil law countries compared to common 
law countries (La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2003b). Supporting this Pagano and 
Volpin (2001) argue that both regulatory design and enforcement activity affect 
financial regulation and capital markets development. Hence, it could be that only 
focusing on legal design (origins) as determinant of investor protection neglects other 
                                                 
59 The legal origin variable equals 0 when common law country and 1 if civil law country (La Porta et al., 1998). The 
proportionality index (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) equals 3 if 100 percent of seats are assigned via a proportional rule, 2 
if the majority of seats are assigned by this rule, 1 if a minority of seats are assigned proportionally, and 0 if no seats are 
assigned this way. For example Scandinavian countries are given the value of 3, while UK’s measure is 0. Unionization 
is measured as annual labor union density rates (Visser, 2006). 
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legal structures, especially within civil law countries, which might affect investor 
protection.  
 
The voting system is another relevant governance determinant since Pagano and Volpin 
(2005b) argue that the design of political voting systems (proportionality) affects 
investor protection.60 Proportionality of the voting system may influence the political 
bargaining game between investors and employees (Pagano and Volpin, 2005a). The 
argument here is that proportional voting pushes political parties to cater more to the 
preferences of social groups with homogeneous preferences (e.g. employees), while 
politicians in non-proportional voting systems have to do more to please the pivotal 
district dominated by residual groups (e.g. rentiers), which are not ideologically 
committed. Pagano and Volpin (2005b) empirically found that proportional electoral 
systems are associated with weaker investor protection. They further propose that other 
relevant political variables (e.g. competition between political parties and democratic 
tenure) affect a country’s overall system. In addition, Perotti and von Thadden (2006) 
maintain that the behaviour of voters is important since if the wealth of the median 
voters increase political support should move towards favouring equity markets.  
 
Roe (2003) suggested that concentrated ownership emerges as a counterweight to 
organized labor in social democratic countries. Unionization can be regarded as a proxy 
for social democracy. For example, strong unions may have a vested interest in 
takeover defenses, which protect firms and their employees against takeovers contrary 
to the best interests of minority investors. Pagano and Volpin (2005a) also argue that 
managers use employees as “shark repellents” which lower firm attractiveness and 
through that presumably prevent takeovers. Naturally, this is not necessarily in the 
interests of the shareholders. Therefore it could be argued that countries with strong 
unions have poorer investor protection. This is also suggested by Pagano and Volpin 
(2005b) who found that employment protection is usually higher in countries with 
proportional voting system (countries with low investor protection).    
 
                                                 
60 If the electoral system is proportional winning a majority of the votes is crucial, whereas it is majoritarian when 
winning a majority of districts ensures victory. 
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Besides using unionization as instrument we also construct two combined variables 
following the arguments given above: legal origin combined with rule of law (legal 
system), and proportionality combined with voice and accountability (voting system). 
Rule of law and voice and accountability (both published by the World Bank) add 
additional elements to our policy measures as highlighted in the literature. Rule of law 
measures for instance the quality of contract enforcement while voice and 
accountability measures political behaviour, for example whether a country’s 
population tends to vote in elections or has freedom of speech.  
 
The rationale for the combined legal variable is as argued earlier that legal design and 
enforcement may substitute each other (La Porta el., 1998). Hence, legal origin can be 
considered as the legal design of a country while rule of law is a proxy for enforcement. 
Note that legal origin is often perceived as exogenous due to its historical origin. This 
interaction between legal origin and rule of law should then capture a broader measure 
of the legal system quality in both civil and common law countries. For example this 
measure whether a civil law country, with arguably a poorer legal design (could be 
debated), compensates by having greater public enforcement. Data also suggests that 
the civil law countries with better rule of law (enforcement) have better investor 
protection (Scandinavian countries) than other civil law countries. Common law 
countries seem to have strong enforcement which might indicate that enforcement 
especially has an impact in civil law countries.   
 
The proportionality of the voting system can be seen as the design of a country’s 
electoral system. This is largely historically determined and therefore exogenous. 
According to the literature the voting system jointly interacts with other political 
determinants such as state of democracy, electoral participation etc. Therefore we 
suggest that a more precise estimate of the system is the combined effect of political 
proportionality of the voting system and “voice and accountability” within a country. 
The idea is that a country might have an acknowledged voting system design but if 
democracy is weak and people do not vote then the overall voting system is not 
necessarily well functioning. The combined variable takes both dimensions into 
account.  
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We regard these background variables as suitable econometric instruments of investor 
protection policy because they are unlikely to have a direct impact on the going private 
frequency but affects investor protection. Specifically we would argue that legal origin, 
rule of law, proportionality, voice and accountability and unionization affects a firm 
equally whether it is listed or not.  
 
Table 5 provides correlation coefficients with observations by country and year. It turns 
out that delisting frequencies at the country level are not significantly correlated with 
investor protection, regardless of type. We note also that investor protection and overall 
governance are not significantly correlated (in fact the numerical correlation is negative 
at the country level). It may be meaningful therefore to talk about different dimensions 
of corporate governance regulation. Investor protection is positively associated with the 
anti self-dealing index proposed by Djankov et al. (2007) and with a measure of 
regulatory costs (Jackson, 2005).  
 
Interestingly, the frequency of new stock exchange listings appears to be significantly 
influenced neither by the LSSVPV investor protection measure nor by the modified 
World Bank governance index. Although we do not have the firm specific information 
to analyze IPOs in this paper, this indicates that higher corporate governance standards 
lead to fewer, rather than more IPOs. This is contrary to the findings of Pagano and 
Volpin (2006), perhaps because they analyze a larger data set which includes 
developing countries while we confine our attention to European countries which 
generally have a higher level of investor protection. 
 
We find that both legal origin and the combined legal variable are highly significantly 
correlated with investor protection. Further, notice that the combined legal variable is 
not strongly correlated with the going private frequency which justifies the use as an 
instrument.  
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Table 5
Correlation matrix of alternative policy measures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Total delisting-frequency 1
2 M&A delisting-frequency 0.3852* 1
3 Going private delisting-frequency 0.8497* -0.1433* 1
4 Bankruptcy & Liquidation delisting-frequency 0.3174* -0.0818 0.2591* 1
5 IPO-frequency -0.1403 -0.0402 -0.1232 -0.0555 1
6 LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor protection index 0.1505 0.1095 0.1108 -0.1110 -0.0203 1
7
World Bank Governance 
index -0.0445 0.3278* -0.2200* -0.1362 -0.1450 -0.1563 1
8 Anti self-dealing index 0.1462* 0.4291* -0.0861 -0.0169 -0.0729 0.4767* 0.2490* 1
9 Regulatory cost 0.1483 0.3400* -0.1061 -0.0663 -0.0632 0.2956* 0.3544* 0.6552* 1
10 Regulatory staff 0.1247 0.2460* -0.0513 -0.0697 -0.0783 0.3260* -0.0998 0.3073* 0.5834* 1
11 Proportionality index -0.0417 -0.1364 0.0827 -0.0992 -0.0773 -0.4445* 0.1455 -0.5605* -0.2104* 0.1651* 1
12 Unionization -0.0896 0.0474 -0.1261 -0.1003 0.1108 -0.2228* 0.4459* -0.1516 -0.0131 -0.0603 0.5568* 1
13 Legal origin -0.0844 -0.3465* 0.1068 0.0137 0.0400 -0.5210* -0.2530* -0.7030* -0.9147* -0.5411* 0.4287* 0.1259 1
14 Combined voting system variable -0.0469 -0.0864 0.0342 -0.1116 -0.0665 -0.4589* 0.4381* -0.4441* -0.1107 0.0943 0.9316* 0.6666* -0.3512* 1
15
Combined legal system 
variable -0.0794 0.0373 -0.0999 -0.0670 -0.0659 -0.5807* 0.6271* -0.3181* -0.6471* -0.6123* 0.4782* 0.3953* 0.5621* 0.5717* 1
Variable explanations:  The delisting frequencies are determined by country and year. The LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor protection index (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) is the updated investor 
protection index by La Porta et al. (1998). The World Bank governance index is defined as the sum of the indices of voice&accountability, regulatory quality, and rule of law. The anti self-dealing 
index is from Djankov et al. (2007). Regulatory costs and staff information is from Jackson (2005). The proportionality index and unionization is from Pagano and Volpin (2005b) and measures the 
proportionality of a country's voting system. It equals 3 if 100 percent of the seats are assigned proportionally, and 0 if no seats are assigned this way. Legal origin equals 0 if it is a common law 
country and 1 if it is a civil law country (constructed by La Porta et al. (1998)). The combined voting system variable is the proportionality index multiplied by the voice and accountability index 
(World Bank). Whereas the combined legal system variable is legal origin multiplied with rule of law (World Bank). Unionization is measured as annual labor union density rates (from Visser (2006)). 
The * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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Proportionality of the voting system has been suggested as an explanation of low 
investor protection (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) and we do observe that this variable is 
negatively correlated with the LSSVPV investor protection (and anti self-dealing 
indices). However, it is not significantly correlated with the World Bank governance 
index. The combined voting (and maybe more precise) variable is also negatively 
correlated with investor protection, yet not correlated with the going private frequency.  
 
Finally, unionization could be an important determinant of political pressure to protect 
labor (Roe, 2003), perhaps at the cost of minority investors. In accordance with this 
hypothesis we observe that unionization (Visser, 2006) is in fact strongly positively 
correlated with the World Bank governance index, but strongly negatively correlated 
with the LSSVPV investor protection index. Interestingly, unionization is positively 
correlated with proportionality of the voting system (which should point in the direction 
of less investor protection according to Pagano and Volpin, 2005a). Also notice that the 
correlation between unionization and going private frequency is low. 
 
In principle, it should be possible to obtain better estimates of the effects of corporate 
governance policy on delistings by including these variables, particularly to the extent 
that they can be regarded as econometric instruments which influence policy without a 
direct influence on delisting frequencies. In practice, however, our endogenous policy 
models tend to be quite sensitive to specification. With this caveat table 6 present 
estimates of the effect of investor protection regulation on the going private frequency, 
while treating the policy variable as endogenously determined. We now aggregate our 
information to country averages per year. According to the Hausman tests performed 
we estimate fixed effects models. 
 
Table 6 represents different two stage least squares instrumental variable regressions. 
Model 1 to 3 represents regressions using the instruments separately, while model 4 and 
5 uses all three instruments jointly.  
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Table 6
Endogenous policy variable
LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor 
protection index 0.0597 * 0.1644 * 0.0735 *** 0.0736 ** 0.0521 **
0.0309 0.0957 0.0233 0.0300 0.0234
Controls
Annual country average 
ownership concentration 0.2845 **
0.1194
Annual country average sales 
growth -0.0007 **
0.0003
Instrumental variables
Combined legal system 
variable
Combined voting system 
variable
Unionization
Firm effect
F-value 3.70 2.93 9.81 5.97 3.54
P-value 0.057 0.090 0.002 0.017 0.018
Hansen J Chi-square p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.007
Observation (country years) 134 134 111 98 98
x
FIXED
x
x
x
FIXED
(5)
x
FIXED
x
FIXED
x
FIXED
x
x
(3) (4)
Variable explanations : The LSSV Pagano-Volpin investor protection index (Pagano and Volpin, 2005b) is the 
updated investor protection index by La Porta et al. (1998). The combined legal system variable is legal origin 
(civil law equals 1 and common law equals 0) multiplied by rule of law (Wold Bank). Legal origin is based on 
La Porta et al. (1998). The combined voting system variable is the proportionality index Pagano and Volpin 
(2005b) multiplied with the voice and accountability index (World Bank). Proportionality measures the 
proportionality of a contry's voting system. Proportionality equals 3 if 100 percent of seats are assigned via a 
proportional rule, 2 if the majority of seats are assigned by this rule, 1 if a minority of seats is assigned 
proportionally, and 0 if no seats are assigned this way. Unionization is measured as yearly labor union density 
rates, 1995-2004 (Visser, 2006). Robust standard errors are reported below parameter estimates. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Going private frequency
(2)(1)
Determinants of Going Private frequency: Two stage least squares instrumental variable 
regressions on going private frequencies 
 
 
In the first model the combined legal system variable is employed as instrument. We 
find that the LSSVPV investor protection variable leads to a higher frequency of going 
private transactions when the index is instrumented by the combined legal variable, 
however, it is only significant on a 10 percentage significance level. The usefulness of 
the instrument is further tested and found valid (the Hansen J test). In the second model 
where the combined voting system variable is used as instrument we also find a positive 
effect from investor protection regulation (10 percentage significance level). Also note 
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that the test of overidentification accepts the instrument. When unionization is used as 
the instrument for investor protection regulation (model 3) we obtain a stronger positive 
significant result compared to previous models. Again the Hansen J test also accepts the 
validity of this instrument.  
 
Finally, we employ the three instruments jointly (model 4 and 5) and both models 
suggests that higher investor protection index is associated with higher going private 
frequencies (at a 5 percentage significance level). However, the instruments are only 
accepted when controls are added to our econometric specification. Hence, the result 
seems less robust when all instruments are jointly applied. In the last model we control 
for ownership structure (the fraction of closely held shares) and sales growth, but drop 
other control variables which become insignificant when aggregated to the country 
level. Countries with high ownership concentration tend to have a significantly higher 
frequency of going private transactions, whereas countries with high sales growth seem 
to have a significantly lower going private frequency. Altogether, these results support 
our previous finding but we acknowledge that these are sensitive to specification. 
Finally, we do acknowledge that we face the same limitations in finding suitable 
instruments for governance policy as the remaining governance literature. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Delistings are an important phenomenon. From 1995 to 2005 30% of the population of 
listed European firms was delisted for one reason or another. Along with IPOs 
delistings can be regarded as a measure of the attractiveness of being listed. The 
hypothesis we test relates to the costs and benefits of investor protection regulation. For 
example, if new corporate governance regulation – e.g. investor protection or codes – 
increase bureaucracy and transaction costs without adding sufficient value to minority 
investors – it may be profitable to take companies private or to merge them to spread 
the fixed costs of governance over a greater volume. This we would call the 
overregulation hypothesis. In contrast if the costs of corporate governance regulation 
are exceeded by increasing efficiency of listed companies, less expropriation of 
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minority investors and greater transparency, companies and their owners will find it 
more attractive to remain listed. This we think of as the efficiency hypothesis.  
 
Overall delisting frequencies are positively correlated with the measure of investor 
protection, the classical anti-director rights index updated by Pagano and Volpin 
(2005b) and with the World Bank governance index. Investor protection also leads to 
more going private transactions, but higher levels the World Bank index are associated 
with fewer going private transactions. The positive association between investor 
protection and delisting by M&A or by going private continues to hold after controlling 
for relevant control variables in multinomial logistic regression. Thus, better protection 
of minority investors appears to lead to more going private transactions. The adoption 
of corporate governance codes also appears to lead to more going private transactions. 
This is consistent with the overregulation hypothesis, i.e. when costs of investor 
protection regulation outweigh the benefits. Bruno and Claessens (2007) also found 
support for the overregulation hypothesis while investigating the effects of corporate 
governance regulation on firm valuation. We did find some indication that better overall 
governance (as measured by the World Bank governance index) was associated with 
fewer going private transactions, which tends to support the efficient regulation 
hypothesis with regard to overall governance: regulation improves the functioning of 
stock markets and therefore strengthens the market for corporate control and increases 
the incentive to remain listed.  
 
Taking into consideration that corporate governance regulation may be an endogenous 
variable makes the relationship more ambiguous since it is difficult to identify proper 
economic instruments which influence investor protection without possibly also 
influencing the going private decision. Nevertheless our best estimates indicate that 
investor protection regulation tends to increase the frequency of going private 
transactions.   
 
Obviously, we cannot deduce from this that protecting minority investors is harmful. It 
may be that gains in investor confidence are well worth the costs of some delisted 
companies. But our findings do indicate that there are costs as well as benefits of being 
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listed and that these relates to corporate governance regulation. One of the costs might 
be that lower private benefits of control and more formalized corporate governance 
practices will lead some companies to delist. While some regulation is necessary and 
beneficial to stock market development, there may also be limits to regulation, for 
example how much minority investors should be protected in a zero sum game with 
other interest groups such as large shareholders, employees or creditors. Moreover, it is 
not difficult to understand how political processes can sometimes lead to socially 
wasteful regulation (Djankov et al., 2003; Olson, 2000). 
 
Cross sectional empirical studies in the law and finance tradition indicate that a high 
level of investor protection is correlated with large stock markets (e.g. La Porta et al., 
1998). It is also noteworthy that a country like UK with high investor protection scores 
does not have particularly many going private transactions whereas Austria and 
Denmark – which have only recently begun to update their corporate governance 
policies – experienced a wave of delistings in the 1995-2005 period. It may be 
necessary to distinguish between short term adjustments and long term cross sectional 
effects. An alternative interpretation is that the increase in investor protection is a proxy 
for a series of other regulatory changes relating to self dealing, corporate governance 
codes and a host of EU directives which in combination may have increased the costs of 
governance beyond the optimum. 
 
We would not claim that overregulation is the only or even the main cause of delistings 
in the European stock markets since 2000. One important driver is clearly changes in 
market value during the boom and bust of the 2000 stock market bubble. Another driver 
is the emergence of private equity funds in Europe during the same period. We have 
controlled for both of these factors in our regressions and find that both of them have an 
important impact. We note, however, that overregulation would influence both market 
valuations and the emergence of private alternatives to the stock market in a way which 
would also tend to lead to more delistings. A complete model of the effects of stock 
market regulation would have to take these complex combined effects of regulation into 
account.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It is no secret that stock markets tend to fluctuate and a substantial body of research 
indicates that these fluctuations have consequences for firm behaviour (Barro 1990; 
Morck and Shleifer, 1990; Comment and Jarrel, 1995; Levine 1997; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003). One interesting question is whether 
market participants are able to time their investments such that they exploit the ups and 
downs of the stock market. For example this may be the case if more firms tend to go 
public when stock prices are high compared to earnings or book values (e.g. Lowry and 
Schwert, 2002; Benninga et al., 2005). 
 
By implication one would think that the decision to delist might also be influenced by 
stock prices. For example, smart buyers could time their investments such that they buy 
and delist publicly traded companies when stock prices are low but refrain from doing 
so when stock prices are high (a contrarian or counter-cyclical strategy). However, 
there is now substantial evidence that an important type of delistings – by mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) - is pro-cyclical: there are more acquisitions when market values 
are high compared to earnings or book values of equity (e.g. Nelson, 1959; Maksimovic 
and Phillips, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; 
Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Ang and Chen, 2007). The most obvious explanation seems 
to be that potential acquirers are more eager to buy when stock prices are high because 
their own prices are also high (which would tend to reduce their implied costs of 
capital), because they tend to have more money to spend in good times or because they 
become more optimistic when things appear to be going well. This is also known as the 
behavioural argument which arises from misvaluation.  
 
In this connection it is interesting to inquire whether going private transactions follow 
the same pattern. In recent years a wave of going private transactions has swept across 
both Europe and the United States. The wave reflects the emergence of private equity 
funds in Europe, but also transactions in which incumbent blockholders decide to take 
their companies private. In both cases the buyers are not listed and may therefore, 
following the behavioural argument, be less sensitive to short term market fluctuations. 
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Could it be that these buyers are not (as) affected by corporate misvaluations? Are these 
buyers thereby able to time market interventions such that they buy when stock prices 
are low rather than when they are high? These are the questions we seek to answer in 
this paper. Remark it is not within our scope to test whether markets are efficient or not. 
The focus is on testing how stock market fluctuations affect delistings. 
 
Delistings from a stock exchange can take place in different ways. A company may be 
acquired by another company or merged with it and the target firm will then be 
delisted. It may be acquired by new owners (e.g. a private equity fund) and delisted. It 
may go bankrupt or be liquidated by the incumbent owners. In rare cases it may even be 
involuntarily delisted by the stock exchange because of failure to comply with the 
listing standards. In this paper we focus on M&A and going private transactions which 
account for 96 percent of the delistings in our sample. Specifically we focus on how 
misvaluation affects going private transactions. We define a going private transaction 
as the acquisition and subsequent delisting of a listed company by a private non-
corporate buyer (e.g. a private equity fund, a large non-corporate blockholder or the 
incumbent management). In contrast, M&A is defined as merger with or acquisition by 
another company, which may or may not be a listed entity. 
 
We make use of a unique and hitherto unexplored dataset of delistings from European 
stock exchanges which we are able to track over the period 1996-2004. Using this 
dataset we demonstrate that mergers and acquisitions tend to be pro-cyclical in 
accordance with previous studies on US data. We do not find the same bias for going 
private transactions.  
 
The findings have important implications for the understanding of going private 
transactions. A number of studies have examined how private equity buyout 
transactions influence the operating performance of acquired companies (e.g. Kaplan, 
1989a; Smith, 1990; Desbrières and Schatt, 2002; Cressy et al., 2007; Guo et al., 2007, 
Vinten, 2007), but the results appear to be mixed. However, going private buyers may 
also create value if they are able to time their investments so as to profit from stock 
market fluctuations. This may not enable private equity funds or large owners (like 
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founding families) to beat the stock market (e.g. Gottschalg et al., 2004; Kaplan and 
Schoar, 2005), but at least they can avoid the value bias which we observe for corporate 
buyers.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 on related literature we particularly 
discuss how the theoretical relationship between M&A and market timing can be linked 
to going private transactions. In section 3 we discuss the data set which covers all 
delistings from European stock exchanges (21 countries) over the period 1995-2005 
with minor exceptions. In section 4 we analyse the probability of delistings by type 
(mergers and acquisition, going private) by both logistic regressions and multinomial 
logistic regressions. Controlling for other variables, we find that the probability of a 
company being delisted in the subsequent year decreases with firm value (q-company) 
regardless of type. Average industry q (q-industry) tends to increase the frequency of 
M&A, but not going private transactions. We clarify these results by analysis of 
different characteristics of companies while investigating whether misvaluation errors 
are more profound in certain companies. Our results indicate that misvaluation errors 
do not seem to drive M&A of large firms and firms in the financial industry. We 
believe that these results support our hypothesis that both large firms and financial 
firms are easier to evaluate for investors. In particular we estimate that the probability 
of going private compared to being M&A is significantly lower in peak years (where 
industry or country q is highest), while the probability of M&A is significantly higher 
in peak years. Finally, in the discussion, we comment on the significance of our 
findings. We cannot demonstrate that it would have been more profitable for companies 
to imitate the timing of private buyers in terms of higher subsequent returns. 
  
2. Related literature 
2.1. Mergers and Acquisitions  
 
From the literature two hypotheses are introduced that explains why periods with high 
stock market valuations coincide with intense M&A activity: 1) The neoclassical view 
where M&A activity mainly reflect industry reorganization opportunities. 2) The 
behavioural view where valuation errors affect M&A activity.  
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According to what may be termed neoclassical or perhaps “efficient markets” theory, 
stock prices reflect fundamental values well, so that a high market value compared to 
earnings, accounting assets or accounting equity simply reflects that a firm has better 
prospects. As such M&A is not driven by valuation, but by changes in technology, 
regulation or market conditions which influence the fundamental value of firms. 
Merger waves reflect industry reorganization whereby assets become redeployed 
toward more efficient use. For example industry shocks (like deregulation or new 
technology) can necessitate horizontal mergers to restructure an industry (Gort, 1969).  
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that 
merger activity in 1990s in the U.S. was clustered by industry. In industries 
characterized by overcapacity M&A may simply be “a civilized alternative to 
bankruptcy” (Dewey, 1961). Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a, 2002b) model how 
technological changes can lead to merger waves through dispersion in q-ratios which 
make it attractive for high-q firms to take over low-q firms. Their theory is supported 
by an empirical study by Dong et al. (2006). However, Harford (2005) maintains that 
technological changes are moderated by capital liquidity so that industry shocks will 
only generate a merger wave if adequate capital liquidity exists to accommodate the 
reallocation of assets. Neoclassical theory is consistent with agency theory, which 
emphasizes the role of M&A in the market for corporate control (Jensen 1986, 1989). 
M&A can be both a solution and a symptom of agency problems. Managerial 
inefficiency could show up in low market-to-book value making the firm a more likely 
target for acquisition because of dissatisfaction among the incumbent owners (Jensen, 
1986; Palepu, 1986). The acquiring firm can replace inefficient management and 
increase earnings in the long run.  
 
According to the behavioural view inefficient financial markets can lead to 
misvaluation (deviations between market and fundamental values of firms), and these 
misvaluations may drive merger waves. Undervaluation (low market-to-book or price-
earnings ratio) implies that targets are less expensive and so more attractive to buy 
(Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Palepu, 1986; Cudd and Duggal, 2000; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). This idea goes back to the study 
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by Nelson (1959) which shows that stock market valuations affect merger activity. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) claim that merger transactions are driven by stock market 
valuations of merging firms. Thus mergers are modelled as a sort of arbitrage by 
rational managers operating in inefficient markets hence, managers are aware of stock 
market inefficiencies. The main finding is that dispersion of valuations among firms 
generates merger waves and particularly that overvalued firms acquire undervalued 
targets. To some extend this prediction overlaps with the (neoclassical) restructuring 
argument which is likely present in diversified industries. Similarly, Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) propose a model of rational managerial behaviour and 
misvaluation which leads to a correlation between market performance and merger 
waves. Thus, it is difficult for target managers to assess the true value of the bid since 
they have limited private information compared to bidder managers. Intuitively rational 
targets without perfect information will accept more bids from overvalued acquirers 
when market valuation is high since they tend to overestimate synergies during these 
periods. Valuation errors are also more likely present in deals where shareholders of the 
target firm are offered shares in the bidding firm.  In addition Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan argue that cash bids will not be affected by misvaluation. Overall, their 
idea is that M&A waves are affected by valuation regardless of any underlying 
(neoclassical) motivation for M&A.  
 
Even though the two behavioural theories differ, they both rely on the acquirers taking 
advantage of temporary misvaluations together with dispersion in misvaluations in the 
market. In an empirical study, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) find support for the 
behavioural hypothesis that misvaluation drive mergers. Specifically, they find that 
acquirers with high (overvalued) market value use stock to acquire targets with 
relatively low (undervalued) market value. Moreover they find that merger intensity is 
highly positively correlated with short-run deviations from long run trends in market 
valuation. This result is especially strong when stocks are used as the method of 
payment. A similar study by Ang and Chen (2007) also finds that overvaluation 
increases the probability of firms becoming acquirers and the probability of using their 
own stocks as payment. 
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Remember that it is not our focus to test whether financial markets are efficient or not. 
Testing for market efficiency is difficult, as noted by for e.g. Dimson and Mussavian 
(2000), especially when there are relatively few historically events to analyze as in the 
case of M&A and going private waves.  
  
2.2. Going private transactions 
 
There are different theoretical arguments that explain going private transactions. We 
will briefly highlight some of them, but focus on the linkage between the behavioural 
view and going private transactions. According to neoclassical theory going private 
transactions can be regarded as reverse public offerings. The trade off between risk and 
incentives may change because of increases in firm size, better growth prospects or 
increases in firm specific risk (Bharath and Dittmar, 2006). If companies list because 
their stockholders can benefit from attracting new equity capital and from increased 
stock liquidity, companies can go private if these listing benefits are no longer present. 
This implies that smaller companies with less liquid stocks and worse growth prospects 
will be more likely to go private (Bharath and Dittmar, 2006). The neoclassical 
argument where M&A waves correlates with industrial restructuring possibilities may 
also apply to going private transactions. This seems actually to be the case in 1980s 
because inefficient firms were among the main targets of buyout funds (Jensen et al., 
2006).  
 
Jensen (1986, 1989) proposed that going private transactions (leveraged buyouts) can 
be regarded as an efficient response to agency problems in publicly listed companies. 
For example, private equity funds can target companies which – for whatever reason – 
deviate substantially from shareholder value maximization. This type of transaction 
could be directed at companies with low ownership concentration, large retained free 
cash flow, high equity to assets ratios or excess employment compared to industry 
benchmarks.  
 
An alternative line of research maintains that the shareholder gains from going private 
transactions arise from a zero sum game with incumbent stakeholders whose wealth is 
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being expropriated (e.g. Shleifer and Summers, 1988). This could mean that companies 
with high debt-to-equity ratios are more likely to go private because a substantial part 
of the cost is paid by increasing risk among pre-transaction incumbent debtholders (e.g. 
Marais, Schipper and Smith, 1989, for the case of bondholders). Moreover, the 
widespread use of (post-transaction) debt in these transactions also expropriates the 
government through lower taxes (Kaplan, 1989b). The incumbent shareholders may 
also be expropriated by the incumbent management (Lowenstein, 1985; Harlow and 
Howe, 1993) or controlling owners: Low dividends and low reported earnings per share 
could signal that managers or controlling owners try to depress prices prior to delisting.  
 
As previously mentioned our focus is on whether market valuations or misvaluations 
(the behavioural theory) also affect the going private frequency. The behavioural view 
has not been applied specifically to going private transactions. However, the application 
seems straightforward. Going private transactions can also be influenced by 
under/overvaluation of a company’s shares relative to fundamentals. High stock prices 
relative to fundamentals mean that it is more expensive to take a company private 
(Palepu, 1986) and so one would expect that companies with high market-to-book 
values are less likely to go private. The same results may emerge from neoclassical 
theory since correctly highly valued companies have better growth prospects and may 
therefore find it profitable to remain listed to finance further expansion.  
The theory by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) can be directly applied to going 
private transactions. We should not expect these transactions to be driven by market 
misvaluations since the incumbent owners are normally paid in cash in such deals. 
Moreover, according to the view of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) we expect that 
managers are rationale, hence, indicating that both incumbent managers and buyout 
fund managers are able to assess the real value of the target, i.e. not being influenced by 
market valuations.  
 
Other studies also seem to support these arguments. For instance Bargeron et al. (2007) 
found that private bidders pay less for targets than public acquirers do. In addition, 
Jensen (2007) argues that one of the key talents of private equity buyout fund managers 
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is their knowledge of what will be valued (of firm assets) and how by the capital 
markets.  
 
We therefore argue that average market values at the country or industry level are less 
likely to influence going private transactions. First, private non-corporate buyers are not 
listed entities (although some private equity funds are now preparing to go public) and 
so their assets or implied costs of capital will not be influenced to the same extent by 
fluctuations in market values. Hence, incumbent managers or PE funds do not have the 
advantage of using own stocks as part of the financing of acquisitions. It could also be 
argued that private buyers are more focused on future value creations perspectives that 
current (market) valuation. For instance, because of concentrated ownership and/or 
incentive schemes they may be more focused on value creation than the managers of 
listed companies (maybe more focused on shareholder value). Finally, private buyers 
are less likely to be motivated by a (perceived) need to pre-empt competitors in bidding 
for acquisition targets. They can afford to participate only if they believe that the 
individual transaction will create value without having to take into consideration 
repercussions on incumbent businesses. In this sense, therefore, private buyers may be 
smart investors compared to companies or at least it seems like going private 
transactions are less driven by misvaluation. 
 
3.  The data 
3.1. Data sources 
 
Our dataset (from Thomson Financial and Worldscope) consists of all listed European 
companies over the period 1995-2005, including both companies that are listed in any 
given year and companies that are not, but were listed at some point during the period. 
We do not have full coverage, for example we miss data from countries like Iceland, 
Switzerland, Russia and other members of the former Soviet Union, but we do have a 
fairly comprehensive sample.64  
                                                 
64 The data consist of information from the following 21 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
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Since we would like to analyze changes in the population and their determinants we 
loose one year (1995). To ensure completeness of the dataset we also drop 2005 from 
the sample to avoid registering a delisted company as listed because it reports late in the 
year. The observation period 1996-2004 both contains bull and bear years, e.g. the 
stock market bubble of the 1990s, the decline 2000-2003 and the partial recovery in 
2004-2005.  
 
Based on the information from Thomson Financial/Worldscope we can distinguish 
between five types of delisting - merger, acquisition, bankruptcy, liquidation or going 
private. The cause of delisting is classified as merger if a firm is delisted because of 
merger with another firm. A firm is denoted as acquired if it is taken over by another 
firm. In M&A it is the target firms which become delisted. Going private firms are 
categorized as such if they are taken over and delisted by a private non-corporate buyer, 
for instance an individual or a private equity fund. Finally, we have direct information 
on whether a firm delists due to bankruptcy or liquidation. This key firm status variable 
published by Thomson Financial is based on their own research on company filings, 
press releases and other news available. A potential problem with this classification is 
overlap between groups due to misspecifications. For example it may be difficult to 
distinguish between an acquisition and a going private transaction in private equity 
buyouts where private equity funds set up a holding company (controlled by the fund) 
which buys the target firm. We checked for this and other measurement problems 
where we have secondary information and found very few misspecifications in which 
going private firms were grouped as acquired. In the present study we combine the 5 
different types of delisting into 3 main groups: merger and acquisition, going private 
and bankruptcy/liquidation. Since our focus is on M&A and going private only these 
results will be reported for simplification. We do not have access to detailed 
information about buyers and so we cannot distinguish between private equity funds 
and incumbent blockholders in going private transactions or between foreign and 
domestic acquirers in M&A transactions. 
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We have yearly observations of the standard accounting and market variables, for 
example company size in terms of assets or turnover, market value, return on assets 
(ROA), debt, cash flow, sales growth, ownership concentration, main industry65, 
country of origin etc. as well as the nature of the delisting (merger, acquisition, going 
private transaction, liquidation or bankruptcy). We correct for extreme observations by 
truncation (e.g. ROA < -100% is registered as ROA = -100%). By country of 
incorporation we link to country information on the aggregate volume of private equity 
investments from Deloitte (2005) and country-specific interest rates. 
 
The firm-specific value (qi,t) is defined as the ratio between (annual) market value plus 
book value of total debt to book value of total assets (a proxy for the replacement value 
of the assets). According to Perfect and Wiles (1994) this q measure is a too simplified 
proxy, however, the proxy used here is however applied in related studies.  
Different key variables are constructed for further analysis using the firm-specific value. 
Yearly country equally weighted averages of firm-specific q’s are calculated similar to 
other studies (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Harford, 2005; Dong et al., 2006; 
Ang and Chen, 2007) – this variable is denoted q-countryj,t. Similarly, using the SIC-
codes industry and yearly equally weighted averages are constructed - this variable is 
denoted q-industryk,t. Further, we define a q-industry dispersion variable as the annual 
(equally weighted) standard deviation of qi,t across firms in an industry. Finally, we create 
an “overvaluation” variable which is the difference between firm-specific qi,t and q-
industryk,t. We did similar calculations using price to earnings ratios and comment on 
them throughout the paper, but report only q-valuations in this paper. 
 
These different q measures are used as proxies for different elements of misvaluations 
in the analysis. However are these q measures able to indicate whether a firm is 
misvalued? We can not be certain that such simplified measures completely captures 
whether companies are valued too high or low, however, by definition it does gives us 
an idea about how a firm is valued relatively to its fundamental value (replacement cost 
or total assets). In particular we employ q measures at the firm, industry and market-
level and hereby we investigate different kinds of relative overvaluations or 
                                                 
65 The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. 
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undervaluations. Moreover, we acknowledge that firm valuation is not the only driver 
of takeovers which is why we control for other firm and market characteristics in our 
analysis.  
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The first major finding in this data set is the magnitude of the changes. We register a 
total of 12612 companies listed at European exchanges during the period, of which an 
astounding 30 percent have been delisted. In market values this corresponds to 
approximately $3.7 trillion or 40 percent of total market value. Obviously firm 
dynamics are very important, and the studies which abstract from them by balanced 
panels or cross sections miss an important part of economic reality.  
 
For an overview figure 1 shows M&A and going private frequencies along with annual 
q averages over the period 1995-2004.  
 
 
Figure 1: M&A and Going private frequencies vs. q-
value
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We observe that M&A transactions peaked in 1998-1999 when q-values were high, but 
declined in 2000-2002 along with average q only to increase again and 2003 when the 
market recovered and q-values began to increase. In short, M&A appears to be pro-
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cyclical and positively related to q-values. In comparison going private transactions 
have been steadily increasing up to 2003 and were particularly frequent during the bear 
market in 2001-2002. If anything going private transactions appear to be 
countercyclical even taking into consideration an increasing trend reflecting the 
emergence of private equity funds in Europe. If we regress M&A on average q we find 
a significant positive effect, while there is no similar effect on going private frequency.  
 
To be sure, average – pan-European – q is a crude measure. It may be preferable to use 
country or industry q or deviations from these averages. In the following we use these 
more detailed measures for statistical analysis.  
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics by type of delisting. We observe that both for going 
private transactions and M&A firm-specific qi,t is generally lower than sample average 
and the average value of the firms which remain listed. Apparently both private buyers 
and companies are economical in the sense that they prefer to buy relatively cheap 
companies. There is no significant difference between private buyers and companies in 
this respect.  But q-country for M&A is larger than the total average and the average of 
remaining listed firms (in accordance with studies by Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004 on US data), and it is also significantly larger 
than for going private transactions. Furthermore, q-industry for M&A deals is also 
significantly higher than for going private transactions. As noted, these differences may 
be attributable to a positive effect of higher valuation ratios on the demand for 
acquisitions among listed acquiring firms. Following Shleifer and Vishny (2003) listed 
acquirers may finance M&A by paying part of the deal using their own stock, and this 
type of financing is of course more favourable in high valuation periods. Alternatively, 
a positive market sentiment (high average q-country) may induce more M&A because 
acquiring companies have lower costs of capital or believe to have better growth 
prospects, while high average q leads to fewer going private transactions because it 
seems more expensive to buy listed companies in good times.   
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Overall 
average
Remaining 
Listed M&A Going private
q-firm specific 1.334 1.354 1.106 1.107 0.000
[55320] [50665] [1961] [1312] 0.042
[1.498] [1.526] [1.083] [1.276]
q-country average 1.343 1.340 1.408 1.271 0.137 ***
[65454] [53798] [1979] [1326] 0.013
[0.401] [0.415] [0.404] [0.369]
q-industry average 1.418 1.361 1.344 1.285 0.059 ***
[65454] [53798] [1979] [1326] 0.018
[0.732] [0.573] [0.543] [0.532]
Debt to assets 0.218 0.215 0.220 0.260 -0.040 ***
[61586] [53252] [1972] [1316] 0.789
[0.204] [0.201] [0.199] [0.252]
Log of assets 5.15 5.11 5.70 4.55 1.14 ***
[64880] [53477] [1978] [1324] 0.07
[2.42] [2.37] [2.21] [1.95]
Dividend payout ratio 0.235 0.239 0.279 0.162 0.117 ***
[50117] [43852] [1558] [1019] 0.011
[0.269] [0.268] [0.264] [0.259]
Stock liquidity 0.289 0.286 0.309 0.248 0.061 ***
[61441] [50385] [1918] [1227] 0.007
[0.222] [0.223] [0.217] [0.193]
Return on assets 2.1 2.2 3.5 -3.9 7.4 ***
[56690] [49631] [1935] [1269] 0.8
[23.7] [23.9] [16.9] [25.5]
Interest rate 5.34 5.32 5.35 5.07 0.28 ***
[64194] [52664] [1966] [1292] 0.04
[1.38] [1.40] [1.20] [1.14]
Private equity investment ratio 0.633 0.629 0.644 0.639 0.005
61364 50071 1914 1235 0.01
[0.381] [0.388] [0.335] [0.399]
Cash flow to sales 7.10 7.19 8.81 0.92 7.89 ***
[60380] [52206] [1939] [1274] 1.12
[30.90] [30.99] [25.93] [37.88]
Difference 
between M&A 
and GP
Variable explanations:  Firm-specific value, q, is defined as market value plus total debt to total assets. q-country average is 
yearly country averages of all the firm-specific q's. q-industry average is yearly industry averages of all the firm-specific 
q's. Stock liquidity is measured as annual country averages of the ratio between common shares traded relatively to 
common shares outstanding. Private equity investment ratio is the ratio between total private equity investments (Deloitte, 
2005) and stock market value by year and country. Number of observations and standard deviations are reported in 
brackets. Standard errors are reported below the difference between the means of the M&A and going private sample. ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
In terms of size (log accounting total assets), M&A targets are typically larger than 
firms that continue to be listed which is a surprise since size has historically been 
regarded as a takeover deterrent. Firm size could have a negative effect on the 
likelihood of becoming a target for merger or acquisition, if it is easier to finance small 
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transactions and if acquisition costs are smaller for small firms (Dietrich and Sorensen, 
1984). However, fixed transaction costs of acquisition imply that unit costs are lower 
when large firms are acquired. In fact the merger activities in the 1980s compared to 
those of other periods were mainly characterized by the large size of targets (Barnes, 
2000). In contrast firms that go private are typically smaller than the firms that remain 
listed and significantly smaller than M&A.  
 
In terms of capital structure, firms going private have higher debt-to-assets ratios than 
firms that continue as listed. One argument from existing research is that the 
shareholder gains from going private transactions arise from a zero sum game with 
incumbent stakeholders whose wealth is being expropriated (e.g. Shleifer and 
Summers, 1988). This could mean that companies with high debt-to-equity ratios are 
more likely to go private because a substantial part of the cost is paid by increasing risk 
among incumbent debtholders (e.g. Marais, Schipper and Smith, 1989, for the case of 
bondholders). On contrary, one might expect that debt ratios should be lower in going 
private transactions. The reasoning is that it is easier for acquirers (e.g. a buyout fund) 
to the finance the deal if the pre-buyout target firm debt is low. However, on average 
this does not seem to be the case. Financial leverage is also important according to the 
failing firms’ hypothesis which regards merger or acquisition as a civilized alternative 
to bankruptcy (Dewey, 1961). Leverage (loss of equity due to past bad performance) 
may also signal inefficient management. Nuttal (1999) finds that avoiding bankruptcy 
or financial distress is an important motive to sell. Our results are more consistent with 
expropriation of existing debtors than with efficiency gains of post transaction 
leveraging. The average debt ratio is significantly lower for M&A firms compared to 
going private firms and is closer to the average for listed firms. There is also a 
substantial literature on equity market timing and capital structure (e.g. Alti, 2006; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002). We attempt to control for this effect later in our econometric 
specification.  
  
Accounting profitability tends to be higher among merged and acquired firms than 
among firms that remain listed, but significantly lower for firms going private 
compared to M&A firms. In other words, the failing firm hypothesis (Dewey, 1961) is 
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more convincing for going private transactions than for M&A. Following Jensen (1986) 
it may be easier to restructure companies which are privately held. Surprisingly, firms 
going private tend to have negative ROA66 on average. Apparently firms that go private 
tend to be low performers. Alternatively, accounting profitability may be manipulated 
by insiders to make companies cheaper which would then indicate expropriation of 
minority investors.  
 
The dividend payout ratio is considerably lower in firms that subsequently go private 
than in firms which are delisted by M&A or stay listed. This is probably attributable to 
relatively bad performance. Alternatively, going private may be a particularly 
appropriate solution to agency problems in companies with substantial free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986) which is not paid out as dividends. The incumbent shareholders may 
also be expropriated by the incumbent management (Lowenstein, 1985; Harlow and 
Howe, 1993) or controlling owners: Low dividends and low reported earnings per share 
could signal that managers or controlling owners try to depress prices prior to delisting.  
 
The cash flow to sales ratio differs greatly. This ratio is defined as funds from 
operations to net sales. Cash flows are considerably larger for M&A than for going 
private transactions. Moreover, cash flows within M&A firms are larger than for listed 
firms. This measure therefore provides no evidence of the free cash flow argument for 
public-to-private transactions (Jensen, 1986, 1989).   
 
In addition to the firm specific variables we include a number of country variables to 
capture the impact of country differences. We use average market liquidity as an 
indicator of trends in liquidity, since there the firm level information is relatively 
scarce. More specific stock liquidity is measured as the annual number of stocks traded 
compared to number of stocks outstanding within a country. Stock market liquidity 
tends to be high for merged or acquired companies, but low for firms going private, if 
we compare to firms that remain listed. Stock liquidity may be an important driver of 
delistings as emphasized by Bharath and Dittmar (2006). If a stock is not liquid (easily 
tradeable), it may be priced at a discount, which implies lower advantages of being 
                                                 
66 ROA is defined as netincome before preferred dividends plus interest expense on debt-interest capitalized after 
taxes relatively to last year’s total assets.  
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listed. This could imply that companies with more concentrated ownership (less free 
float), less traded stocks and operating in less liquid national stock markets will be 
more inclined to go private. 
 
The country-specific interest rates seem to be greater within M&A than for going 
private deals. This is consistent with substitution of debt for equity leverage as a motive 
for taking companies private. We therefore control for this trend effect that low interest 
rates are favourable for leverage buyouts (part of going private transactions).  
 
We also include the annual (country-specific) volume of private equity investment 
(Deloitte, 2005) relative to stock market capitalization to be able to control for the 
growing trend in European going private transactions, which may be spuriously 
correlated with stock market fluctuations. There is a possibility of a time trend in 
delistings. However, we do believe that this measure of private equity investment 
volume captures the main time trend in this time series. Since the surge of private 
equity investment post 2000 was partly motivated by low equity prices, this involves 
some risk of over-controlling.  
 
Summing up, companies being delisted by merger or acquisition are attractive in the 
sense that they tend to be larger and have higher accounting returns than both firms that 
remain listed and firms that exit due to a going private transaction. In contrast, the firms 
going private are relatively unattractive measured on the same variables. Further, going 
private firms are also having a significantly higher debt-to-assets ratio in the delisting 
year.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Market timing, market valuation and its impact on delistings 
 
We begin by estimating determinants of overall delisting using logistic regression and 
determinants of delisting by type using multinomial logistic regression while taking 
into consideration clustering of residuals by firm. We estimate the probability of 
delisting in year t relative to remaining listed (or more precisely the log odds ratio) as a 
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function of a set of explanatory variables measured in the year prior to delisting (year t-
1). We control for fixed industry effects67 and for fixed country effects. We also control 
for time trend by controlling for the annual volume of private equity investment ratio 
which we believe captures general trends in the going private market. 
 
We find that a higher level firm-specific valuation (qit) is associated with fewer 
delistings (model 1), both by M&A and going private transactions (model 2, 3, 4 and 
5). This result is consistent with the undervaluation explanation (low market-to-book or 
price-earnings ratio), i.e. that low values partly reflect undervaluation which makes 
companies more attractive acquisition targets (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Palepu, 
1986; Cudd and Duggal, 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004). However, if we use price-earnings ratio to measure firm value, the 
results are weaker and often insignificant. Numerically, the odds of M&A and going 
private both fall by approximately 20 percent when the firm-specific valuation (qit) 
increases by one unit. 
 
Furthermore, high market valuation (q country average) appears to lead to more 
delistings in general, and to more M&A but fewer going private transactions. To the 
extent that listed companies are taken over by other listed firms in the same country our 
evidence is therefore consistent with greater sensitivity to stock market fluctuations and 
larger agency problems among corporate buyers. A higher sensitivity to market 
fluctuations could also occur if market valuations reflect changes in operating 
profitability and companies prefer to finance acquisitions by retained earnings (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). But we control for cash flow, accounting returns and dividend pay-
out ratios which make this explanation less likely. In terms of magnitude the odds of 
M&A go up by approximately 60 percent when the market valuation (q country 
average) increases by one unit. 
 
In contrast, going private transactions are not significant affected by market valuation 
when controls are applied (model 3 and 5), which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
we proposed. In addition to the differences in corporate governance which we 
                                                 
67 We have information of the firms’ main industry (SIC codes) affiliation from which we aggregate industry 
affiliation to 25 different industry groups. 
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mentioned previously one explanation in the behavioural vein could be that private 
buyers cannot use their own ‘overvalued’ stock as payment (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003). If we use country price-earnings values instead of country q, we find similar 
results. 
 
Industry dispersion (the standard deviation of firm-specific q values by industry) is 
known as a proxy for the neoclassical argument that technological change can lead to 
differences in efficiency within industries which then create scope for restructuring by 
M&A (Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001; 
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002a, 2002b). In accordance with the literature we find 
(model 4) that industry dispersion in firm valuation has a weakly significant positive 
impact on the likelihood of M&A (at the 10 percent significance level). However, when 
country q is included in the regression (model 5) the effect on M&A becomes 
insignificant. In contrast, going private transactions are significantly negatively affected 
by industry q dispersion, suggesting that the neoclassical industry restructuring 
argument does not explain going private transactions (model 4 and 5). An alternative 
explanation is that private equity firms and other private buyers regard industry q 
dispersion as a source of uncertainty/risk, which makes them less likely to buy. Since 
going private transactions involves concentrated ownership, it seems likely that private 
buyers are more risk adverse than listed companies. 
 
As for the control variables we find that firms are more likely to delist (regardless of 
type) if they have a high debt ratio, low profitability, low dividend payouts, low 
liquidity (i.e. if national stock market liquidity is low) and low national interest rates. 
Harford (2005) also finds that capital liquidity is positively correlated with M&A. 
There are also interesting differences between types of delistings. Companies going 
private are smaller, more leveraged, less profitable, have lower dividend ratio and tend 
to be listed in markets with lower liquidity than merged or acquired companies. 
Furthermore, the level of going private transactions is positively affected by lower 
interest rates and larger private equity investments. This is not surprising since many 
going private transactions are financed by debt.  
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Determinants of delisting - 1
q-firm specific -0.168 *** -0.214 *** -0.121 *** -0.191 *** -0.188 *** -0.174 *** -0.182 *** -0.191 *** -0.190 ***
0.025 0.025 0.032 0.033 0.042 0.032 0.041 0.033 0.042
q-country average 0.296 *** 0.523 *** -0.354 *** 0.497 *** 0.141 0.475 *** 0.252
0.086 0.041 0.087 0.107 0.151 0.109 0.155
q-industry dispersion 0.001 * -0.002 *** 0.001 -0.003 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Debt to assets 0.006 *** 0.001 0.012 *** 0.001 0.012 *** 0.001 0.012 ***
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Log of assets -0.017 0.079 *** -0.170 *** 0.079 *** -0.167 *** 0.079 *** -0.167 ***
0.011 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.019
Dividend payout ratio -0.022 ** 0.000 -0.006 *** 0.000 -0.006 *** 0.000 -0.006 ***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Stock liquidity -0.327 ** 0.253 -1.132 *** 0.220 -1.050 *** 0.252 -1.089 ***
0.145 0.179 0.268 0.172 0.256 0.179 0.266
Return on assets -0.004 *** 0.003 ** -0.009 *** 0.003 *** -0.009 *** 0.003 ** -0.009 ***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Interest rate -0.065 *** 0.012 -0.264 *** -0.016 -0.235 *** 0.004 -0.234 ***
0.022 0.027 0.039 0.026 0.040 0.028 0.040
Private equity investment ratio 5.943 -4.652 21.107 ** -8.779 19.274 ** -4.675 21.416 **
6.476 9.438 9.311 9.737 9.214 9.473 9.320
Cash flow to sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
Country dummies YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations (firm-year) 37247
Log pseudolikelihood -8608.5
Pseudo R2 0.020
37247
-10153.1
0.048
(5)
Delisting by:
M&A Going private
37246
-10147.4
0.048
(3)
Delisting by:
M&A Going private
37247
0.007
-15386.6
Table 2
(1)
Delisted
Delisting by:
M&A Going private
(2)
(1) is a logit regression where the response variable is delisting. (2)-(4) are multinomial logit regressions where the response variable outcomes (delisted) are either due to a merger or acquisition, or 
going private transaction (or bankruptcy and liquidation). Variable explanations:  Firm-specific value, q , is defined as market value plus total debt to total assets. q-country average  is yearly country 
averages of all the firm-specific q's. q-industry dispersion  is the standard deviation of q per year and industry. Stock liquidity is measured as annual country averages of the ratio between common 
shares traded relatively to common shares outstanding. Private equity investment ratio is the ratio between total private equity investments (Deloitte, 2005) and stock market value by year and country. 
Robust standard errors are reported below parameter estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent variables / 
Explanatory variables
37246
-10157.7
0.048
(4)
Delisting by:
M&A Going private
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In table 3 we investigate whether delistings are mainly driven by country q or industry 
q.  Model 1 in table 3 suggests that high market industry valuation leads to significantly 
more M&A but has no significant effect on going private transactions. In model 2 we 
combine model 3 from table 2 and model 1 from table 3. Industry q tends to dominate 
country q, which becomes insignificant when we include industry q so we find that 
higher industry q leads to more M&A. This also holds for p/e values. In comparison 
going private transactions appear not to be influenced by industry q – and industy p/e is 
found to have a significantly negative effect. The positive industry effects on M&A 
may be attributable to good growth prospects in the industry which could make it more 
profitable to invest. Alternatively, in the case of horizontal M&A, overvalued equity 
may be a cheap way to finance acquisitions (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). The odds of 
M&A go up by approximately 40 percent when the industry market valuation (q 
industry average) increases by one unit. 
 
There can be several reasons why industry q tends to dominate country q. Much M&A 
in Europe is intra European cross-border transactions in which case the bidder are 
presumably less effected by valuations in the target nation. Alternatively high industry 
q may be a better expression of growth or restructuring opportunities in the target 
company. 
 
In model 3 it is examined whether deviation in firm value from the industry average 
explains the decision to delist. We find that larger deviation from industry average 
increases the frequency of both M&A and going private transactions. The effect is 
slightly stronger for M&A transactions which may be driven partly by horizontal 
M&A. 
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Determinants of delisting - II
q-firm specific -0.203 *** -0.187 *** -0.204 *** -0.187 ***
0.033 0.043 0.033 0.043
q-country average 0.208 0.148
0.135 0.186
q-industry average 0.438 *** 0.059 0.347 *** -0.009
0.077 0.114 0.098 0.141
q-q_industry -0.223 *** -0.181 ***
0.035 0.041
Debt to assets 0.001 0.012 *** 0.001 0.012 *** 0.001 0.012 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Log of assets 0.078 *** -0.169 *** 0.078 *** -0.170 *** 0.077 *** -0.169 ***
0.013 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.019
Dividend payout ratio 0.000 -0.006 *** 0.000 -0.006 *** 0.000 -0.006 ***
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Stock liquidity 0.191 -1.123 *** 0.212 -1.130 *** 0.204 -1.169 ***
0.177 0.266 0.179 0.269 0.174 0.270
Return on assets 0.002 ** -0.009 *** 0.002 ** -0.009 *** 0.003 ** -0.009 ***
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Interest rate -0.002 -0.265 *** 0.004 -0.263 *** -0.002 -0.272 ***
0.027 0.039 0.027 0.039 0.026 0.039
Private equity investment ratio -6.817 20.202 ** -5.393 21.117 ** -8.144 20.951 **
9.796 9.257 9.708 9.298 9.745 9.220
Cash flow to sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations (firm-year)
Log pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R2
(2)
Delisting by:
-10148.1
37247
-10146.4
37247
0.049 0.049
Table 3
Delisting by:
M&A Going private
(1)
(1)-(3) are multinomial logit regressions where the response variable outcomes (delisted) are either due to a merger or acquisition, or going 
private transaction (or bankruptcy and liquidation). Variable explanations:  Firm-specific value, q, is defined as market value plus total debt to 
total assets. q-country average is yearly country averages of all the firm-specific q's. q-industry average is yearly industry averages of all the firm-
specific q's. q-q_industry  is the difference between firm-specific q and industry q. Stock liquidity is measured as annual country averages of the 
ratio between common shares traded relatively to common shares outstanding. Private equity investment ratio is the ratio between total private 
equity investments (Deloitte, 2005) and stock market value by year and country. Robust standard errors are reported below parameter estimates. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Dependent variables / 
Explanatory variables
(3)
Delisting by:
0.048
M&A Going private M&A Going private
37247
-10153.4
 
 
4.2. Interactions with industry and size  
 
Table 4 shows three different models where we evaluate the degree of misvaluation 
error measured on different subgroups: firm size and different industry segments. The 
idea is to test whether the behavioural misvaluation hypothesis applies more to certain 
types of firms and industries in which misvaluation is presumably more or less likely. 
 
Model 1 distinguishes between large and small firms. The hypothesis is that there is 
less noise in the pricing of large companies, since they have more liquid stocks and are 
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followed by more analysts. Observed fluctuations in large company stocks are therefore 
more likely to reflect fluctuations in fundamental values and less likely to be caused by 
misvaluations. Our somewhat arbitrary definition of a large firm is that total assets are 
above $1 billion in the exit year.68 The group of large firms contains of approximately 
20 percent of the firms in the entire sample. Furthermore, almost 30 percent of the 
delisted firms are in the large firm sample. The results indicate that the valuation 
sensitivity is insignificant for large firms, but significant for small firms. As robustness 
checks we run regressions for other size measures (sales and number of employees) and 
obtain similar results. This seems to support our hypothesis that large firms are easier to 
evaluate and therefore the corporate buyers do not experience misvaluation errors 
among these, i.e. the behavioural hypothesis is not supported for large firms. We still 
get our main result that non-corporate buyers are not driven by misvaluation errors in 
neither large nor small firms. 
 
Next, we examine differences between non-financial and financial firms (model 2). 
Here the hypothesis is that the stock market valuation of financial firms is more 
accurate (and misvaluation smaller) because the accounting assets of financial firms 
(which consist to a larger extent of financial assets evaluated at current market values) 
are closer to fundamental values. We define financial firms as firms which belong to 
the SIC-codes of financial and insurance industry (approximately 10 percent of the 
sample). We find that industry q has a significant effect on the likelihood of M&A 
among non-financial firms where there are presumably more errors in market valuation. 
The hypothesis is thus supported since M&A among financial firms does not seem to 
be exposed to valuation errors. Again we find our strong result of no misvaluation 
errors within going private transactions.  
 
                                                 
68 Note, that the median of total assets in the data is $135 millions while the mean is $5792 millions. 
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Table 4
Determinants of delistings - interactions with industry and size
q-firm specific -0.154 * -0.284 -0.201 *** -0.170 *** -0.112 0.029 -0.211 *** -0.202 *** -0.207 *** -0.207 *** -0.212 *** -0.183 ***
0.087 0.177 0.035 0.043 0.172 0.182 0.034 0.044 0.055 0.080 0.042 0.051
q-country average 0.272 0.066 0.210 0.195 0.138 -1.671 0.136 0.208 0.428 0.316 0.131 0.103
0.254 0.468 0.160 0.204 0.751 1.110 0.143 0.193 0.286 0.404 0.154 0.211
q-industry average -0.026 -0.803 0.388 *** 0.025 2.100 3.450 0.368 *** -0.024 0.246 -0.185 0.382 *** 0.056
0.267 0.599 0.107 0.147 1.973 2.724 0.099 0.143 0.214 0.283 0.111 0.166
Debt to assets -0.002 0.008 0.001 0.012 *** 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.012 *** -0.004 0.007 * 0.001 0.013 ***
0.003 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002
Log of assets -0.063 -0.579 *** 0.164 *** -0.112 *** 0.076 ** -0.197 *** 0.052 *** -0.162 *** 0.086 *** -0.164 *** 0.076 *** -0.171 ***
0.043 0.102 0.025 0.029 0.036 0.073 0.015 0.021 0.027 0.040 0.016 0.022
Dividend payout ratio 0.001 -0.004 *** -0.001 -0.006 *** 0.011 *** 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 *** -0.002 -0.009 ** 0.000 -0.005 **
0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.002
Stock liquidity 0.225 -0.262 0.224 -1.361 *** -0.151 -0.193 0.223 -1.244 *** 0.328 -0.962 ** 0.181 -1.196 ***
0.352 0.630 0.212 0.299 0.647 0.991 0.188 0.275 0.328 0.471 0.214 0.325
Return on assets 0.010 -0.030 *** 0.001 -0.009 *** -0.005 -0.002 0.002 ** -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.009 * 0.002 ** -0.009 ***
0.008 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.002
Interest rate -0.110 ** -0.309 *** 0.030 -0.268 *** 0.148 * -0.306 ** -0.018 -0.265 *** -0.016 -0.349 *** 0.004 -0.240 ***
0.054 0.094 0.032 0.043 0.080 0.141 0.029 0.041 0.055 0.084 0.031 0.044
Private equity investment ratio 21.560 59.531 *** -19.373 12.260 11.213 81.256 * -10.185 16.988 * -21.355 15.809 -2.707 23.564 **
14.972 21.408 13.844 10.774 22.810 45.416 10.737 9.656 22.000 27.318 10.379 9.926
Cash flow to sales -0.008 ** 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.003 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.002
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations (firm-year)
Log pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.046
(1)-(6) are multinomial logit regressions where the response variable outcomes (delisted) are either due to a merger or acquisition, or going private transaction (or bankruptcy and liquidation). Variable explanations: 
Firm-specific value, q, is defined as market value plus total debt to total assets. q-country average is yearly country averages of all the firm-specific q's. q-industry average is yearly industry averages of all the firm-
specific q's. Stock liquidity is measured as annual country averages of the ratio between common shares traded relatively to common shares outstanding. Private equity investment ratio is the ratio between total private 
equity investments (Deloitte, 2005) and stock market value by year and country. 
We divide firms in 2 groups: large and small firms using total assets. Firms are characterized as large firm if their total assets exceeds $1 billion. The large firm sample accounts for approximately 20% of the sample and 
almost 30% of the delisted firm sample. Firms are categorized as being a financial firm if it belongs to a financial or insurance industry using SIC-codes. We exclude real estate firms. R&D intensity is defined as R&D 
investments relatively to value-added sales. High R&D firms are defined as having a R&D intensity above the mean(2.4%). Robust standard errors are reported below parameter estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
9399 27848
-2439.4 -7669.5
Delisting by: Delisting by:
M&A Going private M&A Going private
(5) (6)
R&D intensity
High Low
-9300.3
0.052
Financial vs. non-financial firms
-1948.5 -8069.5 -780.6
0.062 0.056 0.079
M&A Going private
29147 3026
M&A Going private M&A Going private
(4)
Non-financial
(1) (2) (3)
Firm size
Large firms Small firms Financial 
Dependent variables / 
Explanatory variables
Delisting by:
M&A Going private
34221
Delisting by: Delisting by: Delisting by:
8100
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Finally, we distinguish between industries with high and low R&D intensities (model 3) 
on the hypothesis that high R&D industries are more opaque and therefore more likely 
to suffer from valuation errors (Zeckhouser and Pound, 1990). We have industry-level 
information of R&D intensity which is defined as R&D investments relatively to value-
added sales. A firm is defined as belonging to the high R&D group if the R&D intensity 
in its industry is above the total average in the delisting year. Companies in this group 
are presumably more difficult for outside investors to evaluate, and industry valuation 
error is therefore more likely. Approximately 25 percent of both listed and delisted 
firms are thus categorized as high R&D firms. However, industry q does not affect 
either the M&A or going private transaction among high R&D firms. Contrary to the 
hypothesis we observe that higher industry q only leads to relatively more M&A 
transactions in low R&D industries where valuation errors are relatively small. We find 
somewhat similar results if we instead use the median or the 75%-fractile as the 
boundary. 
 
Altogether it seems like going private transactions are not driven by valuation errors, 
whereas M&A was to a larger extent driven by valuation errors. The industry value 
effect is stronger for small firms and non-financial firms where valuation error is 
presumably larger. To be sure these findings may be attributable to other factors which 
we have not controlled for. For example it may be more difficult and risky to take large 
companies private compared to organizing a merger with another listed company, and 
this might explain why we see no industry value effect on M&A among large firms. 
Finally, it may be difficult for corporate buyers to raise capital to finance acquisitions in 
very opaque industries (with high R&D ratios), and company managers may therefore 
be unable to benefit from overvaluation by acquiring other companies. But the same 
may apply to the one finding which supports the behavioural M&A hypothesis. It may 
be that the potential for taking financial companies private is effectively limited by 
financial regulation and that this – rather than a smaller valuation error - is why firm 
value is a less important determinant of delisting type in the finance industry.69 
                                                 
69 We also run logit regressions (not reported) where it is evaluated how specific industry affiliation affects 
whether a firm is delisted due to a going private transaction or M&A (here M&A is the base outcome). The data 
suggest that the industries with the highest M&A and going private activity are the same – the industries are the 
following: finance, consumer durables, manufacturing, wholesale and computers, software etc. (using the 12 Fama 
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4.3. The timing ability of M&A vs. going private investors 
 
As previously indicated, the ability to time acquisitions so as to profit by stock market 
fluctuations may be a key advantage for private buyers. Ideally private buyers would be 
able to buy when price are lowest while companies may (for good or bad reasons) be 
inclined to do their acquisitions in peak periods. In table 5 we examine this hypothesis. 
 
Going private and stock the market cycle
Explanatory variables
Peak -0.248 ** -0.202 * -0.040 0.075
0.106 0.106 0.114 0.115
Bottom 0.441 *** 0.414 *** 0.959 *** 0.967 ***
0.112 0.112 0.110 0.111
Observations (firm-year) 3629 3629 3629 3629 3629 3629
Log pseudolikelihood -2465.9 -2461.1 -2459.3 -2468.7 -2430.26 -2430.06
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.016 0.016
Table 5
(1)
q-industry average
(3)(2) (5) (6)
(1)-(6) are logit regressions where the response variable is defined as 0 if a firm becomes delisted due to a merger 
or acquisition, and 1 if a firm is delisted due to a going private transaction. Variable explanations: Peak 
corresponds to when the going private transaction coincides with the highest q-industry average (model 1-3) or 
market capitalization (MC) industry average (model 4-6) in the given period 1995-2004. Bottom is when the 
going private transaction coincides with the lowest q-industry and MC-industry average in the given period 1995-
2004. Robust standard errors are reported below parameter estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Market value industry average
(4)
 
 
The table investigates to what extent companies (M&A) and private buyers (going 
private transactions) are able to time their acquisition such that they buy during industry 
peaks or downturn. This is done by creating dummy variables for years in which 
industry q or industry (log) market capitalization reaches it maximum and minimum 
values over the period 1995-2004 and regressing these dummies on the probability of 
delisting by going private compared to delisting M&A.  
 
Strikingly, we find that firms are more likely to delist by M&A in the peak year and 
more likely to delist by going private when industry q values are at the minimum. The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and French industry classifications). Significant differences are found in specific industries – since M&A occur 
statistical more frequently in utilities, medical and chemicals.  
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result is robust if the annual industry-specific market capitalization is also analyzed. 
Apparently, going private investors are better at buying at the right (cheap) time 
whereas M&A is relatively more likely when the market values are high (and perhaps 
overvalued). A similar result is found by Bargeron et al. (2007) who documents that 
acquisition premiums paid by private equity firms are significantly lower than for other 
types of acquirers. It also relates to the argument by Jensen (2007) that one of the key 
advantages of private equity buyout funds is their knowledge in understanding 
corporate value. Further, a related study (Schmidt et al., 2004) shows that investment 
timing has an impact on the performance of venture capital funds.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
In this paper we have examined the impact of stock market valuations on M&A and 
going private transactions on European stock exchanges over the period 1996-2004. In 
accordance with previous research we have found that mergers and acquisitions tend to 
be pro-cyclical in the sense that they occur more often when industry market valuations 
(q values) are high. We have also shown that this is not the case for going private 
transactions. For example M&A is more likely to take place in bull years, when market 
values peak, while going private transactions are relatively more likely in bear years 
(when valuations are at the bottom). This indicates that private non-corporate buyers 
such as buyouts funds or incumbent managers enter the takeover market when 
valuations are low. The main finding is thus that going private transactions and M&A 
are apparently driven by different causal mechanisms.  
 
There are several possible explanations for these differences. One is that acquiring 
listed companies find it easier to finance acquisitions when market values are high 
while private buyers are less sensitive to fluctuations in market valuations because they 
are not listed, i.e. they cannot use own shares as payment. Alternatively, waves of 
mergers and acquisitions may reflect agency costs of free cash flow which are more 
serious in listed companies where ownership and control is separated to a greater 
degree. Finally, high stock prices may make both investors and acquiring companies 
more optimistic concerning the future business outlook which could make it more 
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attractive to invest. Or maybe going private investors (e.g. incumbent management or 
buyout funds) have a better understanding of what the specific firm value is (Jensen, 
2007). 
 
However, although M&A is more likely than going private transactions in industries 
with high average q-values, we cannot be sure that these industries are overvalued. As 
expected, we found no significant industry q effect in the relatively transparent 
financial industries and or in large firms, but the industry q effect was only significant 
in the more transparent industries with low R&D intensities. Although they do not 
invest much in the highly regulated financial industries, buyout funds are believed to 
prefer investing in relatively transparent and mature industries with high stable cash 
flows and to avoid more opaque and risky industries like pharmaceuticals. Remember 
that private equity buyout funds only accounts for a part of the going private 
transactions. 
 
Furthermore, it is not self evident that buying cheap is equivalent to investing smart. 
Using basic neoclassical arguments it will not always be more profitable to buy in 
industries where industry q is low. There may be momentum effects as well as mean 
reversion in q values. To test this idea we tracked the subsequent evolution of industry 
q and industry stock returns following M&A and going private transactions. We found 
no significant difference between M&A or going private transactions in industry q 
evolution or stock returns in the first year after the transaction. For example there were 
relatively many mergers and acquisitions in 1997 and 1998 when q values were high, 
but they continued to increase in the period after. Likewise the relatively many going 
private transactions during the bear market in 2001 were followed by a further decline 
in q-values in 2002. It may be argued that a substantial part of the value of the 1998-
2000 acquisition boom was written off in 2001-2003, while all the private equity 
investment in the bear years 2001-2002 benefited from value increases in 2003-2004, 
but there are also many uncertainties in a complex argument like this. 
 
Even if private buyers were smarter investors than companies during the boom and bust 
years around the millennium, some of this may be attributable to luck since private 
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equity funds “happened” to emerge in time to profit from the bear market in 2001-
2003.70 Alternatively, private buyers may be more focused on value creation since they 
represent concentrated ownership and other governance characteristics. Moreover, 
private buyers may be less concerned about pre-empting competitors in bidding for 
acquisition targets. They can afford to participate only if they believe that the individual 
transaction will create value without taking into consideration repercussions on 
incumbent businesses.  
 
It is not clear, however, that private buyers will be able to sustain this performance in 
the future. There has been a massive build up of capital in private equity funds which 
appears to have led to increased competition, higher stock prices and lower returns 
among funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Incentive structures which reward fund 
managers (general partners) in proportion to the value of assets under management may 
further exacerbate these problems. At the same time listed companies have probably 
become more focused on the efficient utilization of capital, and many have decided to 
buy back shares or raise dividends rather than use excess funds for possibly value 
destroying acquisitions.  
 
As for future research, it seems desirable to get more information on buyers, 
particularly to be able to distinguish between buyout funds and other acquirers in the 
case of going private transactions. There may also be interesting differences between 
domestic and cross border M&A between listed companies and between listed and 
unlisted companies. Intuitively, foreign buyers and unlisted companies should be less 
influenced by stock market trends. On the same argument acquirers in other industries 
would presumably be less affected by value trends in the industry of the acquired 
company. 
 
                                                 
70 Our results are robust if we control for trend effects on M&A and going private frequency by including past 
going private frequency by country and year. 
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